Intelligent escalation and the principle of relativity

Escalation is the fact that in a game (for instance in an auction), the agents play forever. The $0,1$-game is an extremely simple infinite game with intelligent agents in which escalation arises. It shows at the light of research on cognitive psychology the difference between intelligence (algorithmic mind) and rationality (algorithmic and reflective mind) in decision processes. It also shows that depending on the point of view (inside or outside) the rationality of the agent may change which is proposed to be called the principle of relativity.Comment: arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1306.228

Boltzmann samplers for random generation of lambda terms

Randomly generating structured objects is important in testing and optimizing functional programs, whereas generating random $'l$-terms is more specifically needed for testing and optimizing compilers. For that a tool called QuickCheck has been proposed, but in this tool the control of the random generation is left to the programmer. Ten years ago, a method called Boltzmann samplers has been proposed to generate combinatorial structures. In this paper, we show how Boltzmann samplers can be developed to generate lambda-terms, but also other data structures like trees. These samplers rely on a critical value which parameters the main random selector and which is exhibited here with explanations on how it is computed. Haskell programs are proposed to show how samplers are actually implemented

(Mechanical) Reasoning on Infinite Extensive Games

In order to better understand reasoning involved in analyzing infinite games in extensive form, we performed experiments in the proof assistant Coq that are reported here.Comment: 11

The risk of divergence

We present infinite extensive strategy profiles with perfect information and we show that replacing finite by infinite changes the notions and the reasoning tools. The presentation uses a formalism recently developed by logicians and computer science theoreticians, called coinduction. This builds a bridge between economic game theory and the most recent advance in theoretical computer science and logic. The key result is that rational agents may have strategy leading to divergence .Comment: 3rd International Workshop on Strategic Reasoning, Dec 2015, Oxford, United Kingdom. 201

On the enumeration of closures and environments with an application to random generation

Environments and closures are two of the main ingredients of evaluation in lambda-calculus. A closure is a pair consisting of a lambda-term and an environment, whereas an environment is a list of lambda-terms assigned to free variables. In this paper we investigate some dynamic aspects of evaluation in lambda-calculus considering the quantitative, combinatorial properties of environments and closures. Focusing on two classes of environments and closures, namely the so-called plain and closed ones, we consider the problem of their asymptotic counting and effective random generation. We provide an asymptotic approximation of the number of both plain environments and closures of size $n$. Using the associated generating functions, we construct effective samplers for both classes of combinatorial structures. Finally, we discuss the related problem of asymptotic counting and random generation of closed environemnts and closures

Counting and Generating Terms in the Binary Lambda Calculus (Extended version)

In a paper entitled Binary lambda calculus and combinatory logic, John Tromp presents a simple way of encoding lambda calculus terms as binary sequences. In what follows, we study the numbers of binary strings of a given size that represent lambda terms and derive results from their generating functions, especially that the number of terms of size n grows roughly like 1.963447954. .. n. In a second part we use this approach to generate random lambda terms using Boltzmann samplers.Comment: extended version of arXiv:1401.037

On the Rationality of Escalation

Escalation is a typical feature of infinite games. Therefore tools conceived for studying infinite mathematical structures, namely those deriving from coinduction are essential. Here we use coinduction, or backward coinduction (to show its connection with the same concept for finite games) to study carefully and formally the infinite games especially those called dollar auctions, which are considered as the paradigm of escalation. Unlike what is commonly admitted, we show that, provided one assumes that the other agent will always stop, bidding is rational, because it results in a subgame perfect equilibrium. We show that this is not the only rational strategy profile (the only subgame perfect equilibrium). Indeed if an agent stops and will stop at every step, we claim that he is rational as well, if one admits that his opponent will never stop, because this corresponds to a subgame perfect equilibrium. Amazingly, in the infinite dollar auction game, the behavior in which both agents stop at each step is not a Nash equilibrium, hence is not a subgame perfect equilibrium, hence is not rational.Comment: 19 p. This paper is a duplicate of arXiv:1004.525

Dynamic Logic of Common Knowledge in a Proof Assistant

Common Knowledge Logic is meant to describe situations of the real world where a group of agents is involved. These agents share knowledge and make strong statements on the knowledge of the other agents (the so called \emph{common knowledge}). But as we know, the real world changes and overall information on what is known about the world changes as well. The changes are described by dynamic logic. To describe knowledge changes, dynamic logic should be combined with logic of common knowledge. In this paper we describe experiments which we have made about the integration in a unique framework of common knowledge logic and dynamic logic in the proof assistant \Coq. This results in a set of fully checked proofs for readable statements. We describe the framework and how a proof can beComment: 15

HedN Game, a Relational Framework for Network Based Cooperation

This paper proposes a new framework for cooperative games based on mathematical relations. Here cooperation is defined as a supportive partnerships represented by a directed network between players (aka hedonic relation). We examine in a specific context, modeled by abstract games how a change of supports induces a modification of strategic interactions between players. Two levels of description are considered: the first one describes the support network formation whereas the second one models the strategic interactions between players. Both are described in a unified formalism, namely CP~game. Stability conditions are stated, emphasizing the connection between these two levels. We also stress the interaction between updates of supports and their impact on the evolution of the context.Cooperative Game, Network, Stability, Hedonic Relation

Les crashs sont rationnels

As we show by using notions of equilibrium in infinite sequential games, crashes or financial escalations are rational for economic or environmental agents, who have a vision of an infinite world. This contradicts a picture of a self-regulating, wise and pacific economic world. In other words, in this context, equilibrium is not synonymous of stability. We try to draw, from this statement, methodological consequences and new ways of thinking, especially in economic game theory. Among those new paths, coinduction is the basis of our reasoning in infinite games