Economics education and value change: The role of program-normative homogeneity and peer influence

In the light of corporate scandals and the recent financial crisis, there has been an increased interest in the impact of business education on the value orientations of graduates. Yet our understanding of how students' values change during their time at business school is limited. In this study,weinvestigate the effects of variations in the normative orientations of economics programs. We argue that interaction among economics students constitutes a key mechanism of value socialization, the effects of which are likely to vary across more-or-less normatively homogeneous economics programs. In normatively homogeneous programs, students are particularly likely to adopt economics values as a result of peer interaction. We specifically explore changes in power, hedonism, and self-direction values in a 2-year longitudinal study of economics students (N 5 197) in a normatively homogeneous and two normatively heterogeneous economics programs. As expected, for students in a normatively homogeneous economics program, interaction with peers was linked with an increase in power and hedonism values, and a decrease in self-direction values. Our findings highlight the interplay between program normative homogeneity and peer interaction as an important factor in value socialization during economics education and have important practical implications for business school leaders

Selfish and Indoctrinated Economists?

economists, public good, giving behaviour, education, selection,

Borrower Self-Selection, Underwriting Costs, and Subprime Mortgage Credit Supply

In the U.S., households participate in two very different types of credit markets. Personal lending is characterized by continuous risk-based pricing in which lenders offer households a continuous distribution of borrowing possibilities based on estimates of their creditworthiness. This contrasts sharply with mortgage markets where lenders specialize in specific risk categories of borrowers and mortgage supply is stepwise linear. The contrast between continuous lending for personal loans and discrete lending by specialized lenders for mortgage credit has led to concerns regarding the efficiency and equity of mortgage lending. This paper sheds both theoretical and empirical light on the differences in the two credit markets. The theory section demonstrates why, in a perfectly competitive credit market where all lenders have the same underwriting technology, mortgage credit supply curves are stepwise linear and lenders specialize in prime or subprime lending. The empirical section then provides evidence that borrowers are being effectively sorted based on risk characteristics by the market. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2004subprime, lending, mortgage, self-selection, market segmentation, credit, predatory lending,