"La présidence belge." EIPAScope 1993(3):pp.1-3

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A revival of the Benelux?

'Seit Mitte der 1990er Jahre scheint die Benelux neuen Auftrieb erhalten zu haben, nicht als internationale Organisation, aber in Form einer engeren Zusammenarbeit ihrer Mitglieder im Rahmen der EU. Durch eine Reihe von Memoranda betreffend die zukünftige Entwicklung der EU und spezifische Themen, wie Justiz- und Innenpolitik, waren sie bemüht, den Prozess der europäischen Integration in Richtung einer Vertiefung voranzutreiben. Durch ihren Zusammenschluss versuchen sie, größeren Einfluss auszuüben und die Interessen kleinerer Staaten besser zu vertreten. Gute persönliche Beziehungen auf höchster politischer Ebene haben bei der Herstellung der Verbindungen eine große Rolle gespielt.Die engeren Beziehungen bedeuten allerdings nicht den Beginn einer 'menage a trois'. Die Kooperation findet in erster Linie auf höchster Ebene (zwischen den MinisterpräsidentInnen) statt und ist in sehr flexibler und pragmatischer Weise organisiert. Die Kooperation ist keineswegs allumfassend, und es bestehen weiterhin wichtige ökonomische, kulturelle und politische Unterschiede zwischen den drei Ländern. Sie ist auch keineswegs exklusiv, sondern Teil einer breiteren Strategie der Netzwerkbildung innerhalb der EU.' (Autorenreferat)'Since the mid-1990s, the Benelux seems to have received new impetus, not as an international organisation but as a form of closer cooperation amongst its three members in the framework of the EU. Through a series of memoranda on the further development of the EU and on more specific topics such as justice and home affairs, they have tried to steer the process of European integration in the direction of a further deepening. By joining forces they try to have more impact and to better defend the interests of the smaller member states. Good personal relations at the highest political levels have played an important role in the forging of the links. The closer relations are however not the beginning of a 'menage a trois'. The cooperation is primarily taking place at the highest levels (prime ministers) and is organised in a very pragmatic and flexible way. The cooperation is furthermore far from all-encompassing and there continue to be important economic, cultural, political divergences amongst the three. The cooperation is also not exclusive but part of a broader strategy to develop networks in the EU.' (author's abstract

Damage to fronto-parietal networks impairs motor imagery ability after stroke : a voxel-based lesion symptom mapping study

Background: mental practice with motor imagery has been shown to promote motor skill acquisition in healthy subjects and patients. Although lesions of the common motor imagery and motor execution neural network are expected to impair motor imagery ability, functional equivalence appears to be at least partially preserved in stroke patients.Aim: to identify brain regions that are mandatory for preserved motor imagery ability after stroke.Method: thirty-seven patients with hemiplegia after a first time stroke participated. Motor imagery ability was measured using a Motor Imagery questionnaire and temporal congruence test. A voxelwise lesion symptom mapping approach was used to identify neural correlates of motor imagery in this cohort within the first year post-stroke.Results: poor motor imagery vividness was associated with lesions in the left putamen, left ventral premotor cortex and long association fibres linking parieto-occipital regions with the dorsolateral premotor and prefrontal areas. Poor temporal congruence was otherwise linked to lesions in the more rostrally located white matter of the superior corona radiata. Conclusion: This voxel-based lesion symptom mapping study confirms the association between white matter tract lesions and impaired motor imagery ability, thus emphasizing the importance of an intact fronto-parietal network for motor imagery. Our results further highlight the crucial role of the basal ganglia and premotor cortex when performing motor imagery tasks

The consistency of EU external action post-Lisbon:renewing appropriate measures against Zimbabwe in 2012

The Lisbon Treaty has put the consistency of European Union (EU) external action high on the agenda but little is known about how this imperative is concretely given shape. Adopting a single-case-study approach on the EU’s decision in 2012 to renew the partial suspension of development cooperation with Zimbabwe (Article 96 measures), this contribution aims to provide better insights into the question of the consistency of this decision. More specifically, this article focuses on the Commission’s proposal, on the basis of which the renewal of the suspension was adopted. As a first step it examines the relevant legal (Treaty), substantial (policy framework) and procedural (decision-making) guidelines framing the consistency objective in the EU’s relations with Zimbabwe. While this three-level framework plays an important role in facilitating the consistency of the Commission proposal, it is also clear that it does not provide a sufficient guarantee for a consistent policy output. The case study on Zimbabwe shows how other factors such as the international context, the positions of the member states as well as the preferences and interests of individual Directorate Generals play an important role in the final outcome of the Commission’s decision-making process

Beyond Weber and Straight Cucumbers : bureaucratic politics in the EU

Oratie uitgesproken ter gelegenheid van de aanvaarding van het ambt van bijzonder hoogleraar ‘Administrative Governance in the EU’ aan de Faculteit der Cultuur- en Maatschappijwetenschappen van de Universiteit Maastrich

The European External Action Service and agenda-setting in European foreign policy

ABSTRACT The new High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) and the EEAS have emerged after the Lisbon Treaty as a potential driving force in European foreign policy. This article critically reviews the first two years of the existence of the EEAS to find out whether these new players have managed to shape the direction of the European Union's (EU) external activities. Building on a typology of agenda-setting strategies in the EU developed by Princen (2011), it successively examines how the HR and the EEAS have been trying to 'build credibility' and 'to gain attention' for their priorities. The empirical analysis shows that priority has been given to addressing the 'credibility challenge', with a particular emphasis on capacity building. The strategies of mobilising partners and arousing interest through framing still leave scope for improvement

La Belgique: responsable ou bouc émissaire de l'échec des négociations Fouchet?

On 17 April 1962, Genera! de Gaulle's proposal to establish a political union between the six EC Member States, better known as the 'Fouchet Proposal', was vetoed by Belgium and The Netherlands who made their further support dependent on British participation in the negotiations on a political union.This article examines the position of Belgium, represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. P-H. Spaak and more particularly its evolution from a rather favourable position to a rejection of the project. The contradictory Belgian demand for a more supranational political union at the same time as British membership can be considered in the light of Belgium's wish to promote both the process of European integration and the principle of Atlantic solidarity, the basis of its security. The article describes how the final deathblow to the negotiations was not given by Belgium and The Netherlands but by the French veto of British accession to the EC and the signing of the Franco-German Cooperation Treaty of Elysee in ]anuary 1963