America and Guerrilla Warfare

From South Carolina to South Vietnam, America’s two hundred-year involvement in guerrilla warfare has been extensive and varied. America and Guerrilla Warfare analyzes conflicts in which Americans have participated in the role of, on the side of, or in opposition to guerrilla forces, providing a broad comparative and historical perspective on these types of engagements. Anthony James Joes examines nine case studies, ranging from the role of Francis Marion, the Swamp Fox, in driving Cornwallis to Yorktown and eventual surrender to the U.S. support of Afghan rebels that hastened the collapse of the Soviet Empire. He analyzes the origins of each conflict, traces American involvement, and seeks patterns and deviations. Studying numerous campaigns, including ones staged by Confederate units during the Civil War, Joes reveals the combination of elements that can lead a nation to success in guerrilla warfare or doom it to failure. In a controversial interpretation, he suggests that valuable lessons were forgotten or ignored in Southeast Asia. The American experience in Vietnam was a debacle but, according to Joes, profoundly atypical of the country’s overall experience with guerrilla warfare. He examines several twentieth-century conflicts that should have better prepared the country for Vietnam: the Philippines after 1898, Nicaragua in the 1920s, Greece in the late 1940s, and the Philippines again during the Huk War of 1946-1954. Later, during the long Salvadoran conflict of the 1980s, American leaders seemed to recall what they had learned from their experiences with this type of warfare. Guerrilla insurgencies did not end with the Cold War. As America faces recurring crises in the Balkans, sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and possibly Asia, a comprehensive analysis of past guerrilla engagements is essential for today’s policymakers. Named a Choice Outstanding Academic Title for 2002. Anthony James Joes, professor of international politics and director of the international relations program at St. Joseph\u27s University, is the author of Guerrilla Warfare and Guerrilla Conflict before the Cold War. His summaries of the major guerrilla conflicts and extensive notes make this a useful book for a broad range of readers. —Almanac of Seapower Joes’s . . . judgments, based on a mastery of an impressive array of material, are sound and thought provoking. —Arkansas Historical Quarterly Joes’ argument may stir up some controversy and debate, but his ideas are thought-provoking. —Armor One of the two or three best comparative studies of guerrilla operations. Its conclusions and prescriptions are clear, sensible, and applicable anywhere, anytime. —Bernard Norling A richly informative study of the differing aspects of the American response to the recurrent problems of guerrilla war. —Choice A brilliant comparative study of America’s involvement with guerrilla war. The author writes with elegance, passion, and rigor and masterfully weaves together deep knowledge of history, strategic principles, as well as the literature of guerrilla war. The book’s greatest attribute is drawing lessons about how to win and how to lose across a range of historical experiences. —Gabriel Marcella, U.S. Army War College Provides an excellent summarization of the subject by examining nine cases involving the United States to a significant degree. —Gun Week Joes argues that the United States is destined to become involved in more guerrilla wars in the future. —H-Net Reviews Provides a basis for dialogue among historians, political scientists, and policy makers who are interested in national security. —International Politics The nine case studies and their analysis make an excellent textbook as Joes describes the necessary ingredients for successful guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency, presents case studies of both, and examines the results. —Journal of Conflict Studies A book very much worth a reader’s time and careful consideration. —On Point The history and analysis are excellent. —Paper Wars An important contribution to the study of guerrilla warfare and the US role in such conflicts. It is highly recommended for those in academia, the military, general readers interested in military history, and to those in the national security establishment. —Small Wars and Insurgencies For those in the special-operations community, this book is well worth reading. —Special Warfare Present and future policy makers should examine the record of America and guerrilla warfare. —Virginia Quarterly Review An exceptional book. —WTBF Radio “Joes is at his most engaging when he examines low-intensity conflict during the twentieth century.” —Journal of Cold War Studieshttps://uknowledge.uky.edu/upk_military_history/1017/thumbnail.jp

Military maladaptation : counterinsurgency and the politics of failure

Tactical learning is critical to battlefield success, especially in a counterinsurgency. This article tests the existing model of military adaption against a ‘most-likely’ case: the British Army’s counterinsurgency in the Southern Cameroons (1960–61). Despite meeting all preconditions thought to enable adaptation – decentralization, leadership turnover, supportive leadership, poor organizational memory, feedback loops, and a clear threat – the British still failed to adapt. Archival evidence suggests politicians subverted bottom-up adaptation, because winning came at too high a price in terms of Britain’s broader strategic imperatives. Our finding identifies an important gap in the extant adaptation literature: it ignores politics.PostprintPeer reviewe

Urban Guerrilla Warfare

Guerrilla insurgencies continue to rage across the globe, fueled by ethnic and religious conflict and the easy availability of weapons. At the same time, urban population centers in both industrialized and developing nations attract ever-increasing numbers of people, outstripping rural growth rates worldwide. As a consequence of this population shift from the countryside to the cities, guerrilla conflict in urban areas, similar to the violent response to U.S. occupation in Iraq, will become more frequent. This book traces the diverse origins of urban conflicts and identifies similarities and differences in the methods of counterinsurgent forces. In this wide-ranging and richly detailed comparative analysis, this book examines eight key examples of urban guerrilla conflict spanning half a century and four continents: Warsaw in 1944, Budapest in 1956, Algiers in 1957, Montevideo and São Paulo in the 1960s, Saigon in 1968, Northern Ireland from 1970 to 1998, and Grozny from 1994 to 1996. The book demonstrates that urban insurgents violate certain fundamental principles of guerrilla warfare as set forth by renowned military strategists such as Carl von Clausewitz and Mao Tse-tung. Urban guerrillas operate in finite areas, leaving themselves vulnerable to encirclement and ultimate defeat. They also tend to abandon the goal of establishing a secure base or a cross-border sanctuary, making precarious combat even riskier. Typically, urban guerrillas do not solely target soldiers and police; they often attack civilians in an effort to frighten and disorient the local population and discredit the regime. Thus urban guerrilla warfare becomes difficult to distinguish from simple terrorism. The book argues persuasively against committing U.S. troops in urban counterinsurgencies, but also offers cogent recommendations for the successful conduct of such operations where they must be undertaken.https://uknowledge.uky.edu/upk_military_history/1050/thumbnail.jp

Victorious Insurgencies: Four Rebellions that Shaped Our World

Insurgencies, especially in the form of guerrilla warfare, continue to erupt across many parts of the globe. Most of these rebellions fail, but this book analyzes four twentieth-century conflicts in which the success of the insurgents permanently altered the global political arena: the Maoists in China against Chiang Kai-shek and the Japanese in the 1930s and 1940s; the Viet Minh in French Indochina from 1945 to 1954; Castro\u27s followers against Batista in Cuba from 1956 to 1959; and the mujahideen in Soviet Afghanistan from 1980 to 1989. The book illuminates patterns of failed counterinsurgencies that include serious but avoidable political and military blunders and makes clear the critical and often decisive influence of the international setting.https://uknowledge.uky.edu/upk_political_science_international_relations/1032/thumbnail.jp