106 research outputs found

    Cinematic and aesthetic cartographies of subjective mutation

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    This article exmaines the use of cinema as a mapping of subjective mutation in the work of Deleuze, Gauttari and Berardi. Drawing on Deleuze's distinciton between the reduction of the art-work to the symptom and the idea of art as symptomatology, the article focuses on Berardi's use of cinematic examples, posing the quesiton in each case of to what extent they function as symptomatologies or mere symptoms of cultural and subjective mutations in examples ranging from Bergman's Persona to Van Sant's Elephant to finish on speculations about Fincher's The Social Network as a cirtical engagement with subjective mutation in the 21st Century

    Cooperation Survives and Cheating Pays in a Dynamic Network Structure with Unreliable Reputation

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    In a networked society like ours, reputation is an indispensable tool to guide decisions about social or economic interactions with individuals otherwise unknown. Usually, information about prospective counterparts is incomplete, often being limited to an average success rate. Uncertainty on reputation is further increased by fraud, which is increasingly becoming a cause of concern. To address these issues, we have designed an experiment based on the Prisoner's Dilemma as a model for social interactions. Participants could spend money to have their observable cooperativeness increased. We find that the aggregate cooperation level is practically unchanged, i.e., global behavior does not seem to be affected by unreliable reputations. However, at the individual level we find two distinct types of behavior, one of reliable subjects and one of cheaters, where the latter artificially fake their reputation in almost every interaction.A. A. gratefully acknowledges financial support by the Swiss National Science Foundation (under grants no. 200020-143224, CR13I1-138032 and P2LAP1-161864) and by the Rectors’ Conference of the Swiss Universities (under grant no. 26058983). All authors acknowledge financial support to carry out the experiments by the Faculty of Business and Economics of the University of Lausanne and the fundamental support by Prof. Rafael Lalive. This work has been supported in part by the European Commission through FET Open RIA 662725 (IBSEN) and by the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (Spain) under grant FIS2015-64349-P (VARIANCE)

    Topological Strata of Weighted Complex Networks

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    The statistical mechanical approach to complex networks is the dominant paradigm in describing natural and societal complex systems. The study of network properties, and their implications on dynamical processes, mostly focus on locally defined quantities of nodes and edges, such as node degrees, edge weights and --more recently-- correlations between neighboring nodes. However, statistical methods quickly become cumbersome when dealing with many-body properties and do not capture the precise mesoscopic structure of complex networks. Here we introduce a novel method, based on persistent homology, to detect particular non-local structures, akin to weighted holes within the link-weight network fabric, which are invisible to existing methods. Their properties divide weighted networks in two broad classes: one is characterized by small hierarchically nested holes, while the second displays larger and longer living inhomogeneities. These classes cannot be reduced to known local or quasilocal network properties, because of the intrinsic non-locality of homological properties, and thus yield a new classification built on high order coordination patterns. Our results show that topology can provide novel insights relevant for many-body interactions in social and spatial networks. Moreover, this new method creates the first bridge between network theory and algebraic topology, which will allow to import the toolset of algebraic methods to complex systems.Comment: 26 pages, 19 figures, 1 tabl

    Evolutionary dynamics of group formation

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    This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License CC BY 4.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.Group formation is a quite ubiquitous phenomenon across different animal species, whose individuals cluster together forming communities of diverse size. Previous investigations suggest that, in general, this phenomenon might have similar underlying reasons across the interested species, despite genetic and behavioral differences. For instance improving the individual safety (e.g. from predators), and increasing the probability to get food resources. Remarkably, the group size might strongly vary from species to species, e.g. shoals of fishes and herds of lions, and sometimes even within the same species, e.g. tribes and families in human societies. Here we build on previous theories stating that the dynamics of group formation may have evolutionary roots, and we explore this fascinating hypothesis from a purely theoretical perspective, with a model using the framework of Evolutionary Game Theory. In our model we hypothesize that homogeneity constitutes a fundamental ingredient in these dynamics. Accordingly, we study a population that tries to form homogeneous groups, i.e. composed of similar agents. The formation of a group can be interpreted as a strategy. Notably, agents can form a group (receiving a ‘group payoff’), or can act individually (receiving an ‘individual payoff’). The phase diagram of the modeled population shows a sharp transition between the ‘group phase’ and the ‘individual phase’, characterized by a critical ‘individual payoff’. Our results then support the hypothesis that the phenomenon of group formation has evolutionary roots.Peer reviewedFinal Published versio

    Can Charisma Be Taught? Tests of Two Interventions

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    We tested whether we could teach individuals to behave more charismatically, andwhether changes in charisma affected leader outcomes. In Study 1, a mixed-design fieldexperiment, we randomly assigned 34 middle-level managers to a control or anexperimental group. Three months later, we reassessed the managers using theircoworker ratings (Time 1 raters = 343; Time 2 raters = 321). In Study 2, a within-subjectslaboratory experiment, we videotaped 41 MBA participants giving a speech. We thentaught them how to behave more charismatically, and they redelivered the speech6 weeks later. Independent assessors (n = 135) rated the speeches. Results from thestudies indicated that the training had significant effects on ratings of leader charisma(mean D = .62) and that charisma had significant effects on ratings of leaderprototypicality and emergence...............................................................................................................................

    Cooperation and its evolution in growing systems with cultural reproduction

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    We explore the evolution of cooperation in the framework of the evolutionary game theory using the prisoner's dilemma as metaphor of the problem. We present a minimal model taking into account the growing process of the systems and individuals with imitation capacity. We consider the topological structure and the evolution of strategies decoupled instead of a coevolutionary dynamic. We show conditions to build up a cooperative system with real topological structures for any natural selection intensity. When the system starts to grow, cooperation is unstable but becomes stable as soon as the system reaches a small core of cooperators whose size increase when the intensity of natural selection decreases. Thus, we reduce the emergence of cooperative systems with cultural reproduction to justify a small initial cooperative structure that we call cooperative seed. Otherwise, given that the system grows principally as cooperator whose cooperators inhabit the most linked parts of the system, the benefit-cost ratio required for cooperation evolve is drastically reduced compared to the found in static networks. In this way, we show that in systems whose individuals have imitation capacity the growing process is essential for the evolution of cooperation.Comment: 16 pages, 2 figures. arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1111.247
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