The social brain: allowing humans to boldly go where no other species has been

The biological basis of complex human social interaction and communication has been illuminated through a coming together of various methods and disciplines. Among these are comparative studies of other species, studies of disorders of social cognition and developmental psychology. The use of neuroimaging and computational models has given weight to speculations about the evolution of social behaviour and culture in human societies. We highlight some networks of the social brain relevant to two-person interactions and consider the social signals between interacting partners that activate these networks.Wemake a case for distinguishing between signals that automatically trigger interaction and cooperation and ostensive signals that are used deliberately.We suggest that this ostensive signalling is needed for ‘closing the loop’ in two-person interactions, where the partners each know that they have the intention to communicate. The use of deliberate social signals can serve to increase reputation and trust and facilitates teaching. This is likely to be a critical factor in the steep cultural ascent ofmankind

Mirroring and beyond: coupled dynamics as a generalized framework for modelling social interactions

When people observe one another, behavioural alignment can be detected at many levels, from the physical to the mental. Likewise, when people process the same highly complex stimulus sequences, such as films and stories, alignment is detected in the elicited brain activity. In early sensory areas, shared neural patterns are coupled to the low-level properties of the stimulus (shape, motion, volume, etc.), while in high-order brain areas, shared neural patterns are coupled to high-levels aspects of the stimulus, such as meaning. Successful social interactions require such alignments (both behavioural and neural), as communication cannot occur without shared understanding. However, we need to go beyond simple, symmetric (mirror) alignment once we start interacting. Interactions are dynamic processes, which involve continuous mutual adaptation, development of complementary behaviour and division of labour such as leader-follower roles. Here, we argue that interacting individuals are dynamically coupled rather than simply aligned. This broader framework for understanding interactions can encompass both processes by which behaviour and brain activity mirror each other (neural alignment), and situations in which behaviour and brain activity in one participant are coupled (but not mirrored) to the dynamics in the other participant. To apply these more sophisticated accounts of social interactions to the study of the underlying neural processes we need to develop new experimental paradigms and novel methods of data analysis

Autism and Dyslexia: A Glance Over 25 Years of Research

Autism and dyslexia are wrongly classified as childhood disorders: They are lifelong and therefore have to be studied in adults as well as in children. Individual variability is enormous, and, as a result, behavioral diagnosis remains problematic. The study of the underlying cognitive abilities in autism and dyslexia has acted as a gateway for the emergence of developmental cognitive neuroscience

Mindblind eyes: an absence of spontaneous theory of mind in Asperger syndrome

Adults with Asperger syndrome can understand mental states such as desires and beliefs (mentalizing) when explicitly prompted to do so, despite having impairments in social communication. We directly tested the hypothesis that such individuals nevertheless fail to mentalize spontaneously. To this end, we used an eye-tracking task that has revealed the spontaneous ability to mentalize in typically developing infants. We showed that, like infants, neurotypical adults’ (n = 17 participants) eye movements anticipated an actor’s behavior on the basis of her false belief. This was not the case for individuals with Asperger syndrome (n = 19). Thus, these individuals do not attribute mental states spontaneously, but they may be able to do so in explicit tasks through compensatory learning

Autistic adolescents show atypical activation of the brain's mentalizing system even without a prior history of mentalizing problems.

Some autistic children pass classic Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks that others fail, but the significance of this finding is at present unclear. We identified two such groups of primary school age (labelled ToM+ and ToM-) and a matched comparison group of typically developing children (TD). Five years later we tested these participants again on a ToM test battery appropriate for adolescents and conducted an fMRI study with a story based ToM task. We also assessed autistic core symptoms at these two time points. At both times the ToM- group showed more severe social communication impairments than the ToM+ group, and while showing an improvement in mentalizing performance, they continued to show a significant impairment compared to the NT group. Two independent ROI analyses of the BOLD signal showed activation of the mentalizing network including medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate and lateral temporal cortices. Strikingly, both ToM+ and ToM- groups showed very similar patterns of heightened activation in comparison with the NT group. No differences in other brain regions were apparent. Thus, autistic adolescents who do not have a history of mentalizing problems according to our ToM battery showed the same atypical neurophysiological response during mentalizing as children who did have such a history. This finding indicates that heterogeneity at the behavioural level may nevertheless map onto a similar phenotype at the neuro-cognitive level

Flux of life

Developmental cognitive neuroscience is flourishing but there are new challenges and new questions to be asked. I argue that we need a bigger picture and an evolutionary framework. This brings some challenges, such as the need to rewrite the old story of nature and nurture, and the need to systematically investigate innate predispositions. While brain imaging has provided some splendid insights and new puzzles to solve, its limitations must not be ignored. Can they help us to find out more about the extent to which the infant brain already configures the adult brain? Can we find out why neurodevelopmental disorders often have severe consequences on cognition and behaviour, despite the mitigating force of brain plasticity? I wish to encourage researchers of the future to take risks by letting their imagination inspire theories to pursue hard questions. I end with a wish list of topics, from start-up kits to abstract reasoning, that I hope can be tackled afresh. However, collecting physiological and behavioural data is not enough. We need a deeper understanding of the mechanisms of cognitive development

Impaired Competence for Pretense in Children with Autism: Exploring Potential Cognitive Predictors.

Lack of pretense in children with autism has been explained by a number of theoretical explanations, including impaired mentalising, impaired response inhibition, and weak central coherence. This study aimed to empirically test each of these theories. Children with autism (n=60) were significantly impaired relative to controls (n=65) when interpreting pretense, thereby supporting a competence deficit hypothesis. They also showed impaired mentalising and response inhibition, but superior local processing indicating weak central coherence. Regression analyses revealed that mentalising significantly and independently predicted pretense. The results are interpreted as supporting the impaired mentalising theory and evidence against competing theories invoking impaired response inhibition or a local processing bias. The results of this study have important implications for treatment and intervention

Fast Lane to Slow Science

Fast Science is bad for scientists and bad for science. Slow Science may actually help us to make faster progress, but how can we slow down? Here, I offer preliminary suggestions for how we can transition to a healthier and more sustainable research culture

What we observe is biased by what other people tell us: beliefs about the reliability of gaze behavior modulate attentional orienting to gaze cues

For effective social interactions with other people, information about the physical environment must be integrated with information about the interaction partner. In order to achieve this, processing of social information is guided by two components: a bottom-up mechanism reflexively triggered by stimulus-related information in the social scene and a top-down mechanism activated by task-related context information. In the present study, we investigated whether these components interact during attentional orienting to gaze direction. In particular, we examined whether the spatial specificity of gaze cueing is modulated by expectations about the reliability of gaze behavior. Expectations were either induced by instruction or could be derived from experience with displayed gaze behavior. Spatially specific cueing effects were observed with highly predictive gaze cues, but also when participants merely believed that actually non-predictive cues were highly predictive. Conversely, cueing effects for the whole gazed-at hemifield were observed with non-predictive gaze cues, and spatially specific cueing effects were attenuated when actually predictive gaze cues were believed to be non-predictive. This pattern indicates that (i) information about cue predictivity gained from sampling gaze behavior across social episodes can be incorporated in the attentional orienting to social cues, and that (ii) beliefs about gaze behavior modulate attentional orienting to gaze direction even when they contradict information available from social episodes