Elites, democracy, and parties in the Italian Constituent debates, 1946–1947

Discussions of the role and legitimacy of elites in democratic societies have rarely taken the shape of debates about the internal organization and working of political parties. Except for Michels and Ostrogorski, the party has not received much attention from theorists interested in the elitist dimensions of democratic politics. In this article, I purport to look at the party as a battling ground for competing accounts of the role elites should play in modern democratic societies. However, I will not focus on theoretical analyses of the party. Rather, I will look at how political actors discussed the party in the context of the constituent debates at the Italian Constituent Assembly of 1946–1947. These debates do not explicitly deal with the role elites should play in democratic society. Instead, they center on whether and how the constitution should regulate political parties. Yet while discussing details of legal regulation, the constituents offered contrasting understandings of modern democracy, competing accounts of the role of the masses as well as of the elites, and creative attempts to create stable compromises between the two in a changing society. It is through the reconstruction of these rather practical debates that I aim to uncover how one of the main questions of modern democracy—the relation between elites and masses—has been dealt with politically. This, I suggest, is not only interesting for political or historiographical reasons, but also has theoretical relevance. Not only it directly speaks to recent debates about partisanship and intraparty deliberation, but it is also by looking at political institutions and the reasoning behind their creation that one can recover complex political thinking.1 This, I believe, is made particularly interesting by the fact that it results from long and complicated processes of negotiation of contrasting values as well as from the translation of political ideals into working institutional structures. Reconstructing these processes of negotiation and translation is what I plan to do in this article

Cosmopolitanism, Self-Interest and World Government

Cosmopolitans, if they are interested in seeing their principles realised, must hope that persons worldwide can become motivated to act in accordance with what those principles demand. But although it is important that genuinely moral motives are developed, we should not ignore the potential pragmatic value of self-interested motives to the realisation of cosmopolitan ends. This article considers three such motives: economic self-interest, prudent self-interest and democratic self-interest. I argue that in each case, usefully harnessing these motivations implies or requires global political integration that amounts to ‘world government’. This argument has the effect of reinforcing the already popular view that realising cosmopolitan principles entails global political integration. For those who already endorse that view, my argument will act as supporting evidence; by contrast it represents a challenge to those cosmopolitans who have remained ambivalent about, or indeed have explicitly rejected, the need for global political integration

"Actual" does not imply "feasible"

The familiar complaint that some ambitious proposal is infeasible naturally invites the following response: Once upon a time, the abolition of slavery and the enfranchisement of women seemed infeasible, yet these things were actually achieved. Presumably, then, many of those things that seem infeasible in our own time may well be achieved too and, thus, turn out to have been perfectly feasible after all. The Appeal to History, as we call it, is a bad argument. It is not true that if some desirable state of affairs was actually achieved, then it was feasible that it was achieved. “Actual” does not imply “feasible,” as we put it. Here is our objection. “Feasible” implies “not counterfactually fluky.” But “actual” does not imply “not counterfactually fluky.” So, “actual” does not imply “feasible.” While something like the Flukiness Objection is sometimes hinted at in the context of the related literature on abilities, it has not been developed in any detail, and both premises are inadequately motivated. We offer a novel articulation of the Flukiness Objection that is both more precise and better motivated. Our conclusions have important implications, not only for the admissible use of history in normative argument, but also by potentially circumscribing the normative claims that are applicable to us

Facts, Principles, and (Real) Politics

Should our factual understanding of the world influence our normative theorising about it? G.A. Cohen has argued that our ultimate normative principles should not be constrained by facts. Many others have defended or are committed to various versions or subsets of that claim. In this paper I dispute those positions by arguing that, in order to resist the conclusion that ultimate normative principles rest on facts about possibility or conceivability, one has to embrace an unsatisfactory account of how principles generate normative political judgments. So political theorists have to choose between principles ostensibly unbiased by our current understanding of human motivation and political reality, or principles capable of reliably generating political judgments. I conclude with wider methodological observations in defence of the latter option, and so of a return to political philosophy’s traditional blend of normative and descriptive elements

'Is there a Human Right to Immigrate?'

The chapter critically examines three strategies used to defend a human right to immigrate, understood as a universal right to cross and remain within state borders. The direct strategy looks for essential interests that could ground such a right, but the interests requiring migration are specific to particular persons rather than generic. Instrumental arguments try unsuccessfully to present the right to migrate as necessary to safeguard other human rights. The cantilever strategy holds that it is inconsistent to recognize a domestic right of free movement while denying the corresponding international right. But an extensive domestic right of free movement is necessary to protect citizens from specific threats posed by the state, which are not replicated at international level. Finally three reasons why states and their citizens may have a legitimate interest in controlling immigration are advanced: population size, cultural integrity, and the composition of the citizen body itself

The Albanian Renaissance in political thought: between the Enlightenment and Romanticism

The conceptual genealogy of the Albanian so-called Renaissance is often linked to the influence of Western Romantic ideas on the nationalist movements of the Balkans. This paper analyzes the specificities of the Albanian cultural and political context and suggests, by contrast, that Enlightenment categories provide a better means of comprehension of this stage in Albanian intellectual history. It focuses on the ideological function played by the critique of religion as well as by a cultural project addressed to political struggle and emphasizes its roots in the Enlightenment tradition. It finally argues that Enlightenment concepts such as self-criticism and rational teleology might help to grasp some unique features of the Renaissance movement and to construct a more sophisticated account of the emergence of the Albanian modern state

Rethinking the modern prince: partisanship and the democratic ethos

This article lays out and defends the role of political parties in cultivating a democratic ethos among citizens. It argues that citizens' commitment to the democratic idea of self-rule requires positive conviction of the worth of collective political agency, and suggests that this conviction draws on three main sources, characterised as normative, motivational and executive. The article shows theoretically why parties are able to cultivate all three sources in a way no other political actor can match, thus constituting a unique and indispensable mode of civic engagement. Moreover, it proposes that the widely noted shortcomings of parties in contemporary democracy leave this basic capacity unimpaired, indeed that certain important developments herald renewed opportunities

Democratic dictatorship: political legitimacy in Marxist perspective

This article aims to contextualise, explain and defend the relevance of Marx’s analysis of the dictatorship of the proletariat for contemporary debates on political legitimacy. I call my reconstruction of the Marxist contribution to this debate: the limited legitimacy theory of political authority. Such a theory, I contend, offers a plausible alternative to existing liberal and anarchist accounts and has important implications for a number of key debates in political theory, including the normative significance of the state, the relationship between authority and freedom, the role of democracy, and the meaning and relevance of communist utopia