Are UK citizens losing out in Brussels? Not really

A common criticism of the EU is that Britain lacks influence in Brussels and Strasbourg and can be overruled by other nations. Christopher Wratil uses data from Eurobarometer surveys to analyse whether the EU does act in accordance with public opinion and, specifically, how well the views of UK citizens are represented compared to citizens in other EU countries

Which argument will win the referendum – immigration, or the economy?

The UK is set to vote on its EU membership on Thursday. Which arguments have resonated most with voters throughout the campaign? Sara Hobolt and Christopher Wratil present survey evidence indicating that immigration and the economy have been the most prominent topics. Undecided voters have, however, been less moved by these issues and cite misinformation and distrust in politicians as their reasons for remaining on the fence

Europe’s Choice Populist attitudes and voting intentions in the 2019 European election. Bertelsmann Policy Brief 01.2019

Representation gaps cause populism: those who feel that they are poorly represented are more populist in their thinking and at the polls. The same also applies to the 2019 European elections. However, populist citizens only agree on two things: they are sceptical towards Europe and dissatisfied with EU democracy. When it comes to substantive political issues, left-wing and right-wing populist voters are even more divided than the voters of the mainstream parties. This makes it more difficult to form new majorities in the next European Parliament

The myth of the 'boring election': populism and the 2017 German election

The German federal elections scheduled for 24 September are widely expected to produce another victory for Angela Merkel's CDU/CSU. As Fabian G. Neuner and Christopher Wratil highlight, however, Merkel's dominant position in the polling has potentially masked some interesting developments during the campaign. Chief among these is that there has been a rise in populist sentiment in Germany, which is fuelling support for the right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD) and damaging the CDU/CSU more than any other party

Will Italy’s post-Renzi government be led by a technocrat?

Already before Matteo Renzi had lost his constitutional referendum, media around the world claimed that a ‘government of technocrats’ was the most likely option to follow Renzi in case of electoral defeat. Drawing on their analysis of all technocratic governments appointed in 30 European democracies after 1977, Christopher Wratil and Giulia Pastorella estimate a rather low probability of 12-18% for the next Italian administration to be led by a technocrat. A technocratic government is therefore definitely possible but not as likely as suggested by the media

Voters can become more populist if parties don’t represent their views

Do voters become more populist if no party represents their views? Bruno Castanho Silva and Christopher Wratil conducted an experiment in twelve European countries during the 2019 European Parliament election campaign to see how citizens react when told that no party shares their opinions on issues. The study shows that a lack of representation increases populist sentiment among those who were not populist before

Public opinion and the crisis: the dynamics of support for the euro

Further integration in the European Union (EU) increasingly depends on public legitimacy. The global financial crisis and the subsequent euro area crisis have amplified both the salience and the redistributive consequences of decisions taken in Brussels, raising the question of how this has influenced public support for European integration. In this contribution, we examine how public opinion has responded to the crisis, focusing on support for monetary integration. Interestingly, our results show that support for the euro has remained high within the euro area; however, attitudes are increasingly driven by utilitarian considerations, whereas identity concerns have become less important. While the crisis has been seen to deepen divisions within Europe, our findings suggest that it has also encouraged citizens in the euro area to form opinions on the euro on the basis of a cost–benefit analysis of European economic governance, rather than relying primarily on national attachments

Does the UK lose out in the Council? How opposition to EU proposals acts as a signal to domestic audiences

Those campaigning for a leave vote in Britain’s upcoming referendum often state that the UK has never been on the winning side when it has voted against a proposal in the Council of the European Union. Remain campaigners, however, have responded by arguing that agreements are made by consensus in the Council and that the UK has a strong level of influence. Sara Hagemann, Sara B. Hobolt and Christopher Wratil write that in reality votes against a proposal in the Council act largely as signals to a government’s domestic audience, and this explains why UK governments have voted against proposals more than other member states

Governing Europe for the people? Citizen representation in European Union policy-making

The degree to which European Union (EU) policy-making is representative of citizens’ preferences is a central contested issue in the debate over the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’. Previous studies have demonstrated that in many cases political representatives share their voters’ attitudes to the EU. However, this research has rarely considered the substance of actual legislative policy-making in the EU institutions. Scrutinising the popular image that EU policy-making is unresponsive to public demands, the thesis investigates EU-level representation along the ‘domestic route’, on which citizens’ preferences intrude policymaking through their national governments in the Council of the EU. Using a range of original and existing datasets, the four papers investigate three classic assessment criteria of representation (mandate fulfilment, responsiveness, congruence) with methods ranging from mixed effects regressions to quantitative text analysis. Three central findings emerge: first, national governments are responsive to their domestic public opinion when negotiating and voting on legislative acts in the EU. Regarding legislative conflicts over left-right issues, responsiveness is stronger with majoritarian than proportional electoral systems and peaks when national elections are imminent. When it comes to pro-anti integration conflicts, responsiveness is conditional on the salience of EU issues in national political arenas. Second, executive coordination and parliamentary oversight in EU affairs limit the discretion of national ministers in EU negotiations and help governments to deliver their electoral mandates. Third, final EU policy output is most responsive to and congruent with the views of those national publics that have clear-cut opinions on a policy issue and care intensely about it. These findings are evidence of surprising patterns of citizen representation in EU policy-making. They suggest that politicisation of the EU and the diffusion of executive coordination and parliamentary oversight in EU affairs could strengthen representation. Yet, evidence remains scarce that better representation will end the EU’s legitimacy crisis

Appeasing Eurosceptics? What’s really going on when Britain votes No in the Council of the EU

Those campaigning for a Leave vote in the EU referendum often state that the UK has never been on the winning side when it has voted against a proposal in the Council of the European Union. Remain campaigners, however, have responded by arguing that agreements are made by consensus in the Council and that the UK has a strong influence. Sara Hagemann, Sara Hobolt and Christopher Wratil (left to right) write that in reality, votes against a proposal in the Council act largely as signals to a government’s domestic audience, and this explains why UK governments have voted against proposals more than other member states