Complementary Platforms

We introduce an analytical framework close to the canonical model of platform competition investigated by Rochet and Tirole (2006) to study pricing decisions in two-sided markets when two or more platforms are needed simultaneously for the successful completion of a transaction. The model developed is a natural extension of the Cournot-Ellet theory of complementary monopoly featuring clear cut asymmetric single- and multihoming patterns across the market. The results indicate that the so-called anticommons problem generalizes to two-sided markets because individual platforms do not take into account the negative pricing externality they exert on the other platforms. As a result, mergers between such platforms may be welfare enhancing, but involve redistribution of surplus from one side of the market to the other. Moreover, the limit of an atomistic allocation of property rights however is not monopoly pricing, indicating that there also exist differences with the received theory of complementarity

Using Economics in Antitrust Decisions.Five Lessons from the European Scene

Five lessons on avoiding common mistakes in antitrust decision making are the subject of this contribution. Although many of the usual mistakes are wellknown by specialists in industrial organisation, practioners keep falling in the same trap time after time. But the mistakes become well-known also to a broader audience and hence it is easy to expose the incompetence or captivity of certain decision makers. The article stresses what errors are inadmissible, and why this is the case.

Regulering en internationale innovatie in de farmaceutische industrie

Regulering en internationale innovatie in de farmaceutische industri