Has the impact of key determinants of German exports changed? Results from estimations of Germany's intra euro-area and extra euro-area exports

The question as to whether changes in the external environment may have caused the importance of key determinants of German exports to shift since the 1990s is addressed by estimating Germany's exports to EMU partner countries (intra exports) and to countries outside the euro area (extra exports). Analytically, this is done first by estimating single-equation error correction models across different samples. Second, an estimation applying the Saikkonen (1991) approach is carried out to test whether the long-run export behaviour of intra and extra exports has changed since the 1990s. Finally, simulations are conducted by means of error-correction models in order to reconstruct the adjustment process of both intra and extra exports following demand and price shocks. --intra and extra euro-area exports,export demand,price competitiveness,error correction model

Competitive Permit Markets and Vertical Structures: The Relevance of Imperfect Competitive Eco-Industries

Permit markets lead polluting firms to purchase abatement goods from an eco-industry, which is often concentrated. This paper studies the consequences of imperfect competition in an eco-industry on the equilibrium choices of the competitive polluting firms. It then characterizes the second best pollution cap. By comparing this situation to a competitive one, we show that Cournot competition on the abatement good market contributes not only to a non optimal level of emission reduction but also to a higher permit price, which reduces the production level. These distortions increase with market power measured by the margin taken by the non competitive firms and suggest a second best less stringent pollution cappollution permit market, eco-industry, imperfect competition

Toward waste management contracts

This paper deals with the cost of treatment of the ultimate waste, that is waste which cannot, in the absence of recycling opportunities, be reduced by a suitable taxation scheme. We propose a new way to handle this waste based on aWaste Management Contracts (WMC) which largely implicates the households in the cost reduction process. Within a set of feasible, i.e. budget balancing, incentive compatible and acceptable, contracts we characterize the optimal WMC and compare this system to a more standard one based on an Advanced and a Disposal FeeWaste Management, Disposal Fee Policy, Household Effort, Contracts

"Different actors, different tools? Approaching EU and US democracy promotion in the Mediterranean and the Newly Independent States"

This paper contributes to the research agenda on external democracy promotion by attempting a systematic comparison between the democracy promotion endeavors of two major international actors, the European Union (EU) and the United States of America (US). It first outlines an analytical framework that is then tested for its heuristical value, applying it to EU and US democracy promotion efforts on a global and a regional scale, thus comparing different actors as well as across regions. It concludes by highlighting the differences in design and flexibility of their approaches and relates them to a specificity of EU external relations. While both actors can draw on seemingly similar tool boxes for democracy promotion, the EU tends to limit its own scope of action to a rather cooperative approach due to the emphasis it puts on the standardization and (reciprocal) formalization of relations with third countries, including provisions for democracy promotion

SHOULD WE REALLOCATE PATENT FEES TO THE UNIVERSITIES ?

: In knowledge economies, patent agencies are often viewed as a relevant instrument of an efficient innovation policy. This paper brings a new support to that idea. We claim that these agencies should play an increasing role in the regulation of the relation between heterogeneous private R&D labs and public fundamental research units, especially concerning the question of the appropriation of free basic research results. Since these two institutions work with opposite institutional arrangements (see Dasgupta and David [9]), we essentially argue that there is, on the one hand, an over-appropriation of these results while, on the other hand, there is also an under-provision of free usable results issued from more fundamental research. We show how a public patent office can restore efficiency.Science and technology; patent agency; innovation policy