915 research outputs found

    Laplacian spectrum for the nilpotent Kac-Moody Lie algebras

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    We prove that the maximal nilpotent subalgebra of a Kac-Moody Lie algebra has an (essentially unique) Euclidean metric with respect to which the Laplace operator in the chain complex is scalar on each component of a given degree. Moreover, both the Lie algebra structure and the metric are uniquely determined by this property.Comment: 11 page

    Certain biological principles illustrated by natural color slides

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    Text is accompanied by 30 colored slides. Thesis (Ed.M.)--Boston Universit

    Skylab Earth Resources

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    The successful launch of Skylab on May 14, 1973, provided an unique space platform for study of the ocean, land and atmospheric phenomena of this planet earth. At an altitude of 234 nautical miles above the earth, the 100 ton experimental station orbited the earth every 93 minutes and repeats the same revolution every 5 days. In a near circular orbit, Skylab crossed major parts of the world\u27s land masses and the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian oceans between 50 north and 50 south latitudes. During the 171 days in space, the nine crew members surveyed selected portions of this planet with an array of sophisticated photographic, infrared and microwave sensors that have not been previously flown for earth resources investigations. These sensors formed the Earth Resources Experiment Package (EREP). Figure 1 describes the instruments and the principal use of the sensor data in study of earth. The footprint for each sensor is shown in Figure 2. The camera system consists of two parts. The multispectral camera (S-190A) is an array of six 70mm cameras boresighted so the features seen in one photograph can be simultaneously identified in the photographs from the other five cameras. With this system, images of earth features were obtained on color, color infrared, black-and-white infrared, and black-and-white film. Each photograph covers 163 Km square. The Earth Terrain Camera (S-190B) overlapped the field of view of the S-190A system and recorded information on black-and-white , color and color infrared film. Each photograph covers 109 Km square. The infrared spectrometer was boresighted with a crew-operated movable telescope for conducting radiance measurements of homogeneous areas approximately one-half kilometer in diameter. The multispectral scanner (S-192) is a 13-channel instrument capable of measuring simultaneously in the visible, reflected infrared and one channel in the thermal infrared regions of the spectrum along a 68 Km wide swath. The microwave system (S-193) combines a passive radiometer and an active scatterometer and altimeter in a single frequency of 13 OGHz . This system has an 11 Km field of view and a two axis gimballsd antenna for use in obtaining data 45 forward and to either side of this groundtrack. The sixth instrument is the L-band radiometer (S-194) that operates at a 1. 4 GH frequency and has all Km field of view

    Present practices in student teaching in seventeen New England state teachers colleges and normal schools

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    Thesis (M.A.)--Boston University, 1945. This item was digitized by the Internet Archive

    Proteomic analysis of the bovine and human ciliary zonule

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    PURPOSE: The zonule of Zinn (ciliary zonule) is a system of fibers that centers the crystalline lens on the optical axis of the eye. Mutations in zonule components underlie syndromic conditions associated with a broad range of ocular pathologies, including microspherophakia and ectopia lentis. Here, we used HPLC–mass spectrometry to determine the molecular composition of the zonule. METHODS: Tryptic digests of human and bovine zonular samples were analyzed by HPLC–mass spectrometry. The distribution of selected components was confirmed by immunofluorescence confocal microscopy. In bovine samples, the composition of the equatorial zonule was compared to that of the hyaloid zonule and vitreous humor. RESULTS: The 52 proteins common to the zonules of both species accounted for >95% of the zonular protein. Glycoproteins constituted the main structural components, with two proteins, FBN1 and LTBP2, constituting 70%–80% of the protein. Other abundant components were MFAP2, EMILIN-1, and ADAMTSL-6. Lysyl oxidase-like 1, a crosslinking enzyme implicated in collagen and elastin biogenesis, was detected at significant levels. The equatorial and hyaloid zonular samples were compositionally similar to each other, although the hyaloid sample was relatively enriched in the proteoglycan opticin and the fibrillar collagens COL2A1, COL11A1, COL5A2, and COL5A3. CONCLUSIONS: The zonular proteome was surprisingly complex. In addition to structural components, it contained signaling proteins, protease inhibitors, and crosslinking enzymes. The equatorial and hyaloid zonules were similar in composition, but the latter may form part of a composite structure, the hyaloid membrane, that stabilizes the vitreous face

    Comparative Perceptions of Adult Learners in an Online and Face-to-Face Course

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    The purpose of this research was to compare the perceptions and experiences of adult learners in two sections of the same course on adult learning at the University of Missouri-St. Louis (UMSL); one section was face-to-face and the other section met exclusively online. The subjects were a convenience group of students who had enrolled in the course. The two sections were conducted by the same instructor during the same semester, covered the same course content, and contained identical learning objectives and assignments. All students had the option of taking the course on campus (face-to-face) or completely online. Because the purpose of this research was to describe in rich detail the perceptions and experiences of these learners, the ethnographic participant observer model was used; the questions of transactional distance and learner autonomy were also addressed. Finally, cultural domains for both groups were identified. Data from both course sections were gathered in the form of transcribed classroom discussions, online forum discussions, course email, student interviews, researcher field notes and an online survey. Identification and analysis of cultural domains indicates that the perceptions and experiences of online students were different from those of the face-to-face students. The primary difference between both was a context for interaction. The face-to-face group had a rich social context; and the online group had only a text-based context. The primary similarity for both groups was the same course content. Additional domains were also identified. Both groups relied on MyGateway (UMSL’s version of Blackboard); online students used it for all course-related tasks while face-to-face students relied on it primarily as a course supplement. Data revealed that while most students from both sections found their learning experience interesting and rewarding, those taking the course face-to-face found the social interaction to be a particularly positive experience. While students appreciated the online class option they would have preferred the face-to-face learning environment. Online students also experienced technology-related problems; for students taking the course face to face, technology-related problems were non-existent. Further research is recommended in the area of development and enhancement of social interaction for online students

    The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-To-Fail Problem

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    The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ( Dodd-Frank ) was enacted in July 2010. Dodd-Frank\u27s preamble proclaims that one of the statute\u27s primary purposes is to end \u27too big to fail\u27 [and] to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts. Dodd-Frank does contain useful reforms, including potentially favorable alterations to the supervisory and resolution regimes for systemically important financial institutions ( SIFIs ). However, Dodd-Frank falls far short of the fundamental reforms that would be needed to eliminate (or at least greatly reduce) the public subsidies that are currently exploited by too big to fail ( TBTF ) financial institutions. After briefly describing the financial crisis that led to the enactment of Dodd-Frank, this article evaluates whether the new statute is likely to solve the TBTF problem. Dodd-Frank establishes a new umbrella oversight body – the Financial Stability Oversight Council – that will designate SIFIs and make recommendations for their regulation. The statute also authorizes the Federal Reserve Board ( FRB ) to apply enhanced supervisory requirements to SIFIs. Most importantly, Dodd-Frank establishes a new systemic resolution regime – the Orderly Liquidation Authority ( OLA ) – that should provide a superior alternative to the bailout or bankruptcy choice that federal regulators confronted when they dealt with failing SIFIs during the financial crisis. Nevertheless, Dodd-Frank does not solve the TBTF problem. Congress did not adequately strengthen statutory limits on the ability of large complex financial institutions ( LCFIs ) to grow through mergers and acquisitions. The enhanced prudential standards to be imposed on SIFIs under Dodd-Frank rely heavily on capital-based regulation, which has repeatedly failed to prevent financial crises in the past. Moreover, the success of Dodd-Frank\u27s supervisory reforms will depend heavily on many of the same federal agencies that failed to stop excessive risk-taking by LCFIs in the past and, in the process, showed their vulnerability to political influence wielded by LCFIs and their trade associations. Dodd-Frank\u27s most promising reform – the OLA – does not completely close the door to future transactions that protect creditors of failing LCFIs. The FRB and the Federal Home Loan Banks retain authority to provide emergency liquidity assistance to troubled LCFIs. The FDIC can borrow from the Treasury and can also use the systemic risk exception to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act in order to generate funding to protect creditors of failed SIFIs and their subsidiary banks. While Dodd-Frank has made bailouts more difficult, the continued existence of these additional sources of financial assistance indicates that Dodd-Frank probably will not prevent TBTF rescues during future episodes of systemic financial distress. Contrary to my earlier recommendation, Dodd-Frank does not require SIFIs to pay risk-based assessments to pre-fund the Orderly Liquidation Fund ( OLF ), which will cover the costs of resolving failed SIFIs. Instead, the OLF will be forced to borrow the necessary funds in the first instance from the Treasury (i.e., the taxpayers). Dodd-Frank also does not include my previous proposal for a strict regime of structural separation between SIFI-owned banks and their nonbank affiliates. Thus, unlike Dodd-Frank, my earlier proposals would (i) require SIFIs to internalize the potential costs of their activities by paying risk-based premiums to pre-fund the OLF, and (ii) prevent SIFI-owned banks from transferring their safety net subsidies to their nonbank affiliates. In combination, my proposals would strip away many of the public subsidies currently exploited by financial conglomerates and would subject them to the same type of market discipline that investors have applied over the past three decades in breaking up inefficient commercial and industrial conglomerates. Financial conglomerates have never demonstrated their ability to provide beneficial services to customers and attractive returns to investors without relying on federal safety net subsidies during good times and taxpayer-financed bailouts during crises. Congress must remove those subsidies and create a true “market test” for LCFIs, in which case market forces would probably compel many LCFIs to break up voluntarily

    Receipt from Wilmarth & Son to Ogden Goelet

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    https://digitalcommons.salve.edu/ochre-court/1186/thumbnail.jp

    Narrow Banking: An Overdue Reform that Could Solve the Too-Big-To-Fail Problem and Align U.S. And U.K. Regulation of Financial Conglomerates

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    This article is based on testimony presented on December 7, 2011, before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Protection of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. The article provides an update and extension of my previous work showing that: (1) the U.S., U.K. and other developed nations provided enormous subsidies for “too-big-to-fail” (“TBTF”) financial institutions during the financial crisis, thereby creating dangerous distortions in our financial markets and economies; (2) large financial conglomerates follow a hazardous business model that is riddled with conflicts of interest and prone to speculative risk-taking; (3) the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) creates helpful new tools for regulating systemically important financial institutions (“SIFIs”) and dealing with their potential failure, but Dodd-Frank does not completely close the door to government bailouts of creditors of SIFIs; (4) Dodd-Frank relies on the same regulatory techniques – including capital-based regulation and prudential supervision – that failed to prevent the banking and thrift crises of the 1980s and the current financial crisis; and (5) Dodd-Frank also depends on many of the same federal agencies that failed to stop excessive risk-taking by financial institutions during the credit boom that preceded both crises.In view of Dodd-Frank’s shortcomings, the article reiterates my proposals for more extensive structural reforms and activity limitations that would (i) prevent SIFIs from using federal safety net subsidies to support their capital markets activities, and (ii) make it easier for regulators to separate banks from their nonbank affiliates when financial conglomerates fail. Congress should mandate a pre-funded Orderly Liquidation Fund (“OLF”) and should require all bank and nonbank SIFIs to pay risk-based assessments to the OLF to provide for the future costs of resolving failed SIFIs. Congress should also mandate a “narrow bank” structure for financial conglomerates that would (a) protect the Deposit Insurance Fund from the risks created by nonbank affiliates of SIFI-owned banks, and (b) prevent narrow banks from transferring their FDIC-insured, low-cost funding advantages to their nonbank affiliates. My recommended reforms are similar to the “ring-fencing” proposal issued by the U.K. Independent Commission on Banking and endorsed by the Cameron coalition government. The narrow bank concept provides a promising way for the U.S. and the U.K. to adopt a common approach for regulating financial conglomerates. If the U.S. and the U.K. adopted consistent regimes for controlling the risks posed by SIFIs, they would place great pressure on other developed nations to follow suit
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