Alternative Systems of Crime Control. National, Transnational, and International Dimensions

The typical trial-oriented systems of criminal justice that are primarily based on the strict application of substantive criminal law have reached their functional and logistical limits in most parts of the modern legal world. As a result, new sanction models, less formal, administrative, and discretionary case disposals, plea bargaining arrangements, and other alternative procedural and transitional justice mechanisms have emerged at unprecedented levels in national and international legal orders affiliated both with the civil law and the common law tradition. These normative constructs and practices aim at abbreviating, simplifying, or circumventing the conventional criminal investigation and prosecution. They seek to enhance the effectiveness of conflict resolution proceedings and to shift the focus of crime control from repression to prevention. The present volume explores these alternative, informal, preventive, and transitional types of criminal justice and the legitimacy of new sanction models in the global risk society from the perspective of national and international justice and by focusing on the special regimes of anti-terrorism measures and security law. The authors of the papers are experts and internationally acclaimed scholars in this field. Their research results were presented and discussed at an inter-national conference held on 26-27 January 2018 at Middle Temple in London, UK, which was organized by the School of Law of the Queen Mary University of London, the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law (Freiburg), and the European & International Criminal Law Institute (Athens)

Transnational Private Regulatory Governance: Ambiguities of Public Authority and Private Power

The continuing proliferation of transnational private regulatory governance challenges conceptions of legal authority, legitimacy and public regulation of economic activity. The transnational law merchant or, lex mercatoria, is a case in point in this context, as it represents a laboratory for the exploration of “private” contractual governance in a context, in which the assertion of public or private authority has itself become contentious. The ambiguity surrounding many forms of today’s contractual governance in the transnational arena echoes that of the far-reaching transformation of public regulatory governance, which has been characteristic of Western welfare states over the last few decades. What is particularly remarkable, however, is the way in which the depictions of “private instruments” and “public interests” in the post-welfare state regulatory environment have given rise to a rise in importance of social norms, self-regulation and a general anti-state affect in the assessment of judicial enforcement or administration of contractual arrangements. The paper suggests the need to short-circuit and to read in parallel the justifications offered for a contractual governance model, which prioritizes and seeks to insulate “private” arrangements from their embeddedness in regulated market contexts, on both the national and transnational level