Lawyers: Gatekeepers of the Sovereign Debt Market?

The claim that lawyers act as gatekeepers or certifiers in financial transactions is widely discussed in the legal literature. There has, however, been little empirical examination of the claim. We test the hypothesis that law firms have replaced investment banks as the gatekeepers of the market for sovereign debt. Our results suggest that hiring outside law firms sends a negative signal to the market regarding the pending issuance; a finding that is inconsistent with the thesis that outside law firms primarily play a certification role in the sovereign debt market

A Sovereign’s Cost of Capital: Go Foreign or Stay Local

A critical question faced by any sovereign seeking to raise funds in the bond market is whether to issue the debt under foreign or local parameters. This choice determines other key characteristics of any bond issue such as which banks, lawyers, and investors will be involved. Most important though, this decision involves a tradeoff between the sovereign retaining discretion in managing the issue and relinquishing control of the issue to third parties to prevent the sovereign from expropriating wealth from bondholders in the future. Based on a sample of 17,349 issuances by 117 sovereigns between 1990 and 2015, we investigate this question in the context of the initial pricing of government bonds. We examine the three key factors that bear on this decision; governing law, currency, and exchange listing. We find that highly-rated sovereigns, with strong domestic institutions that protect investors, almost always issue debt under domestic parameters. In contrast, low-rated sovereigns with weak domestic institutions tend to issue debt under foreign parameters. These findings suggest that low-quality sovereigns are forced to issue debt under foreign parameters to assure investors that the sovereign will not act opportunistically to expropriate their wealth once the debt is issued. Put differently, low-quality sovereigns that issue debt under domestic parameters face a higher cost of capital

A Silver Lining to Russia’s Sanctions-Busting Clause

In 2018, Russia began inserting an unusual clause into euro and dollar sovereign bonds, seemingly designed to circumvent future Western sanctions. The clause worked by letting the government pay in roubles if sanctions cut off access to dollar and euro payment systems. The clause received little scrutiny at the time, perhaps because Russia used a state-owned bank, rather than a global investment bank, as underwriter. But with the invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing sanctions imposed by the United States and other governments, the relevance of the clause has become clear. This Essay examines how the market reacted to the clause before and after the invasion. Our expectation was that the market would charge a premium for bonds with the clause. Investors bought euro and dollar bonds, after all, because they did not want to be paid in roubles. Yet contrary to expectations, investors seemed to prefer bonds that allowed for payment in roubles over bonds that did not. This surprising finding has considerable implications for other countries that may lose access to foreign currency for reasons that are more benign than Russia’s war of aggression. Despite its sordid provenance, Russia’s sanctions-busting clause might turn out to be a positive innovation that could benefit countries facing unexpected crises. Indeed, had Ukraine included such a clause in its bonds, the benefit would have been enormous

Essays in Financial Econometrics

<p>The main goal of this work is to explore the effects of time-varying extreme jump tail dependencies in asset markets. Consequently, a lot of attention has been devoted to understand the extremal tail dependencies between of assets. As pointed by Hansen (2013), the estimation of tail risks dependence is a challenging task and their implications in several sectors of the economy are of great importance. One of the principal challenges is to provide a measure systemic risks that is, in principle, statistically tractable and has an economic meaning. Therefore, there is a need of a standardize dependence measures or at least to provide a methodology that can capture the complexity behind global distress in the economy. These measures should be able to explain not only the dynamics of the most recent financial crisis but also the prior events of distress in the world economy, which is the motivation of this paper. In order to explore the tail dependencies I exploit the information embedded in option prices and intra-daily high frequency data. </p><p>The first chapter, a co-authored work with Andrew Patton, proposes a new class of dynamic copula models for daily asset returns that exploits information from high frequency (intra-daily) data. We augment the generalized autoregressive score (GAS) model of Creal, et al. (2013) with high frequency measures such as realized correlation to obtain a "GRAS" model. We find that the inclusion of realized measures significantly improves the in-sample fit of dynamic copula models across a range of U.S. equity returns. Moreover, we find that out-of-sample density forecasts from our GRAS models are superior to those from simpler models. Finally, we consider a simple portfolio choice problem to illustrate the economic gains from exploiting high frequency data for modeling dynamic dependence.</p><p>In the second chapter using information from option prices I construct two new measures of dependence between assets and industries, the Jump Tail Implied Correlation and the Tail Correlation Risk Premia. The main contribution in this chapter is the construction of a systemic risk factor from daily financial measures using a quantile-regression-based methodology. In this direction, I fill the existing gap between downturns in the financial sector and the real economy. I find that this new index performs well to forecast in-sample and out-of-sample quarterly macroeconomic shocks. In addition, I analyze whether the tail risk of the correlation may be priced. I find that for the S&P500 and its sectors there is an ex ante premium to hedge against systemic risks and changes in the aggregate market correlation. Moreover, I provide evidence that the tails of the implied correlation have remarkable predictive power for future stock market returns.</p>Dissertatio

Pricing Sovereign Debt: Discretion v. Expropriation

The Greek restructuring of March 2012 illustrates how non-price contract terms can have a significant effect on the pricing of sovereign debt. In the Greek restructuring, bonds governed by local law suffered NPV haircuts in the range of 60-75%, whereas those bonds governed by foreign law were paid in full and on time. Other contract parameters such as the currency in which the debt is denominated and the exchange on which it is listed can also affect the leeway a sovereign debtor has in dealing with its creditors. In general, we find that sovereigns with strong institutions and investor protections are able to issue bonds under local parameters at relatively lower interest rates. In contrast, sovereigns with relatively weak investor protections have lower bond ratings and are forced to pay relatively higher interest rates on their debt. The important exceptions are those lower rated sovereigns who issue debt under foreign parameters. We believe that these sovereigns are able to obtain lower rates because by issuing bonds under foreign parameters, they reduce (eliminate) their ability to expropriate investors’ wealth once the debt is issued

A Silver Lining to Russia’s Sanctions-Busting Clause

In 2018, Russia began inserting an unusual clause into euro and dollar sovereign bonds, seemingly designed to circumvent future Western sanctions. The clause worked by letting the government pay in roubles if sanctions cut off access to dollar and euro payment systems. The clause received little scrutiny at the time, perhaps because Russia used a state-owned bank, rather than a global investment bank, as underwriter. But with the invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing sanctions imposed by the United States and other governments, the relevance of the clause has become clear. This Essay examines how the market reacted to the clause before and after the invasion. Our expectation was that the market would charge a premium for bonds with the clause. Investors bought euro and dollar bonds, after all, because they did not want to be paid in roubles. Yet contrary to expectations, investors seemed to prefer bonds that allowed for payment in roubles over bonds that did not. This surprising finding has considerable implications for other countries that may lose access to foreign currency for reasons that are more benign than Russia’s war of aggression. Despite its sordid provenance, Russia’s sanctions-busting clause might turn out to be a positive innovation that could benefit countries facing unexpected crises. Indeed, had Ukraine included such a clause in its bonds, the benefit would have been enormous