Justice coopérative et gratuité des transports en commun

Cooperative Justice and Free Public Transit - Urban transportation is a central issue for theories of urban justice. The current car culture is unjust because it discriminates against those who cannot afford to be a part of it, and it is inefficient because it creates a collectively disadvantageous situation. In this paper, I will first argue that public policies should encourage a modal transfer from car to public transit. Drawing on a theory of cooperative justice, I will then argue that free public transit is mutually advantageous and can be defended from both the perspectives of equality and efficiency

The GC-Rich Mitochondrial and Plastid Genomes of the Green Alga Coccomyxa Give Insight into the Evolution of Organelle DNA Nucleotide Landscape

Most of the available mitochondrial and plastid genome sequences are biased towards adenine and thymine (AT) over guanine and cytosine (GC). Examples of GC-rich organelle DNAs are limited to a small but eclectic list of species, including certain green algae. Here, to gain insight in the evolution of organelle nucleotide landscape, we present the GC-rich mitochondrial and plastid DNAs from the trebouxiophyte green alga Coccomyxa sp. C-169. We compare these sequences with other GC-rich organelle DNAs and argue that the forces biasing them towards G and C are nonadaptive and linked to the metabolic and/or life history features of this species. The Coccomyxa organelle genomes are also used for phylogenetic analyses, which highlight the complexities in trying to resolve the interrelationships among the core chlorophyte green algae, but ultimately favour a sister relationship between the Ulvophyceae and Chlorophyceae, with the Trebouxiophyceae branching at the base of the chlorophyte crown

Are Cities Illiberal? Municipal Jurisdictions and the Scope of Liberal Neutrality

One of the main characteristics of today’s democratic societies is their pluralism. As a result, liberal political philosophers often claim that the state should remain neutral with respect to different conceptions of the good. Legal and social policies should be acceptable to everyone regard- less of their culture, their religion or their comprehensive moral views. One might think that this commitment to neutrality should be especially pronounced in urban centres, with their culturally diverse populations. However, there are a large number of laws and policies adopted at the municipal level that contradict the liberal principle of neutrality. In this paper, I want to suggest that these perfectionist laws and policies are legitimate at the urban level. Specifically, I will argue that the principle of neutrality applies only indirectly to social institutions within the broader framework of the nation-state. This is clear in the case of voluntary associations, but to a certain extent this rationale applies also to cities. In a liberal regime, private associations are allowed to hold and defend perfectionist views, focused on a particular conception of the good life. One problem is to determine the limits of this perfectionism at the urban level, since cities, unlike private associations, are public institutions. My aim here is therefore to give a liberal justification to a limited form of perfectionism of municipal laws and policies

Éthique appliquée, institutions adversatives et moralité des rôles professionnels

Arthur Applbaum a nommé éthique adversative la branche de l’éthique professionnelle qui cherche à justifier la moralité des rôles et des pratiques qui permettent aux acteurs d’avoir certains comportements pourtant interdits par la moralité ordinaire. Applbaum considère qu’aucun des différents arguments mis de l’avant par les défenseurs de l’éthique adversative ne justifie de tels écarts de la moralité ; les institutions adversatives et les rôles qu’elles génèrent ne peuvent créer de permissions morales exceptionnelles. Cela découle d’une position métaéthique particulière qu’il nomme positivisme institutionnel (practice positivism), et que l’on peut définir ainsi : la moralité ordinaire a une priorité délibérative sur les règles et les conventions des pratiques et des institutions sociales pour la simple raison que ces dernières sont dépourvues de toute force morale. Cet article cherche à défendre l’éthique adversative contre les critiques d’Applbaum.Arthur Applbaum speaks of an ethics for adversaries to name the branch of professional ethics aimed at justifying the morality of those roles and social practices which seem to allow agents to behave in ways that would be deemed unacceptable by ordinary morality. Applbaum considers that non of the arguments put forth by the proponents of an ethics for adversaries can justify a departure from ordinary morality. In other words, adversarial institutions and their roles cannot create special moral permissions. His position depends on a particular metaethical view he calls practice positivism, according to which ordinary morality always has deliberative priority over the rules and conventions of social practices and institutions, for the mere reason that these practices and institutions have no moral force. This paper addresses this issue, in order to defend the possibility of an ethics for adversaries against Applbaum’s criticisms

Inégalités et justice fiscale : le Canada devrait-il imposer les successions ?

Pour faire face à la croissance des inégalités, plusieurs voix se font aujourd’hui entendre pour défendre la nécessité d’une imposition plus lourde de l’héritage. Or, le Canada est l’une des rares sociétés démocratiques et le seul pays du G7 à avoir entièrement éliminé l’impôt sur l’héritage, les dons ou les successions. Dans le contexte actuel, devrions-nous remettre cet outil fiscal à l’ordre du jour ? Il ne s’agit pas dans ce texte de répondre directement à cette question ni de se prononcer sur les détails d’implantation d’un éventuel impôt sur les successions ou sur le taux d’imposition marginal supérieur que devrait privilégier le Canada. L’objectif est plutôt d’offrir une analyse critique des objections de principe qui sont généralement soulevées, dans le discours public et politique, contre l’impôt sur les successions. Ainsi, pour y voir plus clair dans ce débat moralement chargé, nous nous intéressons dans ce texte à trois types d’arguments distincts et aux façons de les réfuter ou de modérer leur portée : l’argument de la double imposition, le problème de la liberté de choix et l’argument de la vertu.In response to growing inequalities, several voices defend the need for higher inheritance taxes. Canada is one of the few democratic societies and the only G7 country to have completely eliminated inheritance, gift or estate taxes. In the current context, should we put this fiscal tool back on the agenda? This text does not attempt to answer this question directly. Rather, the aim is to provide a critical analysis of the principled objections raised in public and political discourse against estate and inheritance taxes. Thus, to clarify this morally charged debate, we are interested in three distinct types of arguments and in available ways to refute them or moderate their scope: the argument of double taxation, the problem of freedom of choice and the argument of virtue