BGP Hijacking Classification

Recent reports show that BGP hijacking has increased substantially. BGP hijacking allows malicious ASes to obtain IP prefixes for spamming as well as intercepting or blackholing traffic. While systems to prevent hijacks are hard to deploy and require the cooperation of many other organizations, techniques to detect hijacks have been a popular area of study. In this paper, we classify detected hijack events in order to document BGP detectors output and understand the nature of reported events. We introduce four categories of BGP hijack: typos, prepending mistakes, origin changes, and forged AS paths. We leverage AS hegemony-a measure of dependency in AS relationship-to identify forged AS paths in a fast and efficient way. Besides, we utilize heuristic approaches to find common operators\u27 mistakes such as typos and AS prepending mistakes. The proposed approach classifies our collected ground truth into four categories with 95.71% accuracy. We characterize publicly reported alarms (e.g. BGPMon) with our trained classifier and find 4%, 1%, and 2% of typos, prepend mistakes, and BGP hijacking with a forged AS path, respectively

THE MODELING AND OPTIMIZATION OF THE MOCVD-TECHNOLOGIES OF THE HTSC FILMS

The object of investigation: the technological processes of the gasophase settlement of the high-temperature superconductor films. The purpose of the work: the development of methods and the software for modeling and optimization of the technological processes of the high-temperature superconductor (HTSC) films synthesis. The macroscopic model of the processes of transfer has been developed at the HTSC films synthesis; on the base of the Lifshits - Slesov's method, the approach to modeling of the processes of the film microstructure formation has been offered. The software has been developed; the quantitative characteristics have been obtained and the optimization of the technological process has been performed. The modes of formation of the simple film structure on the stage of the coalescence have been designedAvailable from VNTIC / VNTIC - Scientific & Technical Information Centre of RussiaSIGLERURussian Federatio

BGP Communities: Even More Worms in the Routing Can

The article of record as published may be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3278532.3278557BGP communities are a mechanism widely used by operators to manage policy, mitigate attacks, and engineer traffic; e.g., to drop unwanted traffic, filter announcements, adjust local preference, and prepend paths to influence peer selection. Unfortunately, we show that BGP communities can be exploited by remote parties to influence routing in unintended ways. The BGP community-based vulnerabilities we expose are enabled by a combination of complex policies, error-prone configurations, a lack of cryptographic integrity and authenticity over communities, and the wide extent of community propagation. Due in part to their ill-defined semantics, BGP communities are often propagated far further than a single routing hop, even though their intended scope is typically limited to nearby ASes. Indeed, we find 14% of transit ASes forward received BGP communities onward. Given the rich inter-connectivity of transit ASes, this means that communities effectively propagate globally. As a consequence, remote adversaries can use BGP communities to trigger remote blackholing, steer traffic, and manipulate routes even without prefix hijacking. We highlight examples of these attacks via scenarios that we tested and measured both in the lab as well as in the wild. While we suggest what can be done to mitigate such ill effects, it is up to the Internet operations community whether to take up the suggestions