Credit Ratings as Coordination Mechanisms

In this paper, we provide a novel rationale for credit ratings. The rationale that we propose is that credit ratings can serve as a coordinating mechanism in situations where multiple equilibria can obtain. We show that credit ratings provide a "focal point" for firms and their investors. We explore the vital, but previously overlooked implicit contractual relationship between a credit rating agency and a firm. Credit ratings can help fix the desired equilibrium and as such play an economically meaningful role. Our model provides several empirical predictions and insights regarding the expected price impact of ratings changes, the discreteness in funding cost changes, and the effect of the focus of organizations on the efficacy of credit ratings.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39841/3/wp457.pd

Objectivity, Proximity and Adaptability in Corporate Governance

Countries appear to differ considerably in the basic orientations of their corporate governance structures. We postulate the trade-off between objectivity and proximity as fundamental to the corporate governance debate. We stress the value of objectivity that comes with distance (e.g. the market oriented U.S. system), and the value of better information that comes with proximity (e.g. the more intrusive Continental European model). Our key result is that the optimal distance between management and monitor (board or shareholders) has a bang-bang solution: either one should capitalize on the better information that comes with proximity or one should seek to benefit optimally from the objectivity that comes with distance. We argue that this result points at an important link between the optimal corporate governance arrangement and industry structure. In this context, we also discuss the ways in which investors have "contracted around" the flaws in their own corporate governance systems, pointing at the adaptability of different arrangements.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39651/3/wp266.pd

Credit Ratings as Coordination Mechanisms

In this paper, we provide a novel rationale for credit ratings. The rationale that we propose is that credit ratings can serve as a coordinating mechanism in situations where multiple equilibria can obtain. We show that credit ratings provide a "focal point" for firms and their investors. We explore the vital, but previously overlooked implicit contractual relationship between a credit rating agency and a firm. Credit ratings can help fix the desired equilibrium and as such play an economically meaningful role. Our model provides several empirical predictions and insights regarding the expected price impact of ratings changes, the discreteness in funding cost changes, and the effect of the focus of organizations on the efficacy of credit ratings.coordination, credit ratings, multiple equilibria

Restructuring in the banking industry with implications for Europe

Set against the background of a rapidly consolidating financial sector, this paper explores the main forces that are driving this process. Acknowledging that the search for scale and scope economies is one of them, the paper emphasises that the empirical evidence in support of such economies is mixed, at best; while scale and scope economies exist, in principle, they are difficult to attain in practice. The paper considers strategic positioning in an uncertain and rapidly changing environment a more important factor: by expanding scope (and scale), financial institutions acquire options to venture into new activities. An implication of this strategic-option explanation is that consolidation, scope expansion in particular, will partially unravel as and when uncertainty declines and competition forces financial institutions to discover their true competitive advantages

'Trust is good, control is better': the 1974 Herstatt-Bank crisis and its implications for international regulatory reform

With its international supervisory and regulatory implications, the failure of Bankhaus Herstatt is one of the landmarks of post-war financial history. This article offers the first comprehensive historical account of the Herstatt crisis, and contributes to the wider discussions on international supervisory and regulatory reform since the mid-1970s, including regulatory capture, markets' self-regulation and resolution of failed banks. In doing so, it first argues that contrary to a widely held view, the German authorities received early and repeated warnings about Herstatt's dealings but this involved only limited and ineffective regulatory/supervisory responses, then it turns to the actual collapse of the bank in June 1974, and finally explores the wider regulatory issues raised by the Herstatt case

Market Discipline in Conglomerate Banks: Is an Internal Allocation of Cost of Capital Necessary as Incentive Device

This paper analyzes the optimal conglomeration of bank activities. We show that the effectiveness of market discipline for stand-alone activities (divisions) is of crucial importance for the potential benefits of conglomeration. We find that effective market discipline reduces the potential benefits of conglomeration. With ineffective market discipline of stand-alone activities conglomeration would further undermine market discipline, but may nevertheless be beneficial. In particular, when rents are not too high the diversification benefits of conglomeration may dominate the negative incentive effects. A more competitive environment therefore may induce conglomeration. We also show that introducing internal cost of allocation schemes may create 'internal' market discipline that complements the weak external market discipline of the conglomerate. In this context we show that these schemes should respond to actual risk choices, rather than be limited to anticipated risk choices.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39515/3/wp125.pd

Financial innovations, marketability and stability in banking

Abstract A fundamental feature of more recent financial innovations is their focus on augmenting marketability. We point at the potential dark side of marketability. Marketability has possibly led to an excessive proliferation of transaction-oriented banking (trading and financial market activities). The 2007-2009 financial crisis appears to have countered this trend, and possibly reemphasized the importance of relationship banking. In order to focus on these issues in a rigorous way, we will evaluate the key insights from the relationship banking literature, including the potential complementarities and conflicts of interest between intermediated relationship banking activities and financial market (underwriting, securitization, etc.) activities. From here we will point at institutional and regulatory changes that might be needed to improve the stability of the financial sector. One could say that the institutional structure (including regulation) has not kept up with the enhanced marketability and "changeability" of the industry. ______________________

The Many Faces of Information Disclosure

We examine the effects of a variety of mandatory information disclosure regimes on the expected revenues of issuing firms and on their endogenously-arising incentives for financial innovation. The main question we ask is: what kind of information and how much of it should firms be asked to disclose? The analysis uses a noisy rational expectations model in which some investors can choose to become informed at their own expense. Information disclosure then potentially affects the information-advantage of these investors vis-a-vis uninformed (liquidity) investors in the market, and hence their information-acquisition incentives. Thus, asking managers to disclose more information is not obviously desirable for the shareholders of issuing firms. Our main results are as follows. Mandating the disclosure of information about total firm value that would otherwise not have become available to any investor is always good for issuing firms. It increases their expected revenues and also strengthens financial innovation incentives. Mandating the disclosure of information about total firm value that would have been acquired anyway by informed investors but improves the quality of the information that uninformed investors have will benefit firms in emerging capital markets but hurt those in developed capital markets. In developed markets, the attention devoted to disclosure should thus shift from information that concerns total firm value to that which concerns the distribution of this value among claimants. Our conclusion is that disclosure requirements should be more stringent in less-developed capital markets, and that greater stringency in disclosure requirements on securities exchanges leads to a worsening of the borrower pool faced by banks. Our analysis also implies that competition among exchanges or securities regulators will not necessarily lead to a weakening of disclosure requirements.

Определение интервалов квазистационарности экономических систем

В работе рассмотрен вопрос определения оптимального интервала адаптации алгоритма динамического управления капиталом для нестационарного случая методами расчета показателя Херста и построения автокорреляционной функции для анализа временных рядов. Проведен анализ влияния выбора интервала адаптации на эффективность алгоритма. Из анализа полученных результатов следует, что метод расчета показателя Херста позволяет более эффективно, чем метод построения автокорреляционной функции, определить интервал стационарности модели функционирования экономической системы.Робота присвячена питанню визначення оптимального інтервалу адаптації алгоритму динамічного керування капіталом для нестаціонарного випадку за допомогою методів розрахунку показника Херста і побудови автокореляційної функції задля аналізу часових рядів. Проведено аналіз впливу вибору інтервалу адаптації на ефективність алгоритму. Порівняння результатів проведеного аналізу дозволяє стверджувати, що метод розрахунку показника Херста дозволяє більш ефективно, ніж метод побудови автокореляційної функції, визначити інтервал стаціонарності моделі функціонування економічної системи

Diversity of the Genomes and Neurotoxins of Strains of Clostridium botulinum Group I and Clostridium sporogenes Associated with Foodborne, Infant and Wound Botulism.

Clostridium botulinum Group I and Clostridium sporogenes are closely related bacteria responsible for foodborne, infant and wound botulism. A comparative genomic study with 556 highly diverse strains of C. botulinum Group I and C. sporogenes (including 417 newly sequenced strains) has been carried out to characterise the genetic diversity and spread of these bacteria and their neurotoxin genes. Core genome single-nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) analysis revealed two major lineages; C. botulinum Group I (most strains possessed botulinum neurotoxin gene(s) of types A, B and/or F) and C. sporogenes (some strains possessed a type B botulinum neurotoxin gene). Both lineages contained strains responsible for foodborne, infant and wound botulism. A new C. sporogenes cluster was identified that included five strains with a gene encoding botulinum neurotoxin sub-type B1. There was significant evidence of horizontal transfer of botulinum neurotoxin genes between distantly related bacteria. Population structure/diversity have been characterised, and novel associations discovered between whole genome lineage, botulinum neurotoxin sub-type variant, epidemiological links to foodborne, infant and wound botulism, and geographic origin. The impact of genomic and physiological variability on the botulism risk has been assessed. The genome sequences are a valuable resource for future research (e.g., pathogen biology, evolution of C. botulinum and its neurotoxin genes, improved pathogen detection and discrimination), and support enhanced risk assessments and the prevention of botulism