Asymmetric Governance and the Transformation of Employment Relations in the Eurozone: The Contingent Influence of the Ideas of Policy-Makers

The governance of the Eurozone debt crisis has been characterised by the asymmetric distribution of the costs of adjustment, namely the imposition of austerity measures and the liberalisation of institutions of industrial relations in debtor countries that were awarded a bailout package coupled with the protection of banks from creditor countries. By presenting an ideational perspective, this article highlights the role of ideas in explaining these policy outcomes. The importance of ideas is contingent upon the manner in which they are framed. The process of framing enables policy-makers to build support for policies by presenting them in a manner that links an issue with a specific understanding of important economic and political developments. Equally, if not more important in the current context of the Eurozone debt crisis, the importance of ideas is also contingent upon their influence over the maintenance of extant institutional arrangements of Eurozone governance that distribute costs of adjustment in an asymmetrical manner. In particular, we illustrate the role of German Ordoliberalism in heightening the credibility of the threat of withholding financial assistance, in the event of non-compliance with strict conditionality criteria, in the current institutional architecture of Eurozone governance

The management of the Eurozone in crisis times: Actors, institutions and the case of bailout packages

The adjustment to the financial crisis was particularly brutal for Eurozone countries targeted by private bondholders. Financial assistance through the newly created Eurozone governance system was conditional on the implementation of austerity measures and the introduction of structural reforms in industrial relations (decentralization of collective bargaining and liberalization of employment protection). Our analysis focuses on the formation process and the structural features of Eurozone supranational institutions. Building from the insights of actor-centred institutionalism, we illustrate the importance of coalitions among some, but not all, important actors based on the overlapping of their non-monolithic preferences in the process of institutional innovation. The structural features of Eurozone institutions curtailed member states’ ability to effectively resist the imposition of internal devaluation policies. A contested outcome, these institutional features were secured by a specific coalition of important actors – most notably, the German government and the European Central Bank – based on their overlapping interests around internal devaluation policies

Protection of Domestic bank Ownership in France and Germany: The Functional Equivalency of Institutional Diversity in Takeovers

We investigate the character of the market for corporate control (i.e. takeovers) in French and German banking. The key feature of this character is the marked ability of French and German banks to resist unsolicited takeover bids, especially – although not exclusively– those from foreign competitors. We present an institutional perspective to account for the restrained character of takeovers in French and German banking. Our perspective is composed of two elements. First, institutional arrangements are important since they structure power relations among firm stakeholders by providing opportunities, as well as imposing constraints, to influence the decision-making process in which takeover transactions take place. Second, institutional arrangements provide firm stakeholders with several potential opportunities, not just one, to block unsolicited bids since takeover contests are composed of sequences of decisions for which approval is needed at each stage. French and German banks have used different mixes of institutional arrangements, themselves located at different stages of takeover transactions, to secure restrained markets for corporate control. Our institutional analysis, in turn, also illustrates an important shortcoming of banking sector protectionism, namely the contribution of protection from unsolicited takeover bids to the building of banks carrying systemic risks

Corporate governance and takeovers in the Spanish electricity sector

Takeovers, as a restructuring mechanism, has potentially risen in Spain given the European Union directives. Nonetheless national institutions of corporate governance still matters in the assessment of takeovers

Takeovers and the transformation of the electricity sector in Britain and Spain : the importance of institutions and varieties of National Regulatory Authorities

The liberalisation of the electricity sector in Europe has been a watershed event in the evolution of the industry. The monopolistic legal status of state-owned enterprises has been transformed - from state ownership to privatised companies, from regulated monopoly to re-regulated entities - all of which in a new context of liberalisation and increased competition at the European level. However, important variations between countries remain in place despite the introduction European Union (EU) directives. This article focuses on one important aspect of the evolution of the secto

Liberalisation models in the electricity sector : the impact of the market for corporate control in Britain and Spain (1996-2010)

Liberalization and re-regulation have brought along major changes in the regulated environment of utility industries, and particularly in the electricity sector. Nonetheless, the impact of these developments exhibits substantial difference