On the Community Patent

The European Union will be introducing a Europe-wide patent, the so-called Community Patent. Its aim is to foster innovative activity, but strategic effects between firms competing in R&D have not been considered in the official discourse. We show that, even if these are taken into account, the Community Patent will increase innovative activity and welfare. On the other hand, if the decision of participating in R&D is considered, then this increased R&D will be concentrated into fewer firms. Furthermore, we show that existing asymmetries between countries and firms are bound to increase.Community patent, R&D race, Participation in R&D

Bertrand Equilibria and Sharing Rules

We analyze how sharing rules affect Nash equilibria in Bertrand games, where the sharing of profits at ties is a decisive assumption. Necessary conditions for either positive or zero equilibrium profits are derived. Zero profit equilibria are shown to exist under weak conditions if the sharing rule is sign-preserving. For Bertrand markets we define the class of expectation sharing rules, where profits at ties are derived from some distribution of quantities. In this class the winner-take-all sharing rule is the only one that is always sign-preserving, while for each pair of demand and cost functions there may be many others.Bertrand games, Sharing rule, Tie-breaking rule, Sign-preserving sharing rules, Expectation sharing rules

Welfare Analysis of Regulating Mobile Termination Rates in the UK (with an Application to the Orange/T-Mobile Merger)

This paper presents results from a calibrated welfare model of the UK mobile telephony market which includes many mobile networks; calls to and from the fixed network; networkbased price discrimination; and call externalities. The analysis focuses on the short-run effects of adopting lower mobile termination rates (MTRs) on total welfare, consumer surplus and profits. Our simulations show that reducing MTRs broadly in line with the recent European Commission Recommendation to either “long-run incremental cost”; reciprocal termination charges with fixed networks; or “bill-and-keep” (i.e. zero termination rates), increases social welfare, consumer surplus and networks’ profits. Depending on the strength of call externalities, social welfare may increase by as much as £360 million to £2.5 billion per year. The analysis thus lends support to a move away from fully-allocated cost pricing and towards much lower MTRs, with bill-and-keep frequently leading to the highest increase in welfare when call externalities matter. We also apply the model to estimate the welfare effects of the recently-approved merger between Orange and T-Mobile under two different scenarios concerning MTRs.telecommunications; regulation; mobile termination rates; network effects; welfare; simulations welfare, simulations

Preliminary studies in the postures of the children in the elementary schools of Kansas City, Missouri

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Kansas, Sociology, 1924

The race for telecoms infrastructure investment with bypass: Can access regulation achieve the first best?

We analyze the impact of mandatory access on the infrastructure investments of two competing communications networks, and show that for low (high) access charges ?rms wait (preempt each other). Contrary to previous results, under preemption a higher access charge can delay ?rst investment. While ?rst-best investment cannot be achieved with a ?xed access tari¤, simple instruments such as banning access in the future, or granting access holidays right after investment, can improve e¢ ciency. The former forces investment when it would happen too late, while the latter allows for lower access charges in order to delay the second investment when it would happen too early.

The strength of the waterbed effect depends on tariff type

We show that the waterbed effect, i.e. the pass-through of a change in one price of a firm to its other prices, is much stronger if the latter include subscription rather than only usage fees. In particular, in mobile network competition with a fixed number of customers, the waterbed effect is full under two-part tariffs, while it is only partial under linear tariffs

The Interplay Between Regulation and Competitions: The Case of Universal Service Obligations

Regulators have long been aware of the social aspects of communication. In the past, regulated monopolists have provided Universal Service Obligations, typically funded via a system of cross-subsidies. In this paper, we first review the rationale for imposing Universal Service Obligations, based both on theoretical arguments and empirical results. We then address some of the new questions raised by the ongoing liberalisation process. Regulators now face the challenging problem of organising the provision and financing of universal service in a competitive environment.universal service obligations, regulation, competition

National FTTH plans in France, Italy and Portugal

In this paper, we analyze the specific national broadband plans which have been developed by some European governments to foster the deployment of next generation access networks, namely in France, Italy, and Portugal. In particular, we discuss the strategies adopted to achieve wide fibre coverage and encourage co-investment between competing operators. Finally, we highlight the similarities and differences between the strategies followed in these three countries.broadband; fibre; next generation access networks; regulation.

National FTTH plans in France, Italy and Portugal

In this paper, we analyze the specific national broadband plans which have been developed by some European governments to foster the deployment of next generation access networks, namely in France, Italy, and Portugal. In particular, we discuss the strategies adopted to achieve wide fibre coverage and encourage co-investment between competing operators. Finally, we highlight the similarities and differences between the strategies followed in these three countries.broadband; fibre; next generation access networks; regulation

Going beyond duopoly: Connectivity breakdowns under receiving party pays

We show that the prediction of strategic connectivity breakdowns under a receiving-party-pays system and discrimination between on and off-net prices does not hold up once more than two mobile networks are considered. Indeed, if there are at least three competing networks and enough utility is obtained from receiving calls, only equilibria with finite call prices and receiving prices exist. Private negotiations over access charges then achieve the efficient outcome. Bill & keep (zero access charges) and free outgoing and incoming calls are efficient if and only marginal costs of calls are zero