Rule of Law or Rule of Norms?: Informal Institutions and their Role for Democratic Resilience

This paper delves into the intricate interplay between formal and informal institutions in contemporary European political landscapes. It investigates the vital role of informal institutions in supplementing and at times circumventing the formal rules that define the parameters of political functioning. The study identifies four key manifestations of the ascendant influence of informal institutions within recent European dynamics. First, the encroachment of aggressive populism and extremist discourse erodes the authority of formal institutions, challenging their efficacy and integrity. Second, alternative societal and elite behaviours emerge that contest the reinforcing functions previously upheld by informal institutions, thereby prompting a reconsideration of their impact. Third, the increasing scrutiny of informal institutions perpetuating discriminatory practices aligns with the contemporary emphasis on upholding democratic values and civil rights. Fourth, the paper elucidates the role of informal institutions in the (de-)democratization of post-communist states. The study underscores the imperative to not only analyse and aim to enact formal changes but also to delve into the resilient local practices and norms that shape the political landscape

How wars don't end : a response to Gerard Toal's analysis of ceasefire negotiations in Ukraine

Published online: 17 August 2024Gerard Toal’s analysis of Ukraine and its allies’ hesitation to accept Russia’s peace terms, presented in ‘The Territorial Taboo: Explaining the Public Aversion to Negotiations in the Ukraine War Support Coalition’, attributes this reluctance to ‘commitment problems’ and ‘biases’. However, this explanation oversimplifies the issue. Achieving a stable post-agreement order necessitates Western resolve to provide security guarantees for Ukraine and a cohesive strategy regarding Russia’s role in the new global order. Toal’s suggestion of transferring occupied territories to end the war would enable Russia to further its goal of undermining Ukrainian sovereignty and bolster Putin’s dictatorship. This outcome contradicts NATO’s Strategic Concept, prolongs Ukrainian suffering, and perpetuates European security uncertainty. Furthermore, it would require a post-war narrative in which Ukrainians accept defeat and abandon their European aspirations. The resistance to Russia’s proposed settlement stems not from narrative taboos, but from a rational demand for a better resolution where unprovoked aggressors who want to upend international law through pre-modern lawlessness do not win the day

Live fast, die young : Romanian coalitions in time of crisis

Published online: 01 December 2023Romania managed to resist the far end of elite attempts to alter democratic institutions along the lines of Hungary or Poland. Although the country has struggled to improve its democratic track record in the last years, it is still a laggard in securing an independent judiciary, fighting corruption, and upholding human rights compared to other EU member states. This is reflected in how elites manage governance in times of crisis. Disruptive events created the window of opportunity for incumbents to deploy discretionary leadership, including in the formation and termination of cabinets. Such interventions weakened constitutional checks and balances. As a result, Romanian democracy remains a work in progress, while politicians' preferred patterns of coalition governance are a source of stagnation

Global risks to the EU

The first pan-European survey of expert perceptions on conflict-related threats to EU interests. The 'Global Risks to the EU' research project delivers evidence-based insights from the first continent-wide assessment of global risk perceptions among European experts. Launched in 2025, the study asks experts on European politics to evaluate thirty predefined risks impacting EU coherence, unity, security, and prosperity. These risks were ranked based on their likelihood and potential impact on EU interests within the following year. This initiative is designed to provide strategic foresight for shaping European foreign policy, collect data on foreign policy alignment within the EU, and permit comparisons between foreign policy priorities in the US and the EU. Organised by the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) at the European University Institute (EUI), the survey was developed in collaboration with the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), the Trans European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA), and the European Initiative for Security Studies (EISS). The survey is coordinated with the Preventive Priorities Study at the US-based Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)

Europe turns east : Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine

Published online: 10 May 2024Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine has put eastern Europe firmly at the centre of the EU’s foreign policy agenda and given fresh impetus to reforms by candidates for EU membership. But with rightwing movements gaining ground, support for Ukraine and EU enlargement is under threat

What went wrong in Hungary

Published online: April 2024Why did Hungarian democracy have a harder time developing and rooting itself than democracy in other countries? The answer lies in the overlapping institutions and incentives that create democratic resilience. Hungary's political elites never finished their constitutional transition from communism to democracy by agreeing on a new democratic constitution. The 1998 elections polarized Hungarian politics around competing conceptions of democracy in ways that made it hard to reach consensus on a shared constitutional arrangement. Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party rose to power in the late 1990s by offering a strong state that would protect Hungarian society from the threat of social liberalism and foreclose a potential return of communism. Orbán returned to power in 2010, on the heels of the global financial crisis, and began centralizing and entrenching power by deft manipulation of democratic institutions. The case of Hungary tells us what to look for in anticipating democratic failure and serves as a cautionary tale for the EU

Is Europe really forged through crisis? : pandemic EU and the Russia – Ukraine war

Published online: 11 November 2022The European Union’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic revealed changes and continuity in the structure and the functioning of the European project. In lieu of a conclusion to the Special Issue, this article discusses what those lessons tell us about how Europe responds to the following crisis. We compare European responses to the pandemic to those that followed the Russian invasion of Ukraine. We observe more differences than similarities. The same actors do not always play the central role, solidarity among Europeans is sometimes more challenging to engineer, and the requirements to make the overall project more resilient can point in different directions. Such findings show that any argument that Europe is forged through crisis is unlikely to tell us much about what Europe is or where it may be headed. In that sense, the EU is a sui generis multi-level, multi-faceted actor that can change shape in response to events

Riders on the storm : the politics of disruption in European member states during the COVID-19 pandemic

This paper explores how democracies handle the trade-off between public safety and fundamental democratic principles. We show that an exogenous shock, like the pandemic, creates incentives for governing elites to deploy self-empowering mechanisms to avoid institutional checks and balances – with lasting consequences for democratic performance. We examine this prospect in Italy and Romania. These cases have a long history of institutional gridlock; such history reinforces incentives to work around traditional institutions in responding to the pandemic. While the two cases vary in terms of the quality and resilience of their democratic institutions, we find that elites displayed a similar propensity to overlook the intricate institutional balances during a moment of crisis. In Italy, the executive strengthened its power relative to the legislature; in Romania, the strengthening is relative to the judiciary. This finding has implications in assessing the risk for falling standards of liberal democracy across the European Union

Three lessons from the 2004 “Big Bang” enlargement

Published online: 08 April 2024The 2004 “Big Bang” enlargement was a powerful reminder that European integration is an instrument for peace and not just prosperity. The pace of that enlargement depended more on the requirements for stability than on the transformation of the candidate countries. It was also a reminder of the importance of forward‐looking analysis. Candidates might meet the criteria for membership at the time of accession, but that is no guarantee that they will develop in ways that continue to reflect those criteria once they have gained entry. Finally, it was a reminder that enlargement changes the experience of membership for all member states and not just for those countries that gain entry. A larger Union requires greater self‐discipline to hold down congestion in decision‐making and greater multilateral surveillance to prevent the actions of one member state from undermining the benefits of membership for the rest. These reminders are important lessons in planning the European Union’s next historic enlargement. The next enlargement will follow a pace set by security considerations more than the transformative power of the accession process. It will depend on a robust analysis of convergence together with contingency planning for any staged accession. And it will require commitment from existing member states as well as candidate countries to what will become a very different European Union. This next enlargement will be challenging for all parts of Europe. Nevertheless, it is better than the alternative of no enlargement or an accession process with no credible endgame

COVID-19-related anxieties do not decrease support for liberal democracy

Published online: 19 September 2022The COVID-19 pandemic led to widespread fear among the population. Early studies suggested that this resulted in exclusionary attitudes and increased support for discriminatory policy measures. We still lack an understanding of the longer-term, potentially erosive consequences that COVID-19-specific anxieties may carry for citizens' commitment to liberal democratic norms. In this research note, we present evidence from an original experiment in which we manipulate individuals' cognitive accessibility of their fears related to COVID-19. We implemented this experiment in Hungary and Romania – two cases where illiberal attitudes are most likely to amplify under conditions of fear – a year and a half after the outbreak of the pandemic. The results show that our intervention is successful in elevating respondents' levels of worry, anxiety and fear when thinking about infectious diseases like COVID-19. However, these emotions do not carry secondary effects on individuals' levels of right-wing authoritarianism, nationalism or outgroup hostility, nor do they affect preferences for specific discriminatory policy measures aimed to fight a potential resurgence of COVID-19. We discuss these findings in light of the literature on the demand-side determinants of democratic backsliding and the consequences of emotions on political behaviour.This article was published Open Access with the support from the EUI Library through the CRUI - Wiley Transformative Agreement (2020-2023