Live fast, die young : Romanian coalitions in time of crisis

Published online: 01 December 2023Romania managed to resist the far end of elite attempts to alter democratic institutions along the lines of Hungary or Poland. Although the country has struggled to improve its democratic track record in the last years, it is still a laggard in securing an independent judiciary, fighting corruption, and upholding human rights compared to other EU member states. This is reflected in how elites manage governance in times of crisis. Disruptive events created the window of opportunity for incumbents to deploy discretionary leadership, including in the formation and termination of cabinets. Such interventions weakened constitutional checks and balances. As a result, Romanian democracy remains a work in progress, while politicians' preferred patterns of coalition governance are a source of stagnation

COVID-19-related anxieties do not decrease support for liberal democracy

Published online: 19 September 2022The COVID-19 pandemic led to widespread fear among the population. Early studies suggested that this resulted in exclusionary attitudes and increased support for discriminatory policy measures. We still lack an understanding of the longer-term, potentially erosive consequences that COVID-19-specific anxieties may carry for citizens' commitment to liberal democratic norms. In this research note, we present evidence from an original experiment in which we manipulate individuals' cognitive accessibility of their fears related to COVID-19. We implemented this experiment in Hungary and Romania – two cases where illiberal attitudes are most likely to amplify under conditions of fear – a year and a half after the outbreak of the pandemic. The results show that our intervention is successful in elevating respondents' levels of worry, anxiety and fear when thinking about infectious diseases like COVID-19. However, these emotions do not carry secondary effects on individuals' levels of right-wing authoritarianism, nationalism or outgroup hostility, nor do they affect preferences for specific discriminatory policy measures aimed to fight a potential resurgence of COVID-19. We discuss these findings in light of the literature on the demand-side determinants of democratic backsliding and the consequences of emotions on political behaviour.This article was published Open Access with the support from the EUI Library through the CRUI - Wiley Transformative Agreement (2020-2023

COVID-19 related anxieties do not decrease support for liberal democracy

Published online: 10 November 2021Studies carried out at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic confirmed that under the impression of fear individuals were more willing to tolerate violations of liberal-democratic norms and supported discriminatory policies to preserve public safety. But what are the potential consequences of the pandemic on citizens’ attitudes beyond its peak? We conducted an original experiment in which we manipulate individuals’ cognitive accessibility of their fears related to COVID-19 one and a half years after the onset of the pandemic. We fielded the experiment in Hungary and Romania–two cases most likely to see such attitudes amplify under the condition of fear. Our intervention was successful in elevating respondents’ levels of worry, anxiety, and fear when thinking about infectious diseases like COVID-19. However, these emotions did not affect individuals’ levels of rightwing authoritarianism, nationalism, or outgroup hostility, or their preferences for specific discriminatory policies aimed to fight a potential resurgence of COVID-19

Canagliflozin and renal outcomes in type 2 diabetes and nephropathy

BACKGROUND Type 2 diabetes mellitus is the leading cause of kidney failure worldwide, but few effective long-term treatments are available. In cardiovascular trials of inhibitors of sodium–glucose cotransporter 2 (SGLT2), exploratory results have suggested that such drugs may improve renal outcomes in patients with type 2 diabetes. METHODS In this double-blind, randomized trial, we assigned patients with type 2 diabetes and albuminuric chronic kidney disease to receive canagliflozin, an oral SGLT2 inhibitor, at a dose of 100 mg daily or placebo. All the patients had an estimated glomerular filtration rate (GFR) of 30 to <90 ml per minute per 1.73 m2 of body-surface area and albuminuria (ratio of albumin [mg] to creatinine [g], >300 to 5000) and were treated with renin–angiotensin system blockade. The primary outcome was a composite of end-stage kidney disease (dialysis, transplantation, or a sustained estimated GFR of <15 ml per minute per 1.73 m2), a doubling of the serum creatinine level, or death from renal or cardiovascular causes. Prespecified secondary outcomes were tested hierarchically. RESULTS The trial was stopped early after a planned interim analysis on the recommendation of the data and safety monitoring committee. At that time, 4401 patients had undergone randomization, with a median follow-up of 2.62 years. The relative risk of the primary outcome was 30% lower in the canagliflozin group than in the placebo group, with event rates of 43.2 and 61.2 per 1000 patient-years, respectively (hazard ratio, 0.70; 95% confidence interval [CI], 0.59 to 0.82; P=0.00001). The relative risk of the renal-specific composite of end-stage kidney disease, a doubling of the creatinine level, or death from renal causes was lower by 34% (hazard ratio, 0.66; 95% CI, 0.53 to 0.81; P<0.001), and the relative risk of end-stage kidney disease was lower by 32% (hazard ratio, 0.68; 95% CI, 0.54 to 0.86; P=0.002). The canagliflozin group also had a lower risk of cardiovascular death, myocardial infarction, or stroke (hazard ratio, 0.80; 95% CI, 0.67 to 0.95; P=0.01) and hospitalization for heart failure (hazard ratio, 0.61; 95% CI, 0.47 to 0.80; P<0.001). There were no significant differences in rates of amputation or fracture. CONCLUSIONS In patients with type 2 diabetes and kidney disease, the risk of kidney failure and cardiovascular events was lower in the canagliflozin group than in the placebo group at a median follow-up of 2.62 years

Under the Influence: Pay-Offs to Legislative Support Parties under Minority Governments

Previous studies show that in multiparty systems the formation of minority governments can be a rational choice. To ensure survival and policy implementation, minority governments make concessions to non-cabinet parties. In this study, we empirically analyse the pay-offs given to support parties under minority governments. We argue that the content of support agreements is conditioned by support party type. Results are based on a two-stage empirical investigation: a text analysis of 10 explicit support arrangements for minority governments in Romania and a within-case comparison of two Romanian minority cabinets with different support arrangements. We employ an original data set of support agreements and elite interviews with former minority cabinet members. We empirically confirm that ethno-regional parties are mostly policy-seeking and target benefits for their specific groups. In contrast, mainstream parties make stronger claims for office distribution. The analysis challenges the widespread understanding that all support parties are mostly policy-seeking.Peer Reviewe

Minority governments in Romania : a case of stable instability

Romanian politics is defined by stable instability. In thirty years of democratic experience (1990–2020), seventeen prime ministers chaired thirty-four cabinets. Cabinets had an average lifespan of less than a year. Minority cabinets are also a fixed feature of Romanian politics. Among post-communist states, the country tops the charts at more than double the amount of minority cabinets compared to runner-up Latvia. Between 1990 and 2020, over half of Romanian cabinets were minority cabinets (18/34, 53 percent). Among these, six were single-party minority cabinets (see Table 5.1). What explains the preference of Romanian parties to form minority cabinets? Does their minority status affect stability or cabinet performance? If so, under what conditions does either cabinet duration or cabinet performance improve? An analysis of the formation and lives of these cabinets provides a rare chance to observe politicians learning the merits of strategic behavior in a young multiparty environment. In doing so, we can also trace how institutions shape elite behavior in a new democracy and test some of the theories developed for Western Europe on new cases. I find empirical evidence in favor of the important role of the semi-presidential regime structure, and of party and party system features in minority cabinet formation. In particular, the role of the president in nominating the prime minister provides the president with formal and informal power over cabinet composition. Such power was often used to design minority cabinets in favor of the president’s party. Party and party system features refer to the presence of dominant parties, polarizing electoral competition, and the strategies of small parties. We also find that individual political goals and informal institutions—such as corruption and clientelism—play a fundamental role in making and breaking parliamentary alliances. These latter phenomena often shape legislative majorities, making individuals highly dependent on state resources and loosely bonded to a specific party. I posit that this encourages minority cabinet formation, as individual payoffs do not require cabinet membership for the whole party

Informal institutions : the world’s open secrets

3rd editionInformal institutions shape regimes, elite decision-making and citizen behaviour. Politics – in the formal sense – would not work if informal institutions did not exist. But what are informal institutions? Identifying them turns out to be a complicated task. Compared to formal institutions, such as parliaments, parties, elections or constitutions, informal institutions are not coded in writing. Nevertheless, constitutions, party charters, party manifestos and electoral rules are not alone in structuring people’s behaviour. Individuals perpetuate unofficial widely known patterns that also organize behaviour. These collective norms and practices generate informal institutions. Because they are unofficial and unwritten, informal institutions have a less concrete and therefore less readily observable existence. That makes them harder to study. This chapter discusses the benefits and the risks of informal institutions from the perspective of their inherent tensions with formal institutions, their efficiency and their role for democracy. I continue with an overview of how formal and informal institutions interact. The second part looks at the informal institutions from the perspective of efficiency. The third investigates their nuanced role for democracy. The conclusion follows

Broken promises diplomacy : the Russia-Ukraine war and the end of enlargement as we know it

Among its many other tragic effects, the Russia-Ukraine war has complicated life for the countries of the Western Balkans. The European Union’s reaction to the war included the revival of a rhetoric supportive of enlargement to the Western Balkans, in addition to financial aid to weather the energy crisis. The European Council has even granted candidate status to Bosnia and Herzegovina, which opens possibilities for that country to receive additional support. But the EU stopped short of filling that conversation with political or technical content that takes into account the years of “broken promises diplomacy” that led to the loss of credibility in the enlargement process. Instead of reconsidering what enlargement means in this context, both the EU and the countries of the Western Balkans ended up reengaging in the same kind of slow-burning formal accession negotiations they conducted in the past, expecting a different result. This absence of adaptability is likely to cause more damage than good to a region that is already struggling to fight off anti-European and anti-democratic forces from inside and out

Failing forward in Eastern enlargement : problem solving through problem making

Published online: 13 May 2021The ‘failing forward’ synthesis of liberal intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism puts European member states governments in charge of the process of integration. However, this placement does not show clearly whether the principals are reactive or proactive. That distinction between proactive and reactive is important in understanding what it means to say that integration is a movement ‘forward’ and what we mean by ‘success’. Moving forward could mean building out the great ideals of Europe’s political leaders, but it could also mean reacting to events in a way that solves problems, even if only imperfectly. The process of Eastern enlargement shows this distinction at work. We argue that enlargement is ‘successful’ as a reactive process and not as a proactive one. In proactive terms, the Eastern enlargement process has a consistent record of failure inasmuch as agents did not get what they wanted when they wanted it. In reactive terms, enlargement contributed to the creation of a wider and a deeper European Union