Bargaining under Large Risk - An Experimental Analysis -

We present an experimental study to learn about behavior in bargaining situations under large risks. In order to implement realistic risks involved in the field, we calibrate the experimental parameters from an environment involving substantial variation in profits, the motion picture industry. The leading example is the production of a movie that may give rise to a sequel, so actors and producers negotiate sequentially. We analyze the data in light of alternative behavioral approaches to understanding bargaining behavior under large risk.Bargaining, Large Risk, Equity, Experiments, Calibration

Fairness in the Mail and Opportunism in the Internet - A Newspaper Experiment on Ultimatum Bargaining

On 11 May 2001, readers of the Berliner Zeitung were invited to participate in an ultimatum bargaining experiment played in the strategy vector mode: each participant chooses not only how much (s)he demands of the DM1,000 pie but also which of the nine possible offers of DM100, 200,..., 900 (s)he would accept or reject. In addition, participants were asked to predict the most frequent type of behavior. Three randomly selected proposer-responder pairs were rewarded according to the rules of ultimatum bargaining and three randomly chosen participants of those who predicted the most frequent type of behavior received a prize of DM500. Decisions could be submitted by mail, fax or via the internet. Behavior is described, statistically analyzed and compared to the usual laboratory ultimatum bargaining results.Ultimatum bargaining, newspaper experiment, internet experiment, fairness, distribution conflicts

Sonderfälle bei germanischem p-, t-, k-Anlaut als Folge von s-mobile-Wirksamkeit

The essay represents the thesis that the s-mobile phenomenon had not only appeared in Indo-European, but stayed alive in Germanic until after the First Sound Shift. With this assumption a number of words with Germanic p-, t-, k- as initial sound can be put down to elder sp-, st-. sk- forms and can thus be better etymologized than until now. Furthermore, some words traditionally being seen as loanwords can be classified as Germanic. As shown in the essay new possibilities for interpreting river- and place-names arise

Der Flussname Unstrut

In den Namenkundlichen Informationen 99/100 stellen Harald Bichlmeier und Andreas Opfermann – nach harscher Kritik an den Deutungen des Flussnamens Unstrut von Jürgen Udolph und Albrecht Greule – einen eigenen Vorschlag zur Etymologie des Namens vor. Sie greifen auf die traditionelle Segmentierung Un-strut zurück, fassen auch -strut im traditionellen Sinne auf (bieten allerdings auch zwei abweichende Erklärungsmöglichkeiten an). Der Unterschied zur klassischen Deutung des Flussnamens besteht vor allem in der Erklärung des Vorderglieds un-. Sie schlagen vor, un- als „das schwundstufige Allomorph von uridg. *(h1)en ‘in’“ aufzufassen. So bestehe „nun die Möglichkeit, urgerm. *un-strōdV- als sog. entheos-Kompositum zu interpretieren.“ Als die wahrscheinlichste Deutung für Unstrut schlagen sie vor: ‘Sumpfgebiet an sich habend’ bzw. ‘[der Fluss,] in/an dem [= an dessen Ufer] Sumpfgebiet/Gebüsch ist’ (Bichlmeier / Opfermann 2011: 179). Die von Bichlmeier / Opfermann angenommene Bildungsweise mag, vom Indogermanischen her gesehen, formal möglich sein. Ob allerdings das Germanische, dem sie den Flussnamen zuordnen, die Möglichkeit zur Bildung sogenannter entheos-Komposita überhaupt (noch) hatte, scheint doch sehr fraglich zu sein. Die Verfasser führen mit ae. umbor ‘Kind’ ein singuläres Beispiel an, um eine solche grammatische Erscheinung im Germanischen nachzuweisen. Eindeutig ist das Beispiel meines Erachtens keineswegs

Durable-Goods Monopoly with Privately Known Impatience: A Theoretical and Experimental Study

We analyze a durable-goods monopoly which sells a single unit of a good to a buyer whose value of the good is private information. The discount factors of the buyer and the seller may differ and they are private knowledge. We solve for the closed-form solution of a two-period game and compare this solution with the behavior observed in laboratory experiments. The data are to a large extent consistent with the predictions

Auctions and Leaks: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation

We study first- and second-price private value auctions with sequential bidding where second movers may discover the first movers bids. There is a unique equilibrium in the first-price auction and multiple equilibria in the second-price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price rules are equivocal. We experimentally find that in the first-price auction, leaks benefit second movers but harm first movers and sellers. Low to medium probabilities of leak eliminate the usual revenue dominance of first-price over second-price auctions. With a high probability of a leak, second-price auctions generate higher revenue

Telling the other what one knows? Strategic lying in a modified acquiring-a-company experiment with two-sided private information

Lying for a strategic advantage is to be expected in commercial interactions. But would this be more or less obvious when lying could come from either party and question mutually profitable exchange? To explore this, we modify the acquiring-a-company game (Samuelson and Bazerman in Res Exp Econ 3:105–138, 1985) by letting both, buyer and seller, be privately informed. Specifically, the value of the company for the buyer is known only by the seller; whereas, only the buyer is aware by which proportion the sellers evaluation is lower than that of the buyer. Before bargaining, both parties can reveal what they know via cheap-talk numerical messages. Game theoretically, the pooling equilibrium may or may not allow for trade depending on the commonly known expected evaluation discrepancy. By mutually revealing what one knows, one could boost trade and efficiency. Although strategic misreporting prevails quite generally, it is higher for sellers throughout the experiment. Regarding gender, women misreport less, especially as sellers, and offer higher prices