Liability, Pragmatism and Economics

The article considers the concept of legal liability and shows how pragmatist legal thinkers (1) reshaped it in the light of their philosophical externalism and (2) developed an economic analysis of it that is certainly stimulating but raises some serious concerns. The main characters of this story are Oliver Holmes for the classical pragmatist reshaping of the concept, and Learned Hand and Richard Posner for the more recent economic analysis of it. The paper suggests that, despite those concerns, that pragmatist reshaping was, and still is, welcome

Expert signs and legal burdens

Expert signs and expert evidence generate a justification problem in legal factfinding: factfinders cannot form a justified belief about the relevant matter, nor justify the acceptance of an expert testimony, insofar as they do not understand it. The different profiles of factfinders in different legal systems (with jury trial or not) do not make a substantial difference for the point addressed, namely the epistemic or doxastic impasse generated by the inability to understand expert signs, for this occurs everywhere. However, legal systems have a way out of the impasse: burdens of proof. Burden rules govern the outcome of a case. If a burden is not discharged, decision must be against the burdened party. After discussing various aspects of the “Daubert trilogy” and performing a semiotic analysis of one case in particular (Kumho), the paper explores the impact that legal burdens have on expert evidence issues

Le menti non sono documenti (e viceversa)

Riassunto: Per la teoria della documentalità gli oggetti sociali sono atti iscritti e per la teoria della mente estesa le menti si estendono a processi o dispositivi esterni al corpo. Pur per motivi diversi, le due teorie convergono nel ridurre le differenze fra menti e documenti, e hanno a loro supporto la dimensione semiotica di menti e documenti; eppure, in una certa lettura, tali teorie risultano implausibili se si considera che le proprietà delle cose che chiamiamo “menti” non sono identiche alle proprietà delle cose che chiamiamo “documenti” (così come, per altro verso, le proprietà degli oggetti sociali non sono identiche alle proprietà degli atti che li costituiscono). Ciò chiama in causa una implicita tesi comune alle due teorie, quella di un esternismo forte che può essere messo in discussione in favore di un esternismo moderato o interazionista.Parole chiave: Diritto; Documentalità; Esternismo; Oggetti sociali; Ontologia sociale; Mente estesa; Maurizio Ferraris Minds are not documents (and vice versa)Abstract: In the theory of documentality, social objects are understood as inscribed acts; in extended mind theory, minds are considered to extend beyond the body to external processes and devices. Although for different reasons, these two theories rely on the semiotic dimension to reduce the differences between minds and documents. Yet, in a certain reading, such theories are implausible if we consider that the properties of the things we call “minds” are not identical to the properties of the things we call “documents” (just as, on the other hand, the properties of social objects are not identical to the properties of the acts that constitute them). This calls into question a common thesis implicit in both theories: that moderate or interactionist externalism can be used to challenge strong externalism.Keywords: Law; Documents; Extended Mind; Externalism; Social Objects; Social Ontology; Maurizio Ferrari

L'analisi economica come argomentazione giuridica

RIASSUNTO:In primo luogo l’articolo considera l’analisi economica come un tipo di argomentazione giuridica. Gli argomenti che fanno leva sulle conseguenze economiche di un atto giuridico vengono considerati come una forma di argomentazione consequenzialista e viene osservato che tali argomenti competono con molti altri nel contesto dell’interpretazione e dell’applicazione giudiziale del diritto. In secondo luogo viene considerata la pretesa dell’analisi economica di concepire le norme giuridiche come incentivi e viene osservato che tale prospettiva dipende da una serie di argomenti metodologici e una serie di argomenti circa i valori da massimizzare e la razionalità degli agenti economici. ABSTRACT:Firstly, the article takes economic analysis as a type of legal argumentation. The arguments that leverage the economic consequences of legal acts are a form of consequentialist argumentation and it is noted that these arguments compete with many others in the context of judicial interpretation and application of law. Secondly, the claim of economic analysis to conceive of legal norms as incentives is considered and it is observed that this perspective depends on a series of methodological arguments and of arguments about the values to be maximized and the rationality of economic agents.RIASSUNTO:In primo luogo l’articolo considera l’analisi economica come un tipo di argomentazione giuridica. Gli argomenti che fanno leva sulle conseguenze economiche di un atto giuridico vengono considerati come una forma di argomentazione consequenzialista e viene osservato che tali argomenti competono con molti altri nel contesto dell’interpretazione e dell’applicazione giudiziale del diritto. In secondo luogo viene considerata la pretesa dell’analisi economica di concepire le norme giuridiche come incentivi e viene osservato che tale prospettiva dipende da una serie di argomenti metodologici e una serie di argomenti circa i valori da massimizzare e la razionalità degli agenti economici. ABSTRACT:Firstly, the article takes economic analysis as a type of legal argumentation. The arguments that leverage the economic consequences of legal acts are a form of consequentialist argumentation and it is noted that these arguments compete with many others in the context of judicial interpretation and application of law. Secondly, the claim of economic analysis to conceive of legal norms as incentives is considered and it is observed that this perspective depends on a series of methodological arguments and of arguments about the values to be maximized and the rationality of economic agents

Legal Judgment as a Philosophical Archetype

The article addresses three theses on judgment in general and legal judgment in particular, starting from Peirce’s and Dewey’s claims about them. The first thesis, ontological, concerns the content of an act of judgment and says that judgment is about an object instantiating a property (not about a property instantiated by an object). The second, alethic, concerns the relation between judgment and truth and says that judgment is the attribution of a truth value to a proposition. The third, genetic, deals with the moments of judgment claiming it is a process susceptible of being articulated in such moments. Its fundamental moments are 1) hypothesis, 2) inquiry, 3) result. The article claims that the three theses interconnect and hold for both judgment in general and legal judgment, given that the latter is a model of the former; so a complex conception of judgment is articulated, discussing also its relations with assertion and inference

En qué se equivoca el realismo jurídico

El libro Legalidad de Scott Shapiro se propone llevar a cabo una estimulante, pero ardua, tarea filosófica, a saber: ofrecer una explicación de aquello que el derecho es y de por qué vale la pena tenerlo. Su "Teoría del derecho como plan" aborda la primera cuestión en términos de la denominada tesis de los "hechos sociales" y la segunda en términos de la tesis del "fin moral". Así, el derecho está determinado únicamente por hechos sociales, pero posee un punto moral, puesto que la finalidad de la actividad legal es solucionar algunos problemas morales. Las escuelas filosófico-jurídicas del siglo veinte se han dividido acerca de estos temas. Entre tales escuelas, Shapiro rechaza la visión realista porque deja de lado el punto de vista interno. Sin embargo, muchas afirmaciones realistas se referían al conocimiento del derecho, no a su normatividad. El artículo aborda este punto recordando también el debate entre Hart y Ross

The Epistemic Novelty of Norms

The idea of the paper is to look at the way we learn about norms, as a contribution to an understanding of their nature. It is the idea of an a posteriori ontology of norms. For it is pointless to argue about the nature of norms without paying any attention to what we do when we learn something about them or when we act with them. In its turn, the epistemic account presented here is discussed in inferential terms: different cognitive sources and inferences determine different degrees of epistemic novelty that help distinguish kinds of norms and normative systems

The Epistemic Novelty of Norms

The idea of the paper is to look at the way we learn about norms, as a contribution to an understanding of their nature. It is the idea of an a posteriori ontology of norms. For it is pointless to argue about the nature of norms without paying any attention to what we do when we learn something about them or when we act with them. In its turn, the epistemic account presented here is discussed in inferential terms: different cognitive sources and inferences determine different degrees of epistemic novelty that help distinguish kinds of norms and normative systems

Introducción: Un análisis crítico de "La teoría del derecho como plan"

Se reúne una serie de consideraciones acerca de la discusión general. En especial se pretende contextualizar la discusión acerca de Legality como una discusión enmarcada en disensos más amplios sobre cultura jurídica, la definición de positivismo jurídico y el rol de la teoría del derecho

The Sign of the Four

This paper is a contribution to the study of the four classical Italian pragmatists: Papini, Prezzolini, Vailati and Calderoni. They are seen more as representatives of a pragmatist movement than as singular systematic thinkers. The center of Italian pragmatism was the periodical, Leonardo, where these authors discussed and presented an original and provocative understanding of pragmatist philosophy. Thier understanding of pragmatist philosophy has often been underestimated by the subsequent literature. They showed a good comprehension of the novelty brought by American pragmatism but, ignoring some of the most important epistemic aspects of Peirce’s and James’s theories, their philosophical proposals often missed consistency. However, even in their misunderstandings, they signaled a need and possibly a weakness of the whole pragmatist movement. Italian pragmatists underlined the importance of the concreteness of individuals in the realization of universal laws of mathematics and logic, physics and psychology. But, this attitude suffered from some serious tensions between metaphysical assumptions and methodological claims