Human hippocampal CA3 damage disrupts both recent and remote episodic memories

Neocortical-hippocampal interactions support new episodic (event) memories, but there is conflicting evidence about the dependence of remote episodic memories on the hippocampus. In line with systems consolidation and computational theories of episodic memory, evidence from model organisms suggests that the cornu ammonis 3 (CA3) hippocampal subfield supports recent, but not remote, episodic retrieval. In this study, we demonstrated that recent and remote memories were susceptible to a loss of episodic detail in human participants with focal bilateral damage to CA3. Graph theoretic analyses of 7.0-Tesla resting-state fMRI data revealed that CA3 damage disrupted functional integration across the medial temporal lobe (MTL) subsystem of the default network. The loss of functional integration in MTL subsystem regions was predictive of autobiographical episodic retrieval performance. We conclude that human CA3 is necessary for the retrieval of episodic memories long after their initial acquisition and functional integration of the default network is important for autobiographical episodic memory performance

The Ethics of Delusional Belief

In this paper we address the ethics of adopting delusional beliefs and we apply consequentialist and deontological considerations to the epistemic evaluation of delusions. Delusions are characterised by their epistemic shortcomings and they are often defined as false and irrational beliefs. Despite this, when agents are overwhelmed by negative emotions due to the effects of trauma or previous adversities, or when they are subject to anxiety and stress as a result of hypersalient experience, the adoption of a delusional belief can prevent a serious epistemic harm from occurring. For instance, delusions can allow agents to remain in touch with their environment overcoming the disruptive effect of negative emotions and anxiety. Moreover, agents are not blameworthy for adopting their delusions if their ability to believe otherwise is compromised. There is evidence suggesting that no evidence-related action that would counterfactually lead them to believe otherwise is typically available to them. The lack of ability to believe otherwise, together with some other conditions, implies that the agents are not blameworthy for their delusions. The examination of the epistemic status of delusions prompts us to acknowledge the complexity and contextual nature of epistemic evaluation, establish connections between consequentialist and deontological frameworks in epistemology, and introduce the notion of epistemic innocence into the vocabulary of epistemic evaluatio

Changing the size of a mirror-reflected hand moderates the experience of embodiment but not proprioceptive drift: a repeated measures study on healthy human participants.

Mirror visual feedback is used for reducing pain and visually distorting the size of the reflection may improve efficacy. The findings of studies investigating size distortion are inconsistent. The influence of the size of the reflected hand on embodiment of the mirror reflection is not known. The aim of this study was to compare the effect of magnifying and minifying mirror reflections of the hand on embodiment measured using an eight-item questionnaire and on proprioceptive drift. During the experiment, participants (n = 45) placed their right hand behind a mirror and their left hand in front of a mirror. Participants watched a normal-sized, a magnified and a minified reflection of the left hand while performing synchronised finger movements for 3 min (adaptive phase). Measurements of embodiment were taken before (pre) and after (post) synchronous movements of the fingers of both hands (embodiment adaptive phase). Results revealed larger proprioceptive drift post-adaptive phase (p = 0.001). Participants agreed more strongly with questionnaire items associated with location, ownership and agency of the reflection of the hand post-adaptive phase (p < 0.001) and when looking at the normal-sized reflection (p < 0.001). In conclusion, irrespective of size, watching a reflection of the hand while performing synchronised movements enhances the embodiment of the reflection of the hand. Magnifying and minifying the reflection of the hand has little effect on proprioceptive drift, but it weakens the subjective embodiment experience. Such factors need to be taken into account in future studies using this technique, particularly when assessing mirror visual feedback for pain management

Trait phenomenological control predicts experience of mirror synaesthesia and the rubber hand illusion

In hypnotic responding, expectancies arising from imaginative suggestion drive striking experiential changes (e.g., hallucinations) — which are experienced as involuntary — according to a normally distributed and stable trait ability (hypnotisability). Such experiences can be triggered by implicit suggestion and occur outside the hypnotic context. In large sample studies (of 156, 404 and 353 participants), we report substantial relationships between hypnotisability and experimental measures of experiential change in mirror-sensory synaesthesia and the rubber hand illusion comparable to relationships between hypnotisability and individual hypnosis scale items. The control of phenomenology to meet expectancies arising from perceived task requirements can account for experiential change in psychological experiments

A sensational illusion: Vision-touch synaesthesia and the rubber hand paradigm

For individuals with vision-touch synaesthesia, the sight of touch on another person elicits synaesthetic tactile sensation on the observer's own body. Here we used the traditional rubber hand paradigm (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998) and a no-touch rubber hand paradigm to investigate and to authenticate synaesthetic tactile sensation. In the traditional rubber hand paradigm, the participant views a prosthetic hand being touched by the Examiner while the participant's hand - hidden from view - is also touched by the Examiner. Synchronous stimulation of the prosthetic hand and the participant's hidden hand elicits the rubber hand illusion. It may seem to the participant that she is feeling touch at the location of the viewed prosthetic hand - visual capture of touch, and that the prosthetic hand is the participant's own hand - illusion of ownership. Thus, for participants who experience the traditional rubber hand illusion, tactile sensation on the participant's hidden hand is referred to the prosthetic hand. In our no-touch rubber hand paradigm, the participant views a prosthetic hand being touched by the Examiner but the participant's hand - hidden from view - is not touched by the Examiner. Questionnaire ratings indicated that only individuals with vision-touch synaesthesia experienced the no-touch rubber hand illusion. Thus, synaesthetic tactile sensation on the (untouched) hidden hand was referred to the prosthetic hand. These individuals also demonstrated proprioceptive drift (a change, from baseline, in proprioceptively perceived position) of the hidden hand towards the location of the prosthetic hand, and a pattern of increased proprioceptive drift with increased trial duration (60. sec, 180. sec, 300. sec). The no-touch rubber hand paradigm was an excellent method to authenticate vision-touch synaesthesia because participants were naïve about the rubber hand illusion, and they could not have known how they were expected to perform on either the traditional or the no-touch rubber hand paradigm. © 2012 Elsevier Ltd

A sensational illusion: Vision-touch synaesthesia and the rubber hand paradigm

For individuals with vision-touch synaesthesia, the sight of touch on another person elicits synaesthetic tactile sensation on the observer's own body. Here we used the traditional rubber hand paradigm (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998) and a no-touch rubber hand paradigm to investigate and to authenticate synaesthetic tactile sensation. In the traditional rubber hand paradigm, the participant views a prosthetic hand being touched by the Examiner while the participant's hand - hidden from view - is also touched by the Examiner. Synchronous stimulation of the prosthetic hand and the participant's hidden hand elicits the rubber hand illusion. It may seem to the participant that she is feeling touch at the location of the viewed prosthetic hand - visual capture of touch, and that the prosthetic hand is the participant's own hand - illusion of ownership. Thus, for participants who experience the traditional rubber hand illusion, tactile sensation on the participant's hidden hand is referred to the prosthetic hand. In our no-touch rubber hand paradigm, the participant views a prosthetic hand being touched by the Examiner but the participant's hand - hidden from view - is not touched by the Examiner. Questionnaire ratings indicated that only individuals with vision-touch synaesthesia experienced the no-touch rubber hand illusion. Thus, synaesthetic tactile sensation on the (untouched) hidden hand was referred to the prosthetic hand. These individuals also demonstrated proprioceptive drift (a change, from baseline, in proprioceptively perceived position) of the hidden hand towards the location of the prosthetic hand, and a pattern of increased proprioceptive drift with increased trial duration (60. sec, 180. sec, 300. sec). The no-touch rubber hand paradigm was an excellent method to authenticate vision-touch synaesthesia because participants were naïve about the rubber hand illusion, and they could not have known how they were expected to perform on either the traditional or the no-touch rubber hand paradigm. © 2012 Elsevier Ltd

Visual capture of action, experience of ownership, and the illusion of self-touch: a new rubber hand paradigm.

A new rubber hand paradigm evokes an illusion with three conceptually distinct components: (i) the participant experiences her/his hidden right hand as administering touch at the location of the examiner's viewed administering hand (visual capture of action); (ii) the participant experiences the examiner's administering hand as being the participant's own hand (experience of ownership); and (iii) the participant experiences her/his two hands as being in contact, as if she/he were touching her/his own hand (illusion of self-touch). The presence of these illusory experiences was confirmed by questionnaire responses and proprioceptive drift data

Touching my left elbow: the anatomical structure of the body affects the illusion of self-touch.

A self-touch paradigm is used to create the illusion that one is touching one's own left elbow when one is actually touching the examiner's arm. Our new self-touch illusion is sensitive to the anatomical structure of the body: you can touch your left elbow with your right index finger but not with your left index finger. Illusion onset was faster and illusion ratings were higher when participants administered touch using the plausible right index finger compared with the implausible left index finger

Touching my face with my supernumerary hand: a cheeky illusion.

A self-touch paradigm elicits a surprising illusion. With the participant's eyes closed, the examiner guides the participant's right index finger to administer strokes and taps to the right side of the participant's face. At the same time, the examiner strokes and taps the corresponding location on the left side of the participant's face. Although the participant administered touch to only the right side of the face, this paradigm elicited the illusion of self-touch to both sides of the face, and the illusion often implicated a third, disconnected or disembodied, hand. We propose an explanation, and draw parallels with the phenomenon of supernumerary phantom limb