Cover Pricing and the Overreach of ‘Object’ Liability under Article 101 TFEU

This article uses the example of cover pricing to show a possible overreach of liability under Article 101 TFEU, in relation to arrangements deemed to have the ‘object’ of restricting competition. Cover pricing is where a bidder seeks a non-winning bid from a competitor so that he can participate in a tender process without securing the contract. The wide meaning of ‘concerted practice’ means that a potential breach of Article 101 may arise even where the party receiving the request refuses to provide a cover bid. It is important that a restriction by object (which leads to the finding of an infringement regardless of whether the practice was implemented or had any harmful effect) applies only to the most serious arrangements between undertakings. It is shown that cover pricing very rarely has any anti-competitive effect and indeed the alternative (lawful) behaviour, of openly announcing a non-intention to win the contract, is more likely to reduce competition. It is nevertheless treated as an object restriction, mainly because it involves direct communication between competitors of pricing intentions. Article 101 may therefore be unable to distinguish some arrangements with ambivalent effects from the most serious cartel practices. It is argued that a greater effects analysis is needed (either in applying the law or calculating penalties), to ensure fairness and proportionality

BIN Models for Trade-by-Trade Data. Modelling the Number of Trades in a Fixed Interval of Time

In this paper we propose a simple time series model of the number of transactions made in intervals of length $\Delta$ seconds. We call this model the {\sf BIN} model. The properties of the {\sf BIN} model are evaluated while we explore connections between this model and Cox processes --- that is Poisson processes with random intensities. We apply the modelling framework to data on trades in IBM shares.

Dynamics of trade-by-trade price movements: decomposition and models

In this paper we introduce a decomposition of the joint distribution of price changes of assets recorded trade--by--trade. Our decomposition means that we can model the dynamics of price changes using quite simple and interpretable models which are easily extended in a great number of directions, including using durations and volume as explanatory variables. Thus we provide an econometric basis for empirical work on market microstructure using time series of transactions data. We use maximum likelihood estimation and testing methods to assess the fit of the model to a year of IBM stock price data taken from the New York Stock Exchange.Activity, autologistic, conditional independence, decomposition, directions, durations, forecasting, GLARMA, logarithmic distribution, prediction decomposition, size, transactions data.

Law and Peace: Contracts and the Success of the Danish Dairy Cooperatives

We consider the successful early emergence of cooperative creameries in Denmark in the late nineteenth century within the framework of the ‘new institutional economics’ presented by Williamson (2000). Previous work has focused on the social cohesion of the Danes, but we demonstrate that this was not sufficient for the success. The Danish legal system, which we compare to that of other countries, was also of crucial importance, along with the way in which rules were monitored and enforced. Of particular importance was the Danish cooperatives’ use of contracts, which we explore with evidence from a variety of primary and secondary sources.cooperatives; creameries; contracts; new institutional economics

Editorial: Why is Outlines – critical practice studies so critical?

This editorial points back to the papers published in volume 18. It also announces the transfer of the position of main editor of Outlines – critical practice studies.One of the papers in vol. 18 relates directly to what is foundational to Outlines - critical practice studies: The encouragement of critique. For this reason it has been given some extensive attention here. Raffnsøe (2017) wrote: What is critique? Critical turns in the age of criticism.

The treatment of horizontal agreements aimed at solving incentive problems

If a group of horizontal rivals gets together to agree on a way to structure efficient production, are they violating competition law? The issue could arise where a group of producers of agricultural products gets together to form a cooperative or even where professionals in the same field get together in a partnership. On the face of it, each supply agreement between the producer and the cooperative or partnership is vertical, but the design of the collective rules, which govern for all, involves horizontal coordination. This article takes as the starting point the example of dairy cooperatives as they emerged in the later part of the nineteenth century as a solution to a challenge offered by new technology. We use the landmark contract law case of McEllistrim v. Ballymacelligott Cooperative to illustrate the ways in which competition law could be engaged when cooperatives are formed. Comparisons of Ireland and Denmark in the period leading up to the decision suggest that not only might the restraint be ancillary, but if not, it reduced costs, increased quality, and was welcomed by consumers (though these were in England rather than in Denmark or Ireland). The restraint also appears essential in some form, suggesting that either ancillarity or the application of Art. 101(3) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union would have allowed the restraint to be used