Engineering the Modern Administrative State: Political Accommodation and Legal Strategy in the New Deal Era

Administrative constitutionalism in the United States has been characterized by tension and accommodation. The tension reflects the unsettled nature of our constitutional scheme, especially with regard to separation of powers, and also the concern with agency discretion and performance. Still and all, we have accommodated administrative constitutionalism in fundamental ways, through a constitutional jurisprudence that, in the main, accepts broad delegations of regulatory power to the bureaucracy and an administrative law that oversees agency actions under procedural and substantive guidelines. This was not always the case. In this Article , part one of a larger project, we revisit the critical New Deal period to look at the strategies the Congress and the Supreme Court used to resolve controversies over the emerging administrative state. We see the political and legal accommodation as a product of a (mostly) coherent interbranch dialogue, iterative and fueled by strategy. Having surmounted some important roadblocks in the first New Deal, this effort ultimately resulted in a scheme that enabled the federal government to accomplish their three critical objectives: to deploy national power to solve new economic problems, to create delegations appropriate to modern needs, and to craft novel administrative instruments to carry out legislative aims aims — all of which required a due amount of legal accommodation, given extant legal doctrine and the interests of the courts

Limited access orders in the developing world :a new approach to the problems of development

The upper-income, advanced industrial countries of the world today all have market economies with open competition, competitive multi-party democratic political systems, and a secure government monopoly over violence. Such open access orders, however, are not the only norm and equilibrium type of society. The middle and low-income developing countries today, like all countries before about 1800, can be understood as limited access orders that maintain their equilibrium in a fundamentally different way. In limited access orders, the state does not have a secure monopoly on violence, and society organizes itself to control violence among the elite factions. A common feature of limited access orders is that political elites divide up control of the economy, each getting some share of the rents. Since outbreaks of violence reduce the rents, the elite factions have incentives to be peaceable most of the time. Adequate stability of the rents and thus of the social order requires limiting access and competition-hence a social order with a fundamentally different logic than the open access order. This paper lays out such a framework and explores some of its implications for the problems of development today.Corporate Law,Labor Policies,Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures,E-Business,Disability

Executive Opportunism, Presidential Signing Statements, and the Separation of Powers

Executive discretion over policy outcomes is an inevitable feature of our political system. However, in recent years, the President has sought to expand his discretion through a variety of controversial and legally questionable tactics. Through a series of simple separation of powers models, we study one such tactic, employed by both Democratic and Republican presidents: the use of signing statements, which purport to have status in the interpretation of statutory meaning. Our models also show that signing statements upset the constitutional vision of lawmaking and, in a wide range of cases, exacerbate legislative gridlock. We argue that courts should not legally credit signing statements; we conclude by discussing executive opportunism broadly

Diagnosis of autosomal dominant polycystic kidney disease in utero and in the young infant.

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/135563/1/jum198765249.pd

Local governance and business performance in Vietnam:the transaction costs’ perspective

Local governance and business performance in Vietnam: the transaction costs’ perspective. Regional Studies. This paper adopts a transaction costs’ perspective to explain why the growth of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) may vary across regions of an emerging economy. Furthermore, it is argued that young and small firms gain more from the improvement of local governance than do old and large firms. In addition, depending on the institutional history, SMEs will respond differently to the incentives provided by local governance. Analysing more than 300,000 SMEs in Vietnam during 2006–12, it is shown that higher-quality local governance positively influences local SME revenue growth; this effect is stronger for young and small firms, and matters more where institutional history suggests there is less support for entrepreneurship

Viable tax constitutions

Taxation is only sustainable if the general public complies with it. This observation is uncontroversial with tax practitioners but has been ignored by the public finance tradition, which has interpreted tax constitutions as binding contracts by which the power to tax is irretrievably conferred by individuals to government, which can then levy any tax it chooses. However, in the absence of an outside party enforcing contracts between members of a group, no arrangement within groups can be considered to be a binding contract, and therefore the power of tax must be sanctioned by individuals on an ongoing basis. In this paper we offer, for the first time, a theoretical analysis of this fundamental compliance problem associated with taxation, obtaining predictions that in some cases point to a re-interptretation of the theoretical constructions of the public finance tradition while in others call them into question

Executive Agencies, Ministers, and Departments: Can Policy and Management Ever be Separated?

The creation of executive agencies outside core departments has been a major element of administrative reforms throughout Europe during the past two decades, driven by a managerial logic, which also has been at the core of most academic works on "agencification." In this article, the authors take a different perspective by focusing on executive agencies' influence in the policy process. The authors analyze the policy influence of a large executive agency with service delivery tasks in the context of a parliamentary system of government (Flanders, Belgium). A comparison of the agency's influence in two major policy processes shows that a complex interplay of policy content, patterns of interaction, and mutual trust with the political leadership and organizational characteristics helps in explaining the observed patterns of influence. The findings also raise normative concerns regarding potential problems of disconnecting operations from policy formulation via agencification. © 2012 SAGE Publications