Elliptic Curve Cryptography in Practice

In this paper, we perform a review of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), as it is used in practice today, in order to reveal unique mistakes and vulnerabilities that arise in implementations of ECC. We study four popular protocols that make use of this type of public-key cryptography: Bitcoin, secure shell (SSH), transport layer security (TLS), and the Austrian e-ID card. We are pleased to observe that about 1 in 10 systems support ECC across the TLS and SSH protocols. However, we find that despite the high stakes of money, access and resources protected by ECC, implementations suffer from vulnerabilities similar to those that plague previous cryptographic systems

A thermal‐gradient approach to variable‐temperature measurements resolved in space

Peer Reviewedhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/155923/1/jcr2te5056.pd

Imperfect forward secrecy: How Diffie-Hellman fails in practice

International audienceWe investigate the security of Diffie-Hellman key exchange as used in popular Internet protocols and find it to be less secure than widely believed. First, we present Logjam, a novel flaw in TLS that lets a man-in-the-middle downgrade connections to "export-grade" Diffie-Hellman. To carry out this attack, we implement the number field sieve discrete logarithm algorithm. After a week-long precomputation for a specified 512-bit group, we can compute arbitrary discrete logarithms in that group in about a minute. We find that 82% of vulnerable servers use a single 512-bit group, and that 8.4% of Alexa Top Million HTTPS sites are vulnerable to the attack. a In response, major browsers have changed to reject short groups. We go on to consider Diffie-Hellman with 768-and 1024-bit groups. We estimate that even in the 1024-bit case, the computations are plausible given nation-state resources. A small number of fixed or standardized groups are used by millions of servers; performing precomputation for a single 1024-bit group would allow passive eavesdropping on 18% of popular HTTPS sites, and a second group would allow decryption of traffic to 66% of IPsec VPNs and 26% of SSH servers. A close reading of published NSA leaks shows that the agency's attacks on VPNs are consistent with having achieved such a break. We conclude that moving to stronger key exchange methods should be a priority for the Internet community

Imperfect Forward Secrecy: How Diffie-Hellman Fails in Practice

International audienceWe investigate the security of Diffie-Hellman key exchange as used in popular Internet protocols and find it to be less secure than widely believed. First, we present Logjam, a novel flaw in TLS that lets a man-in-the-middle downgrade connections to " export-grade " Diffie-Hellman. To carry out this attack, we implement the number field sieve discrete log algorithm. After a week-long precomputation for a specified 512-bit group, we can compute arbitrary discrete logs in that group in about a minute. We find that 82% of vulnerable servers use a single 512-bit group, allowing us to compromise connections to 7% of Alexa Top Million HTTPS sites. In response, major browsers are being changed to reject short groups. We go on to consider Diffie-Hellman with 768-and 1024-bit groups. A small number of fixed or standardized groups are in use by millions of servers. Performing precomputations for just ten of these groups would allow a passive eavesdropper to decrypt traffic to up to 66% of IPsec VPN servers, 26% of SSH servers, 24% of popular HTTPS sites, or 16% of SMTP servers. In the 1024-bit case, we estimate that such computations are plausible given nation-state resources, and a close reading of published NSA leaks shows that the agency's attacks on VPNs are consistent with having achieved such a break. We conclude that moving to stronger key exchange methods should be a priority for the Internet community

Beneficial immune modulatory effects of a specific nutritional combination in a murine model for cancer cachexia

The majority of patients with advanced cancer are recognised by impaired immune competence influenced by several factors, including the type and stage of the tumour and the presence of cachexia. Recently, a specific nutritional combination containing fish oil, specific oligosaccharide mixture, high protein content and leucine has been developed aimed to support the immune system of cancer patients in order to reduce the frequency and severity of (infectious) complications. In a recently modified animal model cachexia is induced by inoculation of C26 tumour cells in mice. In a pre-cachectic state, no effect was observed on contact hypersensitivity, a validated in vivo method to measure Th1-mediated immune function, after adding the individual nutritional ingredients to the diet of tumour-bearing mice. However, the complete mixture resulted in significantly improved Th1 immunity. Moreover, in a cachectic state, the complete mixture reduced plasma levels of pro-inflammatory cytokines and beneficially affected ex vivo immune function. Accordingly, the combination of the nutritional ingredients is required to obtain a synergistic effect, leading to a reduced inflammatory state and improved immune competence. From this, it can be concluded that the specific nutritional combination has potential as immune-supporting nutritional intervention to reduce the risk of (infectious) complications in cancer patients