Jeffreys's law for general games of prediction: in search of a theory

We are interested in the following version of Jeffreys's law: if two predictors are predicting the same sequence of events and either is doing a satisfactory job, they will make similar predictions in the long run. We give a classification of instances of Jeffreys's law, illustrated with examples.Comment: 12 page

Leading strategies in competitive on-line prediction

We start from a simple asymptotic result for the problem of on-line regression with the quadratic loss function: the class of continuous limited-memory prediction strategies admits a "leading prediction strategy", which not only asymptotically performs at least as well as any continuous limited-memory strategy but also satisfies the property that the excess loss of any continuous limited-memory strategy is determined by how closely it imitates the leading strategy. More specifically, for any class of prediction strategies constituting a reproducing kernel Hilbert space we construct a leading strategy, in the sense that the loss of any prediction strategy whose norm is not too large is determined by how closely it imitates the leading strategy. This result is extended to the loss functions given by Bregman divergences and by strictly proper scoring rules.Comment: 20 pages; a conference version is to appear in the ALT'2006 proceeding

Competing with stationary prediction strategies

In this paper we introduce the class of stationary prediction strategies and construct a prediction algorithm that asymptotically performs as well as the best continuous stationary strategy. We make mild compactness assumptions but no stochastic assumptions about the environment. In particular, no assumption of stationarity is made about the environment, and the stationarity of the considered strategies only means that they do not depend explicitly on time; we argue that it is natural to consider only stationary strategies even for highly non-stationary environments.Comment: 20 page

Game-theoretic versions of strong law of large numbers for unbounded variables

We consider strong law of large numbers (SLLN) in the framework of game-theoretic probability of Shafer and Vovk (2001). We prove several versions of SLLN for the case that Reality's moves are unbounded. Our game-theoretic versions of SLLN largely correspond to standard measure-theoretic results. However game-theoretic proofs are different from measure-theoretic ones in the explicit consideration of various hedges. In measure-theoretic proofs existence of moments are assumed, whereas in our game-theoretic proofs we assume availability of various hedges to Skeptic for finite prices

Rough paths in idealized financial markets

This paper considers possible price paths of a financial security in an idealized market. Its main result is that the variation index of typical price paths is at most 2, in this sense, typical price paths are not rougher than typical paths of Brownian motion. We do not make any stochastic assumptions and only assume that the price path is positive and right-continuous. The qualification "typical" means that there is a trading strategy (constructed explicitly in the proof) that risks only one monetary unit but brings infinite capital when the variation index of the realized price path exceeds 2. The paper also reviews some known results for continuous price paths and lists several open problems.Comment: 21 pages, this version adds (in Appendix C) a reference to new results in the foundations of game-theoretic probability based on Hardin and Taylor's work on hat puzzle