¿Son el asilo y la inmigración realmente una cuestión de la Unión Europea?

La búsqueda de una solución al asilo para toda la UE podría estar bloqueando que se encontrasen soluciones a nivel nacional o bilateral

The Strategic Use of Resettlement: Changing the Face of Protection?

Discussion about resettlement is increasing worldwide. Traditional resettlement countries look to the EU to establish new programs to expand the use of this durable solution. Some EU Member States appear most interested in resettlement for the potential it might offer in resolving the problems of smuggling, high asylum-seeker arrivals, and widespread anti-immigrant tendencies. This article sets out four key arguments on: the reasons for conducting resettlement; the “see-saw” numbers hypothesis; perceptions of refugees according to their means of arrival; and the links between asylum and resettlement, while discussing the European developments and global discussion of the strategic use of resettlement.La réinstallation devient de plus en plus un sujet de préoccupation au niveau international. Les pays de réinstallation traditionnels se tournent vers l’Union Européenne et s’attendent à ce qu’elle développe de nouveaux programmes pour étendre l’usage de cette solution durable. Certains pays de l’UE semblent extrêmement intéressés dans la réinstallation en vue du potentiel qu’elle offre pour résoudre les problèmes de passages clandestins de personnes, de hauts niveaux d’arrivée de demandeurs d’asile et des tendances généralisées anti-immigrants. Cet article met de l’avant quatre arguments principaux : les raisons d’avoir une politique de réinstallation; l’hypothèse des nombres en balançoire à bascule; la perception variable qu’on a des réfugiés selon leur mode d’arrivée; et, les liens entre le droit d’asile et la réinstallation – tout en discutant des développements européens et des pourparlers globaux sur l’utilisation stratégique de la réinstallation

Kosovo's Refugees and the ED: Wherein Lies the Threat?

The crisis in Kosovo, which has developed over the course of a decade into a conflict involving more states than any since World War II has resulted in the displacement of almost the entire Kosovar- Albanian population, as well as of a great many Serbs and other regional populations. The European Union (EU) memberstates have prided themselves on their unity of action under NATO, in tackling this crisis. However, there has been no unity of policy toward the "refugees" - in spite of the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, with its goal of 'an area of freedom security and justice' involving a common asylum and immigration policy. The most frequently heard arguments for the reluctance to accept Kosovars in EU states are that this would only encourage ethnic cleansing, and that EU states already have too many immigrants, asylum-seekers and refugees who will not go home. The position of the "refugees" is thus a politically difficult one, and becomes a security issue in many senses. In this article, the author explores some ideas about the nature of the nexus between refugees (and migration more generally) and security in the post-Cold War world. In doing this, she will set out to critique the writings on 'societal security' in particular, posing the key question as to where exactly the threat lies as far as refugees are concerned.La crise du Kosovo, qui s' est développé en une decennie pour deboucher sur un conflit impliquant Ie plus grand nombre d'états depuis la Seconde Guerre Mondiale, a eu pour resultat Ie déplacement de la quasi totalité de la population kosovarde de souche albanaise, ainsi que d'un grand nombre de serbes et autres segments de population locale. Les états membres de l'Union Européenne (UE) se sont glorifiés de leur unité d'action sous couvert de l'OTAN lors de leur prise en charge de la crise. Cependant, il n'y a eu aucune unité de doctrine sur la question des «réfugiés» - et ce en dépit de l' entrée en vigueur du traité d'Amsterdam, avec ses objectifs de mise en place «d' une zone de liberté, de securité, et de justice» impliquant asile commun et politique d' immigration. L' argument Ie plus fréquemment avance pour expliquer la resistance des états de l'UE a accueillir des Kosovars est celui selon lequel cela representerait un encouragement implicite a la purification ethnique. S'y ajoute l'idée selon laquelle les états de l'UE comptent déjà trap d'immigrants, de demandeurs d' asile, et de réfugiés qui ne rentreront plus chez eux. Conséquemment la position de «réfugié> est une position politique difficile, et pose, de plusieurs points de vue, des problèmes de sécurité. Dans Ie présent article, l'auteure développe un certain nombre de considérations sur la nature du point nodal entre réfugiés (et immigration, de façon plus generale) et sécurité dans Ie monde de l'après Guerre froide. Ce faisant, elle procède à la critique d' un certain nombre de travaux, notamment ceux traitant de la «sécuriée societale», et soulève la question clef suivante: où réside exactement la menace en ce qui concerne les réfugiés

The Refugee-Security Dilemma in Europe

Focusing on two of the institutions involved in the range of European activities on conflict prevention and displacement in the wake of the Yugoslav crisis, this article seeks to address the complex interplay of refugee protection and security enhancing strategies. The conclusion to an analysis of the mandates and expectations placed upon the OSCE's High Commissioner on National Minorities and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is that the latter is at risk of abrogating its responsibilities towards refugees and potentially misinterpreting the motives of other (actual conflict prevention) organs in the international security arena and their impact (or not) on displacement. The article places this institutional and conceptual dilemma of refugee protection and security in the context of International Relations theories, and stands squarely against the view that refugees are themselves a threat to west European security.En concentrant son attention sur deux des institutions impliquées dans le réseau des activités européennes en matière de prévention des conflits et des déplacements de populations dans la mouvance de la crise yougoslave, le présent article s'efforce d'analyser l'interconnexion complexe qui s'établit entre la protection des réfugiés et les stratégies de renforcement de la sécurité. La conclusion d'une analyse des mandats et projets chapeautés par le Haut Commissaire aux Minorités Nationales de l'OSCE et le Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies aux réfugiés est que ce dernier risque purement et simplement d'abdiquer ses responsabilités envers les réfugiés et de virtuellement mécomprendre les motifs d'autres organismes (assurant de fait la prévention de conflits) dans l'arène de la sécurité internationale, ainsi que leur impact (ou absence d'impact) sur les déplacements de populations. Le présent article place ce dilemme institutionnel et conceptuel de la protection des réfugiés et de la sécurité dans le contexte des théories sur les relations internationales et s'inscrit fermement en faux contre la croyance selon laquelle les réfugiés seraient eux même une menace à la sécurité en Europe occidentale

Early ultrasound surveillance of newly-created haemodialysis arteriovenous fistula

IntroductionWe assess if ultrasound surveillance of newly-created arteriovenous fistulas (AVFs) can predict nonmaturation sufficiently reliably to justify randomized controlled trial (RCT) evaluation of ultrasound-directed salvage intervention.MethodsConsenting adults underwent blinded fortnightly ultrasound scanning of their AVF after creation, with scan characteristics that predicted AVF nonmaturation identified by logistic regression modeling.ResultsOf 333 AVFs created, 65.8% matured by 10 weeks. Serial scanning revealed that maturation occurred rapidly, whereas consistently lower fistula flow rates and venous diameters were observed in those that did not mature. Wrist and elbow AVF nonmaturation could be optimally modeled from week 4 ultrasound parameters alone, but with only moderate positive predictive values (PPVs) (wrist, 60.6% [95% confidence interval, CI: 43.9–77.3]; elbow, 66.7% [48.9–84.4]). Moreover, 40 (70.2%) of the 57 AVFs that thrombosed by week 10 had already failed by the week 4 scan, thus limiting the potential of salvage procedures initiated by that scan’s findings to alter overall maturation rates. Modeling of the early ultrasound characteristics could also predict primary patency failure at 6 months; however, that model performed poorly at predicting assisted primary failure (those AVFs that failed despite a salvage attempt), partly because patency of at-risk AVFs was maintained by successful salvage performed without recourse to the early scan data.ConclusionEarly ultrasound surveillance may predict fistula maturation, but is likely, at best, to result in only very modest improvements in fistula patency. Power calculations suggest that an impractically large number of participants (>1700) would be required for formal RCT evaluation

Los romaníes apátridas en Macedonia

Muchas personas de etnia roma tienen que lidiar con la discriminación y los prejuicios tanto de grupos privados como de gobiernos nacionales

Return Seen From A European Perspective: An Impossible Dream, An Improbable Reality, or An Obstruction to Refugee Policy?

The central theme of this Essay is that both individuals in need of protection and governments obliged to grant protection to those in need generally hold the eventual return of citizens to their countries of origin to be the ideal scenario. However, this ideal cannot always come to fruition -- not only due to circumstances in the country of origin, but also as an unintended consequence of policy decisions taken by governments concerning the protection of refugees (or indeed internally displaced persons ( IDPs )) and the reactions of individuals to the outcomes of those policy decisions. Return, it will be suggested, takes on added dream like qualities because those involved know that it is probable to be something of an impossible dream. The suggestion in this Essay is that the myth of return, as envisioned in different ways by refugees and policy makers, obstructs effective policy making on refugee protection issues, and can reduce the potential for a fruitful period of refuge with at least temporary [*1507] integration. At first sight counter-intuitive: perhaps better integration of refugees in and with the host society could in fact support the prospects for eventual and sustainable return. In addressing this theme, we will first look at the story of return in and from Europe in the 1990s and the Cold War thinking which has formed the context of protection policy that is only gradually starting to change. We then turn to the approaches of governments and of individuals sustained by the myth of return. Individual choices in seeking protection and migration also relate to government policies, and their attachment to the ideal of return can be influenced in reaction to their understanding of government policies. Specific attention is given to the situation of IDPs in Georgia, as an example of displaced persons clinging to the myth of return. Turning to the other side of return, the Dutch government policy on the return of rejected asylum seekers is then discussed, demonstrating that the tough language of returning rejected asylum seekers can, but does not automatically, lead to removal. Bringing the issues together, we look more broadly at the focus on readmission within a general refugee, asylum and migration policy, and the international sentiment about the conditions under which return is possible. In conclusion, we consider the policy implications of looking holistically at return, and combining the ideal of return with pragmatic approaches to integration

Are asylum and immigration really a European Union issue?

Attempts to find an EU-wide solution to asylum may be preventing the finding of workable solutions at the bilateral or national level