Fair allocation of indivisible goods among two agents

One must allocate a finite set of indivisible goods among two agents without monetary compensation. We impose Pareto-efficiency, anonymity, a weak notion of no-envy, a welfare lower bound based on each agent’s ranking of the sets of goods, and a monotonicity property relative to changes in agents’ preferences. We prove that there is a rule satisfying these axioms. If there are three goods, it is the only rule, with one of its subcorrespondences, satisfying each fairness axiom and not discriminating between goods. Further, we confirm the clear gap between these economies and those with more than two agents.indivisible goods, no monetary compensation, no-envy, lower bound, preference-monotonicity

Tests of new instrument for measuring Dublin Descriptors

In the summer of 2007 a new instrument was developed which aimed at providingan operationalisation of the Dublin descriptors (Appendix 1). Special attention waspaid thereby to the so-called ‘anchor problem’ inherent in most self-assessments:the lack of an objective frame of reference against which different respondents canassess their own level of competence.The instrument consists of a combination of general and specific items. First of alla general item was formulated for each of the 5 Dublin descriptors. The generalitems were formulated in such a way as to match the original descriptors as closelyas possible. Anchors were developed for each of these items which correspond tojunior college, bachelors and masters levels. For example, for the item“communication” the junior college level was indicated by the anchor “is able totransmit information”, the bachelors level by "is able to communicate ideas andtransmit solutions” and the master level by “is able to communicate conclusionsand the knowledge, motivations and considerations that underlie these conclusionsin a convincing manner”. The anchors for the bachelors and masters level arederived more or less directly from the Dublin descriptors, and those for the juniorcollege level are based on the European Qualification Framework. For practicalreasons it was decided not to develop anchors for the PhD level. The anchors wereplaced in a scale ranging from 1 to 8, with the junior college level being assigned ascale value of 2, the bachelors level the value 5 and the masters level the value 7.This allowed respondents the option of choosing a level above masters level orbelow junior college level if they find that appropriate. The distances betweenjunior college, bachelors and masters level approximates the mean differences inyears of education corresponding to each level.labour market entry and occupational careers;

Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems

A set of agents with possibly different waiting costs have to receive the same service one after the other. Efficiency requires to maximize total welfare. Equity requires to at least treat equal agents equally. One must form a queue, set up monetary transfers to compensate agents having to wait, and not a priori arbitrarily exclude agents from positions. As one may not know agents’ waiting costs, they may have no incentive to reveal them. We identify the only rule satisfying Pareto-efficiency, a weak equity axiom as equal treatment of equals in welfare or symmetry, and strategy-proofness. It satisfies stronger axioms, as no-envy and anonymity. Further, its desirability extends to related problems. To obtain these results, we prove that even non-single-valued rules satisfy Pareto-efficiency of queues and strategy-proofness if and only if they select Pareto-efficient queues and set transfers in the spirit of Groves (1973). This holds in other problems, provided the domain of quasi-linear preferences is rich enough.queueing problems, efficiency, fairness, strategy-proofness

An Impossibility in Sequencing Problems

A set of agents with different waiting costs have to receive a service of different length of time from a single provider which can serve only one agent at a time. One needs to form a queue and set up monetary transfers to compensate the agents who have to wait. We prove that no rule satisfies efficiency of queues and coalitional strategy-proofness.mathematical economics;

Do business administration studies offer better preparation for supervisory jobs than traditional economics studies?

The question whether graduates of business administration (BA) are better prepared for supervisory jobs and have a greater chance of acquiring supervisory jobs than non-BA economics graduates, forms the central theme of the paper. In addition, special attention is given to the question whether having a supervisory job pays off, particularly with an educational background in BA. In order to answer these questions, we have used a data set that relates to the labour market position of graduates from Dutch universities at the early stages of their careers.We have found that BA graduates, despite their multidisciplinary education and the fact that they have fewer deficiencies in their education with respect to the ability for teamwork than non-BA graduates, do not have a greater chance of acquiring supervisory jobs than graduates from non-BA economics courses. We have also found that having a supervisory job pays off, regardless of the education (BA versus non-BA). Lastly, we have found that most of the skills required for managerial leadership are acquired through work and not in education. This suggests that a combination of working and learning may be more effective for developing managerial skills than a purely educational setting.Key words: business administration and non-business administration graduates, supervisory jobs, required competences, job chances, earnings.JEL classification: J 24, J 31, J 44.labour market entry and occupational careers;

An investigation into the role of human capital competences and their pay-off

Learning is possible both in school and later on when working. The learning process is thereby dependent on the context wherein it takes place. This implies that in particular three groups of competences can be distinguished. First of all, competences acquired in school, which are of direct use in later work, secondly, competences acquired in school, which facilitate acquiring new competences after graduation from school and finally, competences acquired mainly in a working context. Using a unique dataset on Italian university graduates, the target of this paper is to show that these three competences can indeed be distinguished and to discuss their different roles and pay-offs in the labour market.We will show that, firstly, the level of field-specific skills obtained in higher education offers graduates a comparative advantage when working inside the own field-specific domain and therefore has a pay-off for those graduates who are able to find a job in their own field-specific domain; secondly, that management skills are valued in the labour market but seem to be more effectively acquired in a working context than in higher education and thirdly, that general academic competences acquired in higher education do not pay off directly but have a significant supportive role when learning skills that have a direct pay-off in the labour market but are more effectively acquired outside education.labour market entry and occupational careers;

Evidence-based health care policy in reimbursement decisions : lessons from a series of six equivocal case-studies

Context: Health care technological evolution through new drugs, implants and other interventions is a key driver of healthcare spending. Policy makers are currently challenged to strengthen the evidence for and cost-effectiveness of reimbursement decisions, while not reducing the capacity for real innovations. This article examines six cases of reimbursement decision making at the national health insurance authority in Belgium, with outcomes that were contested from an evidence-based perspective in scientific or public media. Methods: In depth interviews with key stakeholders based on the adapted framework of Davies allowed us to identify the relative impact of clinical and health economic evidence; experience, expertise & judgment; financial impact & resources; values, ideology & political beliefs; habit & tradition; lobbyists & pressure groups; pragmatics & contingencies; media attention; and adoption from other payers & countries. Findings: Evidence was not the sole criterion on which reimbursement decisions were based. Across six equivocal cases numerous other criteria were perceived to influence reimbursement policy. These included other considerations that stakeholders deemed crucial in this area, such as taking into account the cost to the patient, and managing crisis scenarios. However, negative impacts were also reported, in the form of bypassing regular procedures unnecessarily, dominance of an opinion leader, using information selectively, and influential conflicts of interest. Conclusions: 'Evidence' and 'negotiation' are both essential inputs of reimbursement policy. Yet, purposely selected equivocal cases in Belgium provide a rich source to learn from and to improve the interaction between both. We formulated policy recommendations to reconcile the impact of all factors identified. A more systematic approach to reimburse new care may be one of many instruments to resolve the budgetary crisis in health care in other countries as well, by separating what is truly innovative and value for money from additional 'waste'