Culture and Development: An Analytical Framework

This paper develops a framework which analyzes how a population's culture affects the decisions of rational profit maximizing firms, while simultaneously exploring how the actions of these firms in turn affect the population's culture.By endogenizing culture as well as the more usual economic variables, it shows how an economically valuablebehavioural trait can be sustained as part of a competitive equilibrium.It is shown that, for given primitives, an economy can be in either a 'good' steady state, in which the valuable cultural trait is present, or a welfare dominated 'bad' one in which the valuable cultural trait disappears.Starting from the 'good' steady state and implementing productivity improvements raises welfare, but if changes are too rapid this steady state will not be reached from the old one.Instead, the unique trajectory is to the bad steady state where welfare is reduced.culture;development;inequality;technological change

Trust, Social Capital and Economic Development

Many argue that elements of a society s norms, culture or social capital are central to understanding its development.However, these notions have been difficult to capture in economic models.Here we argue that trustworthiness is the economically relevant component of a society s culture and hence comprises its social capital.Individuals are trustworthy when they perform actions they have promised, even if these do not maximize their payoffs.The usual focus on incentive structures in motivating behaviour plays no role here.Instead, we emphasize more deep-seated modes of behaviour and consider that trustworthy agents are socialized to act as they do.To model this socialization, we borrow from a relatively new process of preference evolution pioneered by Bisin and Verdier (2001).The model developed endogenously accounts for social capital and explores its role in the process of economic development.It captures in a simple, formal way the interaction between social capital and the economy s productive process.The results obtained caution against rapid reform, provide an explanation for why late developing countries cannot easily transplant the modes of production that have proved useful in the West, and suggest an explanation for the pattern of reform experiences in ex-communist countries.technological change;public finance;economic development

Managerial Capital and the Market for CEOs

This paper reconciles two pronounced trends in U.S. corporate governance: the increase in pay levels for top executives, and the increasing prevalence of appointing CEOs through external hiring rather than internal promotions. We propose that these trends reflect a shift in the relative importance of "managerial ability" (transferable across companies) and "firm-specific human capital" (valuable only within the organization). We show that if the supply of workers in the corporate sector is relatively elastic, an increase in the relative importance of managerial ability leads to fewer promotions, more external hires, and an increase in equilibrium average wages for CEOs. We test our model using CEO pay and turnover data from 1970 to 2000. We show that CEO compensation is higher for CEOs hired from outside their firm, and for CEOs in industries where outside hiring is prevalent.CEO pay, CEO turnover, General skills, Firms specific skills

Culture and Development:An Analytical Framework

This paper develops a framework which analyzes how a population's culture affects the decisions of rational profit maximizing firms, while simultaneously exploring how the actions of these firms in turn affect the population's culture.By endogenizing culture as well as the more usual economic variables, it shows how an economically valuablebehavioural trait can be sustained as part of a competitive equilibrium.It is shown that, for given primitives, an economy can be in either a 'good' steady state, in which the valuable cultural trait is present, or a welfare dominated 'bad' one in which the valuable cultural trait disappears.Starting from the 'good' steady state and implementing productivity improvements raises welfare, but if changes are too rapid this steady state will not be reached from the old one.Instead, the unique trajectory is to the bad steady state where welfare is reduced.

Trust, Social Capital and Economic Development

Many argue that elements of a society s norms, culture or social capital are central to understanding its development.However, these notions have been difficult to capture in economic models.Here we argue that trustworthiness is the economically relevant component of a society s culture and hence comprises its social capital.Individuals are trustworthy when they perform actions they have promised, even if these do not maximize their payoffs.The usual focus on incentive structures in motivating behaviour plays no role here.Instead, we emphasize more deep-seated modes of behaviour and consider that trustworthy agents are socialized to act as they do.To model this socialization, we borrow from a relatively new process of preference evolution pioneered by Bisin and Verdier (2001).The model developed endogenously accounts for social capital and explores its role in the process of economic development.It captures in a simple, formal way the interaction between social capital and the economy s productive process.The results obtained caution against rapid reform, provide an explanation for why late developing countries cannot easily transplant the modes of production that have proved useful in the West, and suggest an explanation for the pattern of reform experiences in ex-communist countries.

Delegated job design

We develop a theory of delegation within organizations where agents are privately informed about whether they should be engaged in exploitation or in exploration activities. Excessive delegation lead agents to inefficiently herd into exploration in an attempt to boost their market value. The theory is consistent with both high-delegation practices and practices where agents are assigned to activities. Our main result is that an agent should be delegated more the weaker career concerns, a variable that is made endogenous through the firm's technology and its degree of transparency. The theory sheds light on empirical regularities that are previously unexplained, such as a positive relation between wages and delegation, and delegation being more prevalent in closed environments or environments with long-term employment contracts

Managerial Capital and the Market for CEOs

This paper reconciles two pronounced trends in U.S. corporate governance: the increase in pay levels for top executives, and the increasing prevalence of appointing CEOs through external hiring rather than internal promotions. We propose that these trends reflect a shift in the relative importance of “managerial ability” (transferable across companies) and “firm-specific human capital” (valuable only within the organization). We show that if the supply of workers in the corporate sector is relatively elastic, an increase in the relative importance of managerial ability leads to fewer promotions, more external hires, and an increase in equilibrium average wages for CEOs. We test our model using CEO pay and turnover data from 1970 to 2000. We show that CEO compensation is higher for CEOs hired from outside their firm, and for CEOs in industries where outside hiring is prevalent