Apprehending anxiety: an introduction to the Topical Collection on worry and wellbeing

The aim of this collection is to show how work in the analytic philosophical tradition can shed light on the nature, value, and experience of anxiety. Contrary to widespread assumptions, anxiety is not best understood as a mental disorder, or an intrinsically debilitating state, but rather as an often valuable affective state which heightens our sensitivity to potential threats and challenges. As the contributions in this volume demonstrate, learning about anxiety can be relevant for debates, not only in the philosophy of emotion, but also in epistemology, value theory, and the philosophy of psychopathology. In this introductory article, we also show that there is still much to discover about the relevance that anxiety may have for moral action, self-understanding, and mental health.Peer reviewe

Reasonable doubt as affective experience: Obsessive–compulsive disorder, epistemic anxiety and the feeling of uncertainty

How does doubt come about? What are the mechanisms responsible for our inclinations to reassess propositions and collect further evidence to support or reject them? In this paper, I approach this question by focusing on what might be considered a distorting mirror of unreasonable doubt, namely the pathological doubt of patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). Individuals with OCD exhibit a form of persistent doubting, indecisiveness, and over-cautiousness at pathological levels (Rasmussen and Eisen, 1992; Reed, 1985; Tolin et al., 2003). I argue that the failure in OCD is of an affective nature, involving both excessive epistemic anxiety and hyperactive feelings of uncertainty. I further argue that our adaptive disposition to inquire about the right matters - that is, about propositions which are both epistemically risky and imply harmful possibilities - might depend on these affective mechanisms

The Noetic Feeling of Confusion

Feeling confused can sometimes lead us to give up on the task, frustrated. What is less emphasized is that confusion may also promote happy (epistemic) endings to our inquiries. It has recently been argued that confusion motivates effortful investigative behaviors which can help us acquire hard-to-get epistemic goods (DiLeo et al., 2019; D’Mello & Graesser, 2012). While the motivational power of confusion and its benefits for learning has been uncovered in recent years, the exact nature of the phenomenon remains obscure. In this paper we attempt to shed light on the nature and epistemic value of an experience we are all familiar with: the experience of being confused at an object, a statement, etc. We first review the psychological literature on confusion, where it is most often considered to be an epistemic emotion. We then propose a refined account of confusion, by drawing on the literature on metacognitive or noetic feelings, both in psychology and in the philosophy of mind. In particular, we claim that confusion centrally involves the experience of the limits of one’s cognitive capacities, because it results from a monitoring of our cognitive activities as we encounter a cognitive obstacle while processing a given content. Finally we show how our account may explain findings about the role of the experience of confusion in motivating deeper inquiry into complex problems and bringing about epistemic success in these cases

L'enquêteur anxieux : émotions et incertitude épistémique

En épistémologie, des développements récents ont conduit à considérer que les états affectifs sont des facteurs pertinents dans l'étude de la connaissance. Je me concentrerai précisément sur l'attitude épistémique du doute, dans la mesure où elle est liée à la réaction émotionnelle de l'anxiété. Dans cette thèse, je développe une hypothèse quant à la manière dont nos inclinations naturelles à faire l'expérience du doute sur le fait de savoir si p se produisent, ce qui impliquera de manière centrale des mécanismes affectifs spécifiques. Trois questions principales structurent le présent travail. La première question concerne la nature de l'enquête, ses étapes et ses desiderata (chapitre 1,2), la deuxième concerne les déterminants affectifs de l'enquête (chapitres 3, 4, 5, 6), et la troisième concerne les effets sur l'enquête lorsque ces déterminants affectifs fonctionnent mal (chapitres 7, 8, 9, 10). Dans les chapitres 1 et 2 de la thèse, j'expose certains des desiderata de l'enquête, tant en ce qui concerne les normes épistémiques que les normes de la rationalité pratique. Dans le chapitre 3, je me concentre sur cette étape clé spécifique de l'enquête : le moment du doute. Je donne un aperçu de la relation entre le doute et l'enquête telle que décrite par René Descartes, Charles Peirce et, plus récemment, Christopher Hookway. Le doute que je souhaite examiner plus en détail peut être appelé "doute réel" (Peirce, 1877), "doute chaud" (Thagard, 2008) ou "doute actif" (Hookway, 1998). Je m’attache ensuite à explorer les émotions et les sentiments qui sont considérés comme jouant un rôle central dans nos activités épistémiques, et plus spécifiquement dans le succès épistémique de nos enquêtes (Hookway 2002, 2003 ; Thagard 2002 ; Brun, Doguoglu & Kuenzle 2008 ; de Sousa 2009). Je présenterai ensuite mon propre cas d’étude, une émotion qui a été relativement négligée, notamment dans la littérature philosophique : l'émotion d'anxiété. Dans le chapitre 4, je dresse un portrait de l'anxiété : Je passe en revue ses caractéristiques fonctionnelles, ses caractéristiques phénoménologiques, ses tendances à l'action typiques, sa base cognitive, ses objets intentionnels et ses manifestations dysfonctionnelles. Au chapitre 6, je me concentre sur un type particulier d'anxiété : l'anxiété épistémique. L'objectif de ce chapitre est de faire la lumière sur la nature de l'anxiété épistémique, en proposant un compte rendu unifié de sa nature, de sa fonction et de son contenu. Au chapitre 7, je présente le trouble obsessionnel-compulsif (TOC) comme une étude de cas de doute réel dysfonctionnel chronique. En examinant les mécanismes possibles responsables du doute pathologique, je propose d'ouvrir une voie vers la compréhension du type ordinaire de doute réel qui émerge au début de l'enquête. Quels sont les effets sur nos activités d'enquête, lorsque les mécanismes psychologiques qui sous-tendent le doute réel dysfonctionnent ? Le chapitre 8 se concentre sur les différentes défaillances épistémiques en jeu dans le TOC. Que pouvons-nous apprendre des formes dysfonctionnelles (temporaires et chroniques) de doute, sur la chaîne de mécanismes psychologiques qui concourent à provoquer un doute réel ? Dans le chapitre 9, je soutiens qu'en mettant en évidence les incertitudes épistémiques problématiques, l'anxiété épistémique met en évidence les possibilités d'erreur, les défaiteurs, et les conditions qui sapent la croyance. En d'autres termes, elle crée les conditions d'un passage, d'une base épistémique solide de jugement non réfléchi, à une inquiétude consciente (Nagel, 2018). Cela signifie, en ce qui concerne la réalité psychologique du doute, qu'elle implique nécessairement le processus de passage d'un mode de cognition intuitif, "en pilotage automatique", à un état d'esprit réfléchi et prudent, à la suite de l'expérience de signaux d'incertitude problématique.In epistemology, recent developments have led to the view that affective states are relevant factors in the study of knowledge. I will focus specifically on the epistemic attitude of doubt, as it relates to the emotional response of anxiety. In this thesis, I develop a hypothesis as to how our natural inclinations to experience doubt about whether p occur, which will centrally involve specific affective mechanisms. Three main questions structure the present work. The first question concerns the nature of inquiry, its stages and desiderata (Chapter 1,2), the second concerns the affective determinants of inquiry (Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6), and the third concerns the effects on inquiry when these affective determinants malfunction (Chapters 7, 8, 9, 10). In Chapters 1 and 2 of the dissertation, I outline some of the desiderata of inquiry, both in terms of epistemic norms and standards of practical rationality. In Chapter 3, I focus on that specific key stage of inquiry: the moment of doubt. I provide an overview of the relationship between doubt and inquiry as described by René Descartes, Charles Peirce, and, more recently, Christopher Hookway. The doubt I wish to examine in more detail can be called "real doubt" (Peirce, 1877), "warm doubt" (Thagard, 2008), or "active doubt" (Hookway, 1998). I then focus on exploring the emotions and feelings that are considered to play a central role in our epistemic activities, and more specifically in the epistemic success of our investigations (Hookway 2002, 2003; Thagard 2002; Brun, Doguoglu & Kuenzle 2008; de Sousa 2009). I will then present my own case study, an emotion that has been relatively neglected, especially in the philosophical literature: the emotion of anxiety. In Chapter 4, I provide a portrait of anxiety: I review its functional features, phenomenological features, typical action tendencies, cognitive basis, intentional objects, and dysfunctional manifestations. In Chapter 6, I focus on one particular type of anxiety: epistemic anxiety. The purpose of this chapter is to shed light on the nature of epistemic anxiety, offering a unified account of its nature, function, and content. In Chapter 7, I present obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) as a case study of chronic dysfunctional real doubt. By examining the possible mechanisms responsible for pathological doubt, I propose to open a path toward understanding the ordinary type of real doubt that emerges early in the investigation. What are the effects on our investigative activities when the psychological mechanisms underlying dysfunctional real doubt? Chapter 8 focuses on the various epistemic failures at play in OCD.What can we learn from dysfunctional (temporary and chronic) forms of doubt, about the chain of psychological mechanisms that work together to bring about real doubt? In Chapter 9, I argue that by highlighting problematic epistemic uncertainties, epistemic anxiety highlights the possibilities for error, the defeaters, and the conditions that undermine belief. In other words, it creates the conditions for a shift from a solid epistemic foundation of unreflective judgment to conscious anxiety (Nagel, 2018). This means, with respect to the psychological reality of doubt, that it necessarily involves the process of moving from an intuitive, "autopilot" mode of cognition to a reflective, cautious state of mind as a result of experiencing problematic signals of uncertainty

Apprehending anxiety: an introduction to the Topical Collection on worry and wellbeing

The aim of this collection is to show how work in the analytic philosophical tradition can shed light on the nature, value, and experience of anxiety. Contrary to widespread assumptions, anxiety is not best understood as a mental disorder, or an intrinsically debilitating state, but rather as an often valuable affective state which heightens our sensitivity to potential threats and challenges. As the contributions in this volume demonstrate, learning about anxiety can be relevant for debates, not only in the philosophy of emotion, but also in epistemology, value theory, and the philosophy of psychopathology. In this introductory article, we also show that there is still much to discover about the relevance that anxiety may have for moral action, self-understanding, and mental health.Peer reviewe

Are hopeful imaginings valuable ?

According to contemporary philosophical accounts of hope, a hopeful emotion involves an element of imagination as input, part, or output of hope. A typical description of a hopeful episode often goes with mental imagery or immersion into the hoped-for scenario: as Ariel is hoping to win the dance competition on Saturday night, he projects himself in the scenario where he visualizes his name appearing on the screen display, quasi-hears the crowd cheering, feels proud, and starts thinking about the national dance competition. This raises the question: how does hope exactly interact with the processes required to produce a mental image or even an immersive exploration of the desired reality? This is the question we tackle in our paper. Rather than putting forward a new account of the nature of hope, we explore the interactions between hope and the different kinds of imagination