The Plurality of Consciousness

There are many, distinct phenomena that have gone under the name “consciousness,” and there are many corresponding problems that have all been labeled “the problem of consciousness.” This paper distinguishes several of these distinct problems of consciousness, and proposes solutions to each of them

Slurs and lexical presumption

Grice's cryptic notion of “conventional implicature” has been developed in a number of different ways. This paper deploys the simplest version, Lycan's (1984) notion of “lexical presumption,” and argues that slurs and other pejorative expressions have normal truth-conditional content plus the most obvious extra implicatures. The paper then addresses and rebuts objections to “conventional implicature” accounts that have been made in the literature, particularly those which focus on non-offensive uses of slurs

On the Substitution of Identicals in Counterfactual Reasoning

It is widely held that counterfactuals, unlike attitude ascriptions, preserve the referential transparency of their constituents, i.e., that counterfactuals validate the substitution of identicals when their constituents do. The only putative counterexamples in the literature come from counterpossibles, i.e., counterfactuals with impossible antecedents. Advocates of counterpossibilism, i.e., the view that counterpossibles are not all vacuous, argue that counterpossibles can generate referential opacity. But in order to explain why most substitution inferences into counterfactuals seem valid, counterpossibilists also often maintain that counterfactuals with possible antecedents are transparency‐preserving. I argue that if counterpossibles can generate opacity, then so can ordinary counterfactuals with possible antecedents. Utilizing an analogy between counterfactuals and attitude ascriptions, I provide a counterpossibilist‐friendly explanation for the apparent validity of substitution inferences into counterfactuals. I conclude by suggesting that the debate over counterpossibles is closely tied to questions concerning the extent to which counterfactuals are more like attitude ascriptions and epistemic operators than previously recognized

Portland\u27s Changing Landscape

Occasional Papers in Geography Publication No. 4 What is the nature and character of Portland? What are the conditions, changes and developments that have made it what it is? How does Portland compare with other places? What makes it unique? These are some of the question pursued in this volume. This book contains thirteen chapters discussing various facets of Portland\u27s environmental, economy, and character. It is an up-to-date and comprehensive analysis of dynamics and change in the landscape. An overview is provided of Portland as a city and place to live, as well as its functional significance on a national and international basis. Two threads are woven through the tapestry of these essays. One is that Portland is a big city but with many attributes of a small town. The other is the closeness and accessibility of city and nature. The challenge is how to nurture and maintain both - to have our cake and eat it too. The evidence is clear that most American cities have not been able to achieve this. Only the future can tell how Portland will fare. The authors are all professional geographers or work in closely related fields. All have been involved with the Portland scene for a number of years and are uniquely qualified to write about these topics. While each approaches problems from his or her own perspective, the net result is a summing up, a taking stock of where we have been and where we are going. When considered as a whole the book should provide a better view than we have had of the nature and character of this special place.https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/geog_occasionalpaper/1000/thumbnail.jp

A TRUTH PREDICATE IN THE OBJECT LANGUAGE

The semantic paradoxes arise when the range of the quantifiers in the object language is too generous in certain ways. But it is not really clear how unfair to Urdu or to Hindi it would be to view the range of their quantifiers as insufficient to yield an explicit definition of ‗true-in-Urdu ‘ or ‗true-in-Hindi‘. Or, to put the matter in another, if not more serious, way, there may in the nature of the case always be something we grasp in understanding the language of another (the concept of truth) that we cannot communicate to him. In any case, most of the problems of general philosophical interest arise within a fragment of the relevant natural language that may be conceived as containing very little set theory. Of course these comments do not meet the claim that natural languages are universal. But it seems to me this claim, now that we know such universality leads to paradox, is suspect. –―Truth and Meaning‖ Thus did Davidson reply to Tarski‘s objection that a truth-theoretic semantics for a natural language will self-destruct when that language‘s Liar sentence rolls down the input chute