Stakes sensitivity and credit rating: a new challenge for regulators

The ethical practices of credit rating agencies (CRAs), particularly following the 2008 financial crisis, have been subject to extensive analysis by economists, ethicists, and policymakers. We raise a novel issue facing CRAs that has to do with a problem concerning the transmission of epistemic status of ratings from CRAs to the beneficiaries of the ratings (investors, etc.), and use it to provide a new challenge for regulators. Building on recent work in philosophy, we argue that since CRAs have different stakes than the beneficiaries of the ratings in the ratings being accurate, what counts as knowledge (and as having ‘epistemic status’) concerning credit risk for a CRA may not count as knowledge (as having epistemic status) for the beneficiary. Further, as it stands, many institutional investors (pension funds, insurance companies, etc.) are bound by law to make some of their investment decisions dependent on the ratings of officially recognized CRAs. We argue that the observation that the epistemic status of ratings does not transmit from CRAs to beneficiaries makes salient a new challenge for those who think current regulation regarding the CRAs is prudentially justified, namely, to show that the harm caused by acting on a rating that does not have epistemic status for beneficiaries is compensated by the benefit from them acting on a CRA rating that does have epistemic status for the CRA. Unlike most other commentators, therefore, we offer a defeasible reason to drop references to CRAs in prudential regulation of the financial industry

A Comparison of Cooling Techniques to Treat Cardiac Arrest Patients with Hypothermia

Introduction. We sought to compare the performance of endovascular cooling to conventional surface cooling after cardiac arrest. Methods. Patients in coma following cardiopulmonary resuscitation were cooled with an endovascular cooling catheter or with ice bags and cold-water-circulating cooling blankets to a target temperature of 32.0–34.0°C for 24 hours. Performance of cooling techniques was compared by (1) number of hourly recordings in target temperature range, (2) time elapsed from the written order to initiate cooling and target temperature, and (3) adverse events during the first week. Results. Median time in target temperature range was 19 hours (interquartile range (IQR), 16–20) in the endovascular group versus. 10 hours (IQR, 7–15) in the surface group (P = .001). Median time to target temperature was 4 (IQR, 2.8–6.2) and 4.5 (IQR, 3–6.5) hours, respectively (P = .67). Adverse events were similar. Conclusion. Endovascular cooling maintains target temperatures better than conventional surface cooling

Does ought imply can?

Most philosophers believe that a person can have an obligation only insofar as she is able to fulfil it, a principle generally referred to as “Ought Implies Can”. Arguably, this principle reflects something basic about the ordinary concept of obligation. However, in a paper published recently in this journal, Wesley Buckwalter and John Turri presented evidence for the conclusion that ordinary people in fact reject that principle. With a series of studies, they claimed to have demonstrated that, in people’s judgements, obligations persist irrespective of whether those who hold them have the ability to fulfil them. We argue in this paper that due to some problems in their design, Buckwalter & Turri’s conclusions may not be warranted. We present the results of a series of studies demonstrating the problems with their design and showing that, with an improved design, people judge that obligation depends on ability after all