Decentralization, Interdependence and Performance Measurement System Design:Sequences and Priorities

We investigate the determinants of decentralization and performance measurement choices in multidivisional firms.We extend the research on the economics of organizational design choices by examining the impact of two important determinants of those choices, namely, subunit interdependencies and knowledge transfer costs.We test our predictions with a simultaneous equation model that captures the endogenous choices relating to the level of decentralization and the use of alternative subunit performance measures using data collected from 78 business units.Our findings are generally consistent with our predictions.

Goal Setting, Information, and Goal Revision: A Field Experiment

People typically set goals in settings where they cannot be sure of how they will perform, but where their performance is revealed to them in parts over time. When part of the uncertainty is resolved, initial goals may have turned out to be unrealistic and hence they no longer work as a motivation device. Revising goals may increase performance by making goals realistic, but may also adversely affect performance through reduced goal commitment. We study the effects of motivating university students to set goals and inviting them to revise their goals later, using a field experiment involving nearly 2,100 students. We use courses containing two midterms and a final exam, where midterms reduce uncertainty about students’ potential performance. We find that motivating students to set goals does not affect performance on average. Students with midterm grades lower than their goal, decrease their performance. This effect is driven by students who were motivated to set goals without being made aware that they can revise their goals later. This finding may help explain why the evidence of the effectiveness of goals on study performance is mixed.Hervorming Sociale Regelgevin

Stellen van doelen verbetert studieresultaten

Hervorming Sociale Regelgevin

Fathering Daughters and Personality

Hervorming Sociale Regelgevin

Essays on Intrinsic Motivation of Students and Workers

This thesis focuses on intrinsic motivation. In the first part of the thesis I examine the effects of motivating university students to set goals on study performance. In particular I study whether encouraging students to set a grade goal and further motivating them to set a more ambitious grade goal has an effect on their study performance. In this setting, goals are not combined with any extrinsic rewards or punishments. Hence the effects from goal setting on performance stem from students’ intrinsic motivation to achieve their goal. The other two essays focus on workers’ motivations to help others. I focus on two prominent ways to help others: i) by exerting effort on the job and ii) by making contributions to charity. I study the relation between helping others by exerting effort on the job and helping others outside the workplace by comparing equally altruistic workers’ money and time donations

Socially Useless Jobs.

Hervorming Sociale Regelgevin

Hiaatverzekeringen voor arbeidsongeschiktheid leiden niet tot minder werk

Hervorming Sociale Regelgevin

Socially Useless Jobs

Hervorming Sociale Regelgevin

Workers' Moral Hazard and Insurer Effort in Disability Insurance

Disability Insurance (DI) may affect workers’ outcomes such as their probability to enter DI, to recover, and their employment. Supplementary insurance may increase these moral hazard effects, but also increases the financial gains of private insurers to reduce benefit costs. With increased insurer activities to prevent and reintegrate workers, the overall effects of increased insurance coverage on workers’ outcomes are thus ambiguous. This paper aims to separate worker and insurer responses to increased insurance, using unique administrative data on firms’ supplementary DI insurance contracts. Using a Two-Way FixedEffects model on the sickness and employment rates of worker cohorts with and without supplementary contracts at some point in time, we find that insurer efforts compensate workers’ moral hazard effects.Hervorming Sociale Regelgevin