Social status and crime

We consider a large population of agents choosing either to engage in a criminal activity or working. Individuals feel varying degrees of selfreproach if they commit criminal acts. In addition, they are concerned with their social status in society, based on others' perceptions of their values. In making their decisions, individuals weigh both the material and social risks of being a criminal and a worker. We find that introducing social status concerns may induce multiple equilibria. We also consider the implications of intragroup and intergroup interactions in an economy with two classes of earning abilities. Typically, there is more crime in the low ability group and increasing punishment reduces crime, but the opposite may also be true.asymmetric information; behavioral economy; crime; game theory; social identity

Identifying the provisioning policies of Belgian banks. National Bank of Belgium Working Paper No. 326

Loan loss reserves make up an essential part of a bank’s soundness and more generally its viability. An under-provisioned reserve account implies that capital ratios may overstate a bank’s ability to absorb future losses. For this reason, both supervisory authorities and investors regularly assess the adequacy of the loan loss provisions alongside the more popular capital ratios. The aim of the paper is to identify what motivates the loss provisioning policies employed by Belgian banks, especially whether banks use provisioning to inter-temporally smooth their earnings or capital positions. Owing to the relatively long data series, the paper also investigates whether the introduction of the IAS-39 "incurred loss" accounting standards or the onset of the financial crisis in 2008/9 had any impact on the provisioning decisions. The results show that provisioning practices of Belgian banks have been rather tightly linked to future losses, although the relationship has weakened considerably after the introduction of the IAS-39 standards and, to a lesser extent, after the financial crisis. There is also evidence that Belgian banks might have used provisioning decisions to manage their current earnings and to some extent to signal future profitability, although the latter motive also appears to have weakened after the introduction of IAS-39 standards

Can Wages Signal Kindness?

We model the interaction between an employer and a worker with interdependent preferences in a simple one-shot production process. In particular, we assume that the worker becomes kinder if she senses that her employer is an altruist. We assume that intentions are private information. Thus, the wage proposal signals the intentions of the employer to the worker. We show that if the workers have ”reasonable” beliefs, then the unique prediction of the game is a separating equilibrium outcome in which wages are fully informative about the intentions of the employer. However, if there are several employers simultaneously bidding to hire a single worker, then there may exist another equilibrium in which wages are completely uninformative.altruism; asymmetric information; behavioral economy; game theory; labour relations; reciprocity

Measuring Returns to Education and Human Capital in the Southern Mediterranean. MEDPRO Technical Report No. 17/September 2012

Measuring human capital has been a significant challenge for economists because the main variable of interest is intangible and not directly observable. In the Middle Eastern and Northern African region the task is further complicated by the general scarcity of comparable and reliable data. This study overcomes these challenges by relying on a unique international survey that covers most of the region and by deriving a market-based measure that uses returns to education and various labour market factors as guidance. The results show that private returns to schooling are relatively low in most southern Mediterranean countries (SMC). Israel and Turkey are clear outliers, surpassing even the EU-MED averages. In Algeria and Jordan, the returns are almost flat, implying that earnings do not respond significantly to education levels. Despite high attainment levels, Greece, Spain and Portugal also perform badly; only marginally surpassing some of the bottom-ranked SMC, providing evidence of problems in absorption capacity. The baseline scenarios for 2030 show substantial sensitivity to current estimates on returns to education. In particular, improving attainment levels can produce measurable gains in the future only when the returns to education are already high. Such is the case for Egypt, Morocco and Turkey, which substantially improve their human capital stocks under the baseline scenarios, surpassing several EU-MED countries with little or no room for improvement

Endogenous Leadership: Selection and Influence

In social dilemmas, leading a team by making heroic efforts may prove costly, especially if the followers are not adequately motivated to make similar sacrifices. Attempting to understand what motivates these seemingly selfless individuals to lead, we report the results of a two-stage public good experiment with endogenous timing. Even though it turns out to be costly on average, a large proportion of our subjects volunteer to lead. Our findings suggest that a fraction of these leaders are socially concerned, while others expect to distill some personal gain, possibly of non-pecuniary nature. The composition of the team also matters, as publicizing certain attributes of a subject's teammates has an impact on her decision to lead. Lastly, though voluntary leaders improve efficiency in their team, they are not necessarily more influential than randomly imposed leaders.leadership; endogenous selection; influence; voluntary contribution; experiment

Endogenous Leadership Selection and Influence

When it examines the risk of coordinated effects, an antitrust authority will usually compare the situation where the merger is accepted with an attendant risk of collusion with the benchmark case in which competition is present ex-post. The main objective of this paper is to show that the antitrust authority must take into account the possibility for firms to collude if a merger is rejected. In fact, firms can have incitations to make collusion ex-post (after a rejection of a merger) whereas they would not make collusion ex-ante. All the papers on mergers and collusion tend to look at a minimal discount factor threshold for collusion to be sustained. This article does not only suggest necessary and sufficient conditions for collusion to be enforced but it also analyses the choice which firms have as to whether to collude. We consider an industry with cost-asymmetric firms and we study the analysis of collusion under leniency programmes.endogenous switching models ; experiment ; influence ; leadership ; voluntary contribution

Can Wages Signal Kindness?

Working Paper du GATE 2005-11We model the interaction between an employer and a worker with interdependent preferences in a simple one-shot production process. In particular, we assume that the worker becomes kinder if she senses that her employer is an altruist. We assume that intentions are private information. Thus, the wage proposal signals the intentions of the employer to the worker. We show that if the workers have ”reasonable” beliefs, then the unique prediction of the game is a separating equilibrium outcome in which wages are fully informative about the intentions of the employer. However, if there are several employers simultaneously bidding to hire a single worker, then there may exist another equilibrium in which wages are completely uninformative

Voluntary Leadership: Selection and Influence

International audienceIn social dilemmas, leading a team by making heroic efforts may prove costly, especially when the followers are not adequately motivated to make similar sacrifices. Attempting to shed light on what drives people to lead, we devise a two-stage public good experiment with endogenous timing. We show that leading by making generous contributions is widespread and relatively persistent. At least three motives explain this behavior. Some use leadership strategically to distill personal gains, with the expectation that others will respond by being at least as generous. Others are more altruistic, volunteering to lead even though this may come at a personal cost. Yet for another fraction of volunteers, a concern for maintaining a positive social image appears to be responsible. We also find that voluntary leaders are not necessarily more influential than randomly-chosen leaders

Investigating Diversity in the Banking Sector in Europe: The Performance and Role of Savings Banks. CEPS Paperbacks. June 2009

In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the foundations of modern and innovative financial systems developed over decades have suffered serious damage. This has triggered massive state interventions and has led authorities to revamp the regulatory structures and frameworks. While many voices have called for a return to more traditional approaches to banking and finance, no one has argued the merits of diversity. This book investigates the merits of a diverse banking system with a special focus on the performance and role of savings banks in selected European countries where they are still prominent (Austria, Germany and Spain) and where they have progressively disappeared (Belgium and Italy). The theoretical and empirical arguments that are developed in this book tend to support the view that it is economically and socially beneficial to have ‘dual bottom-line’ institutions, such as savings banks. For those who accept this premise, it would suggest that policy-makers should not take or support actions that could jeopardise this valuable element of the financial system in various countries in Europe and of the emerging integrated European financial system

Regulation of European Banks and Business Models: Towards a new paradigm? CEPS Paperbacks. June 2012

Amidst talks of establishing an EU-wide banking union, the recent changes in the regulatory framework and the rethinking of the future of European banking structure, the future of EU bank regulation is inextricably linked to banks’ business models. Using a sample of over 70 banks, which overlaps with those subjected to the EBA’s 2011 stress tests, this report emphasizes the key regulatory gaps that emerge from a comprehensive analysis of the soundness and performance of bank business models and provides policy-makers with guidance to reinforce the evolving regulatory framework in European banking