Cooperation and profit allocation in distribution chains

We study the coordination of actions and the allocation of profit in distribution chains under decentralized control. We consider distribution chains in which a single supplier supplies goods for replenishment of stocks of several retailers who, in turn, sell these goods to their own separate markets. The goal of the supplier and the retailers is to maximize their individual profits. Since the optimal joint profit under centralized control is larger than the sum of the individual optimal profits under decentralized control, cooperation among firms by means of coordination of actions may improve individual profits. The effects of cooperation are studied by means of cooperative games. For each distribution chain we define a corresponding cooperative game and study its properties. Among others we show that such games are balanced. Based on the nice core structure a stable solution concept for these games is proposed and its properties are interpreted in terms of the underlying distribution chain. \u

Two Classes of Cooperative Games Related to One-Object Auction Situations

AMS classifications; 91A12; 90B05;market games;ring games;one-object auction situations;big boss games;peer group games

Inventory Games

AMS classifications: 90D12, 90B05.inventory management;information;cooperative games;proportional division

A Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Identity Development and Harmful Alcohol Use within a Racially/Ethnically Diverse Sample

The development of a clear sense of identity is a key developmental task in adolescence, and recent studies have found that identity synthesis and confusion are associated negatively and positively, respectively, to alcohol use. One alcohol expectancy - tension reduction - coincides with the hypothesis that identity development may prove to be a stressful developmental process, and may thereby serve as a motivator for adolescents to drink when a belief exists that stress can be reduced through alcohol use. In the present study, we examined the mediational effects between identity synthesis and confusion and later alcohol risk via alcohol expectancies and valuations. The sample included 756 adolescents (53% girls; Mage=13.7 years; SD=1.6 years, 41.4% Hispanic, 39.6% non-Hispanic Black, 8.7% non-Hispanic White, 5.2% Asian, and 5.2% Other). Neither identity synthesis nor confusion significantly predicted tension reduction expectancies. Results indicated that tension reduction expectancies at Time 2 positively predicted alcohol risk levels at Time 3 (β=.112, p=.018). Our findings did not fully support our a-priori hypothesis that identity confusion and identity synthesis later predict tension reduction, in turn predicting alcohol risk. Interestingly, however, the findings revealed that identity synthesis did predict declines in expectancy valuations. This research contributes to the current literature and expounds upon the potential interactions between adolescent identity development and alcohol expectancies and specifically, valuations

Production-inventory games and pmas games: characterizations of the Owen point

Production-inventory games were introduced in Guardiola et al. (2007) as a new class of totally balanced combinatorial optimization games. From among all core-allocations, the Owen point was proposed as a specifically appealing solution. In this paper we study some relationships of the class of production-inventory games and other classes of new and known games. In addition, we propose three axiomatic characterizations of the Owen point. We use eight axioms for these characterizations, among those, inessentiality and additivity of players' demands are used for the first time in this paper

p-additive games: a class of totally balanced games arising from inventory situations with temporary discounts

We introduce a new class of totally balanced cooperative TU games, namely p -additive games. It is inspired by the class of inventory games that arises from inventory situations with temporary discounts (Toledo, 2002) and contains the class of inventory cost games (Meca et al. 2003). It is shown that every p-additive game and its corresponding subgames have a nonempty core. We also focus on studying the character concave or convex and monotone of p-additive games. In addition, the modified SOC-rule is proposed as a solution for p-additive games. This solution is suitable for p-additive games since it is a core-allocation which can be reached through a population monotonic allocation scheme. Moreover, two characterizations of the modified SOC-rule are provided

Cooperation and profit allocation in distribution chains

We study the coordination of actions and the allocation of profit in supply chains under decentralized control in which a single supplier supplies several retailers with goods for replenishment of stocks. The goal of the supplier and the retailers is to maximize their individual profits. Since the outcome under decentralized control is inefficient, cooperation among firms by means of coordination of actions may improve the individual profits. Cooperation is studied by means of cooperative game theory. Among others we show that the corresponding games are balanced and we propose a stable solution concept for these games

Profit allocation in agricultural supply chains: exploring the nexus of cooperation and compensation

In this paper, we focus on decentralized agricultural supply chains consisting of multiple non-competing distributors satisfying the demand of their respective markets. These distributors source a single product from a farmer through an agricultural cooperative, operating in a single period. The agents have the ability to coordinate their actions to maximize their profits, and we use cooperative game theory to analyze cooperation among them. The distributors can engage in joint ordering, increasing their order size, which leads to a decrease in the price per kilogram. Additionally, distributors have the opportunity to cooperate with the farmer, securing a reduced price per kilogram at the cost price, while compensating the farmer for any kilograms not acquired in the cooperation agreement. We introduce multidistributor-farmer games and we prove that all the agents have incentives to cooperate. We demonstrate the existence of stable allocations, where no subgroup of agents can be better off by separating. Moreover, we propose and characterize a distribution of the total profit that justly compensates the contribution of the farmer in any group of distributors. Finally, we explore the conditions under which the farmer can be compensated in order to maximize their revenues when cooperating with all players

p-additive games: a class of totally balanced games arising from inventory situations with temporary discounts

We introduce a new class of totally balanced cooperative TU games, namely p-additive games. It is inspired by the class of inventory games that arises from inventory situations with temporary discounts (Toledo Ph.D. thesis, Universidad Miguel Hernández de Elche, 2002) and contains the class of inventory cost games (Meca et al. Math. Methods Oper. Res. 57:481–493, 2003). It is shown that every p-additive game and its corresponding subgames have a nonempty core. We also focus on studying the character of concave or convex and monotone p-additive games. In addition, the modified SOC-rule is proposed as a solution for p-additive games. This solution is suitable for p-additive games, since it is a core-allocation which can be reached through a population monotonic allocation scheme. Moreover, two characterizations of the modified SOC-rule are provided.This work was partially supported by the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science and Generalitat Valenciana (grants MTM2005-09184-C02-02, ACOMP06/040, CSD2006-00032)