Chapitre 5: Le Semestre permet-il à certains acteurs sociaux d’entrer subrepticement dans la relance européenne ?

À l’été 2020, dans une démarche sans précédent, l’UE a proposé à ses États membres de les aider à faire face aux retombées de la pandémie de Covid-19. Pour ce faire, elle a puisé dans le budget à long terme de l’UE (2021-2027) et créé un nouveau système de soutien temporaire appelé « NextGenerationEU » (NGEU). Officiellement mis en place en février 2021, la « facilité de reprise et de résilience » (FRR), qui est au cœur de NGEU, offre un soutien financier aux États membres, notamment par une combinaison de subventions et de prêts (Parlement européen et Conseil de l’UE 2021). Pour financer ces dépenses, l’UE a émis des emprunts, dont l’ampleur et la portée sont inédites et rompent avec des tabous de longue date (Alcidi et Corti, ce volume). Malgré tout cela, tous les analystes ne s’accordent pas pour dire qu’il s’agit là d’un changement radical (par exemple, Howarth et Quaglia, 2021). La Commission européenne a insisté pour que ces fonds soient assortis de conditions, à savoir être consacrés à la transition numérique, à la transition énergétique et à la stimulation d’une croissance sociale et inclusive bénéficiant à la prochaine génération. Les États membres doivent soumettre des plans nationaux de reprise et de résilience (PRR) détaillés pour accéder aux fonds.Institutions, Decisions and Collective Behaviou

State of the art. Overview of concepts, indicators and methodologies used for analyzing the social OMC.

This paper is a detailed analysis about the literature on the Social OMC from 2006-2010, focusing on how OMC research has been carried out. It specifically points to which theoretical framework/concepts are used, and how change is conceptualised and measured. It is organised in five sections. The first concerns visibility and awareness about the OMC; the second analyses research on the EU level coordination process; the third scrutinizes how features of the OMC have been analysed. The fourth and fifth sections, addressing how national integration of the OMC has been researched, respectively address substantive policy change as well as national policy-making. Strikingly, virtually all OMC research adopts theoretical frameworks derived from literature on Europeanisation and/or institutionalisation. Also, as the OMC is voluntary and sanction-free, it depends heavily on how and the the extent to which actors use it (agenda-setting, conflict resolution, maintaining focus on a policy issue, developing a policy dialogue, etc). OMC research has become nuanced and does highlight how, for which purpose and with which outcome actors engage with the OMC. Another finding is that there is data on policy issues addressed through the OMC, learning does take place and there is knowledge about domestic policy problems. However, the linkage between knowledge of an issue and direct use of the OMC for policy change in social policy is weak, but that may change with EU2020, where social policy has received a higher profile. Most research covers the EU-15, much more research needs to be undertaken in newer EU member states

The Operation of the Social Protection and Social Inclusion OMC in Belgium: A Hybrid Policy Instrument between Hard and Soft Law

[From the introduction]. Many more examples could be given, but the general picture is clear: the OMCs have been weighed on the scales and found wanting by mainstream academic literature. These sceptical views seems to be in sharp contrast with the views expressed by many actors involved in the Open method of Coordination on Social Protection and Social Inclusion. Indeed, the general picture emerging from a (formal) large-scale evaluation are critical, but at the same time they (strongly) support these processes (European Commission, 2005). This conclusion is corroborated by (informal) interviews with individual civil servants and social partner representatives from the 10 new Member States (CEEC) (Vanhercke, 2007). In other words, those involved in the OMC have also weighed it on the scales, but have not at all found it wanting. Finally, the abovementioned academic views seem to contrast with a recent Report from the European Parliament, in which the Committee on Legal Affairs warns against the “indirect legal effects” of soft law which is “liable to circumvent the influence of the other (democratic) instruments” and would “allow the executive effectively to legislate by means of soft-law instruments, thereby potentially undermining the Community legal order” (European Parliament, 2007:4-5). The remainder of this paper will be devoted to piecing the empirical puzzle that emerges from the previous paragraphs: on the hand, the outright sceptical views with regard to the OMC held by recent mainstream academic literature; on the other hand continued (and potentially increasing) support for this method from many of the actors who are involved in it. More particularly, we will develop one possible explanation for the continuing support of many actors, namely the hypotheses that the actors experience that this ‘soft’ mode of governance is quite a bit harder, and much more useful, in practice than they had thought, or than most academics seem to grasp so far. We try to provide empirical evidence to solve this puzzle, by looking at the actual operation in a Belgian context of one of the OMC’s, namely the Social Protection and Social Inclusion OMC (SPSI OMC), and more particularly its Social Inclusion strand. In the next section, we will begin by briefly developing a theoretical perspective which we see as fit to assess the OMC effectiveness at the national level. In section 2 we will describe, for each of the dimensions of the theoretical framework, whether there is any evidence of ‘real’ impact in Belgium

The ‘generosity’ of pensions for workers in hard jobs: in need of a nuanced debate

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Delivering the Goods for Europe 2020? The Social OMC’s Adequacy and Impact Re-Assessed

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Art. 16 remaining questions in OMC research

Abstract: Tackling pensions' problems means engaging with what Pierson (2001) has called 'immovable objects'. Additionally, the EU competence for drafting specific legislation in this area remains unfulfilled potential, while EU legislation in other policy areas creates indirect pressures on national pension policies. Under such circumstances it seems that the room for an effective European intervention in the domain is limited, especially for "soft" modes of governance such as the Open Method of Coordination on Social Protection and Social Inclusion (SPSI). The pension's strand of the SPSI OMC is often referred to in academic writings as a bureaucratic nightmare which only involves experts and technocrats, even if some cognitive effects have been acknowledged. I take issue against the view of the OMC as mere window dressing. This chapter argues that OMC is "effective" in that it provides opportunities to create policy windows of opportunity which EU and national policymakers use in their efforts to discuss, manage and reform pension systems. Building on John Kingdon's (1995) theoretical framework and applying it to both the EU level and the (most likely) case of Belgium, I conclude that the pension OMC influences, against the odds, three core streams of the policy formation process. First, OMC influences the acceptance of compelling problems so that decision makers pay serious attention to them; secondly, OMC brings about changes in the political stream; and thirdly OMC makes certain ideas 'take hold and grow', so that they matter (more) in the policy soup. The core mechanisms through which OMC operates are puzzling, through deliberate learning and de facto socialization, and powering, through usage of the OMC architecture and peer pressure as a result of comparisons with others

Hoezo, ver van ons bed? Over de wisselwerking tussen het Belgische en Europese armoedebeleid

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Against the odds: the open method of coordination as a selective amplifier for reforming Belgian pension policies

Tackling pensions' problems means engaging with what Pierson (2001) has called 'immovable objects'. Additionally, the EU competence for drafting specific legislation in this area remains unfulfilled potential, while EU legislation in other policy areas creates indirect pressures on national pension policies. Under such circumstances it seems that the room for an effective European intervention in the domain is limited, especially for "soft" modes of governance such as the Open Method of Coordination on Social Protection and Social Inclusion (SPSI). The pension's strand of the SPSI OMC is often referred to in academic writings as a bureaucratic nightmare which only involves experts and technocrats, even if some cognitive effects have been acknowledged. I take issue against the view of the OMC as mere window dressing. This chapter argues that OMC is "effective" in that it provides opportunities to create policy windows of opportunity which EU and national policymakers use in their efforts to discuss, manage and reform pension systems. Building on John Kingdon's (1995) theoretical framework and applying it to both the EU level and the (most likely) case of Belgium, I conclude that the pension OMC influences, against the odds, three core streams of the policy formation process. First, OMC influences the acceptance of compelling problems so that decision makers pay serious attention to them; secondly, OMC brings about changes in the political stream; and thirdly OMC makes certain ideas 'take hold and grow', so that they matter (more) in the policy soup. The core mechanisms through which OMC operates are puzzling, through deliberate learning and de facto socialization, and powering, through usage of the OMC architecture and peer pressure as a result of comparisons with others.status: publishe

From the Lisbon strategy to the European Pillar of Social Rights: the many lives of the Social Open Method of Coordination

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