Assessment of Vaginal Lactobacillary Flora in Wet Mount and Fresh or Delayed Gram's Stain

Objective: The assessment of the vaginal lactobacillary flora helps to direct further diagnostic microbiologic investigations in genital infectious disease and seems to represent a powerful tool in predicting infectious morbidity and preterm labor during pregnancy. In the absence of a “gold standard,” we studied the variations in assessing lactobacillary morphotypes according to the method used

SMoTherSpectre: exploiting speculative execution through port contention

Spectre, Meltdown, and related attacks have demonstrated that kernels, hypervisors, trusted execution environments, and browsers are prone to information disclosure through micro-architectural weaknesses. However, it remains unclear as to what extent other applications, in particular those that do not load attacker-provided code, may be impacted. It also remains unclear as to what extent these attacks are reliant on cache-based side channels. We introduce SMoTherSpectre, a speculative code-reuse attack that leverages port-contention in simultaneously multi-threaded processors (SMoTher) as a side channel to leak information from a victim process. SMoTher is a fine-grained side channel that detects contention based on a single victim instruction. To discover real-world gadgets, we describe a methodology and build a tool that locates SMoTher-gadgets in popular libraries. In an evaluation on glibc, we found hundreds of gadgets that can be used to leak information. Finally, we demonstrate proof-of-concept attacks against the OpenSSH server, creating oracles for determining four host key bits, and against an application performing encryption using the OpenSSL library, creating an oracle which can differentiate a bit of the plaintext through gadgets in libcrypto and glibc

Time Protection: the Missing OS Abstraction

Timing channels enable data leakage that threatens the security of computer systems, from cloud platforms to smartphones and browsers executing untrusted third-party code. Preventing unauthorised information flow is a core duty of the operating system, however, present OSes are unable to prevent timing channels. We argue that OSes must provide time protection in addition to the established memory protection. We examine the requirements of time protection, present a design and its implementation in the seL4 microkernel, and evaluate its efficacy as well as performance overhead on Arm and x86 processors

Efficacy and tolerance of local treatment of acute vulvovaginal candidiasis with 4 different single doses (10, 25, 50 and 100 mg) of Ro 14-4767 versus a 7-day treatment with miconazole.

SCOPUS: ar.jinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishe

Fallout: Leaking Data on Meltdown-resistant CPUs

status: publishe