A Comparison: The Islamic Revolution of 1979 and Iran's Green Movement of 2009

In the summer of 2009 thousands of voices combined as Iranians, young and old, cried out in reaction to the presidential election from their rooftops—"Marg Bar Dictator" (death to the dictator) and "Allahu Akbar" (God is great). In the weeks following President Ahmadinejad‟s "victory", voices from the rooftops of Tehran and other major Iranian cities reverberated with revolutionary phrases that had not been heard in almost thirty years. This widespread civil disobedience, along with the daily demonstrations taking place on the street, signaled the Iranian people‟s challenge of the Islamic government.But after months of mass protests, why was there no political change after the 2009 Iranian presidential election? Why did the demonstrations that had up to 3 million protestors stop while in 1979 similar dissent developed into a revolutionary movement? These questions will be addressed by comparing four significant variables common to both the 1979 Revolution and the 2009 Green Movement; international pressure, internal pressure, strength of opposition, and governmental tactics used against the opposition. The analysis of these variables will illuminate the similarities and differences between 1979 and 2009 and examine under what conditions a political opposition movement could be successful in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The simple fact that Iranians were yelling from the rooftops like they did 30 years ago against the Shah, demonstrates they have not forgotten about the Islamic Revolution of 1979. And they have certainly not forgotten about the outcome—the capture of the political movement, which began as a democratic process, by Islamic extremists. The Iranian people eager to rid themselves of an autocratic government, but realize true regime change takes time. Iranians today have learned the lessons of the 1979 Revolution

Sexual harassment is not a laughing matter

Two letters to the Editor of The Daily Maine Campus from two female undergraduate students requesting to remain anonymous. The students report on a off-campus party where they allegedly experienced multiple incidents of sexual harassment and sexual assault

Learning from lived experience in government care : sharing gains in knowledge and practice in youth participation with key care stakeholders

Increasingly progressive organisations are changing how they see and work with young people. Such organisations as well as government are acknowledging the invaluable skills and insights young people with lived experiences can contribute as youth leaders, and genuine co-design partners shaping policy with key decision makers. This paper presents three care experienced perspectives on the benefits and challenges of capturing the voices of young people to inform policy and organisational decision-making in youth services. Sharing models of effective youth participation in policy development may lead to improved policy making and greater efficiency in child welfare service delivery. Encouraging young people's participation and empowerment involves a range of 'soft skills' that can be resource and time intensive. Sharing learning and knowledge from and about this work can be difficult as a result. The authors work on many innovative and important youth participation projects and seek to share young people's suggestions for how to facilitate meaningful participation for young people. Strategies for avoiding tokenism and increasing shared decision-making are discussed

Reinventing the Looking Glass: Developing a Canadian Foreign Intelligence Service

Should Canada create its own foreign intelligence service? This paper will explore this issue in five stages. First, a brief examination of Canada’s intelligence history will discuss how Canada has engaged in espionage and examine why it has failed to establish a foreign intelligence service. Second, the thesis will delineate Canada’s foreign intelligence community, the major collectors of foreign intelligence, and assess foreign intelligence support for United Nations peacekeeping. The third stage of the examination will be a critical analysis of Canada’s intelligence capabilities. This will lead to the fourth stage, the debate over whether Canada needs a foreign intelligence service. Fifth, the method will be suggested for creating a Canadian secret service as well as reforming Canada’s intelligence infrastructure and the Canadian Forces Information Operations doctrine

This manuscript is no longer available

This manuscrpt was retracted on August 19, 2014. Please contact our office at [email protected] for more information