Information sharing and credit : firm-level evidence from transition countries

We investigate whether information sharing among banks has affected credit market performance in the transition countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, using a large sample of firm-level data. Our estimates show that information sharing is associated with improved availability and lower cost of credit to firms. This correlation is stronger for opaque firms than transparent ones and stronger in countries with weak legal environments than in those with strong legal environments. In cross-sectional estimates, we control for variation in country-level aggregate variables that may affect credit, by examining the differential impact of information sharing across firm types. In panel estimates, we also control for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level, as well as for changes in macroeconomic variables and the legal environment

Do the type and number of blockholders influence R&D investments? : new evidence from Spain

Using data from 3,638 Spanish firms between 1996 and 2000, this article studies the relationship between the presence of large shareholders in the ownership structure of firms and R&D investment. Consistent with our theoretical contention, our results indicate that the impact of large shareholders on the R&D investment is (1) negative when blockholders are banks, (2) positive when blockholders are non-financial corporations and (3) null when blockholders are individuals. In addition, we find a systematic negative relationship between the number of blockholders and R&D investment. Finally, we extend our study by analysing the influence that the combined effect between blockholder type and R&D investment has on the firm’s economic performance. Results of this work provide relevant implications for policy makers and academic research.Publicad

Stock Market Returns, Corporate Governance and Capital Market Equilibrium

This paper analyzes why corporate governance matters for stock returns if the stock market prices the underlying managerial agency problem correctly. Our theory assumes that strict corporate governance prevents managers from diverting cash flows, but reduces incentives for managerial effort. In capital market equilibrium, this trade-off has implications for the firm's earnings, stock returns, and managerial ownership, because governance impacts the firm's risk-return structure. In particular, the strictness of corporate governance is negatively related to earnings and positively to β. Various empirical tests with U.S. data using the governance index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) yield results consistent with these predictions

Bank insolvencies, priority claims and systemic risk

We review an extensive literature debating the merits of alternative priority structures for banking liabilities put forward by financial economists, legal scholars and policymakers. Up to now, this work has focused exclusively on the relative advantages of each group of creditors to monitor the activities of bankers. We argue that systemic risk is another dimension that this discussion must include. The main message of our work is that when bank failures are contagious then when regulators assign priority rights need also to take into account how the bankruptcy resolution of one institution might affect the survival of other institutions that have acted as its creditors. When the network structure is fixed the solution is straightforward. Other banks should have priority to minimize the risk of their downfall. However, if the choice of policy can affect the structure of the network, policy design becomes more complex.This is a fruitful avenue for future research

How Does Investors' Legal Protection Affect Productivity and Growth?

This paper analyzes the implications of investors' legal protection on aggregate productivity and growth. We have two main results. First, that better investors' legal protection can mitigate agency problems between investors and innovators and therefore expand the range of high-tech projects that can be financed by non-bank investors. Second, investors' legal protection shifts investment resources from less productive (medium-tech) to highly productive (high-tech) projects and therefore enhances economic growth. These results stem from two forces. On one hand, private investors' moral hazard problems (in which entrepreneurs shift investors' resources to their own benefit), and on the other hand innovators' risk of project termination by banks due to wrong signals about projects' probability of success. Our results are consistent with recent empirical studies that show a high correlation between legal investors' protection and the structure of the financial system as well as the economic performance at industry and macroeconomic levels