113,450 research outputs found
TCB operation supply inventory system /TCBSYS/
System produces inventory report for each updated period and special report for long term inventory information summary. Report summarizes consumption, outstanding orders, and balance of each inventory item. System generates, corrects, and adjusts inventory tapes. Restrictions of system are listed
On the finiteness and stability of certain sets of associated primes ideals of local cohomology modules
Let be a Noetherian local ring, an ideal of and a
finitely generated -module. Let be an integer and
r=\depth_k(I,N) the length of a maximal -sequence in dimension in
defined by M. Brodmann and L. T. Nhan ({Comm. Algebra, 36 (2008), 1527-1536).
For a subset S\subseteq \Spec R we set S_{{\ge}k}={\p\in
S\mid\dim(R/\p){\ge}k}. We first prove in this paper that
\Ass_R(H^j_I(N))_{\ge k} is a finite set for all }. Let
\fN=\oplus_{n\ge 0}N_n be a finitely generated graded \fR-module, where
\fR is a finitely generated standard graded algebra over . Let be
the eventual value of \depth_k(I,N_n). Then our second result says that for
all the sets \bigcup_{j{\le}l}\Ass_R(H^j_I(N_n))_{{\ge}k} are
stable for large .Comment: To appear in Communication in Algebr
(Average-) convexity of common pool and oligopoly TU-games
The paper studies both the convexity and average-convexity properties for a particular class of cooperative TU-games called common pool games. The common pool situation involves a cost function as well as a (weakly decreasing) average joint production function. Firstly, it is shown that, if the relevant cost function is a linear function, then the common pool games are convex games. The convexity, however, fails whenever cost functions are arbitrary. We present sufficient conditions involving the cost functions (like weakly decreasing marginal costs as well as weakly decreasing average costs) and the average joint production function in order to guarantee the convexity of the common pool game. A similar approach is effective to investigate a relaxation of the convexity property known as the average-convexity property for a cooperative game. An example illustrates that oligopoly games are a special case of common pool games whenever the average joint production function represents an inverse demand function
Structural and optical properties of MOCVD AllnN epilayers
7] M.-Y. Ryu, C.Q. Chen, E. Kuokstis, J.W. Yang, G. Simin, M. Asif Khan, Appl. Phys. Lett. 80 (2002) 3730. [8] D. Xu, Y. Wang, H. Yang, L. Zheng, J. Li, L. Duan, R. Wu, Sci. China (a) 42 (1999) 517. [9] H. Hirayama, A. Kinoshita, A. Hirata, Y. Aoyagi, Phys. Stat. Sol. (a) 188 (2001) 83. [10] Y. Chen, T. Takeuchi, H. Amano, I. Akasaki, N. Yamada, Y. Kaneko, S.Y. Wang, Appl. Phys. Lett. 72 (1998) 710. [11] Ig-Hyeon Kim, Hyeong-Soo Park, Yong-Jo Park, Taeil Kim, Appl. Phys. Lett. 73 (1998) 1634. [12] K. Watanabe, J.R. Yang, S.Y. Huang, K. Inoke, J.T. Hsu, R.C. Tu, T. Yamazaki, N. Nakanishi, M. Shiojiri, Appl. Phys. Lett. 82 (2003) 718
Analiza zależności między wynikami sportowymi a stopami zwrotu przedsiębiorstw zaangażowanych w sponsoring sportowy
The article is a short study of the importance of non-economic factors in the fluctuation of rates of return of sponsors’ stocks quoted on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. The authors focus on the correlations between sport results of Polish football clubs and rates of return of stocks of stock exchange companies. Dynamic econometric models assuming heteroscedasticity of a random coefficient are used.Artykuł jest krótkim studium o znaczeniu czynników nieekonomicznych w kształtowaniu się stóp zwrotu z akcji spółek sponsorskich na Giełdzie Papierów Wartościowych w Warszawie. W pracy skupiono się na związkach między wynikami sportowymi klubów piłkarskich a stopami zwrotu spółek giełdowych. Wykorzystano tu dynamiczne modele ekonometryczne zakładające heteroskedastyczność składnika losowego
A multiplicative potential approach to solutions for cooperative TU-games
Concerning the solution theory for cooperative games with transferable utility, it is well-known that the Shapley value is the most appealing representative of the family of (not necessarily efficient) game-theoretic solutions with an additive potential representation. This paper introduces a new solution concept, called Multiplicativily Proportional () value, that can be regarded as the counterpart of the Shapley value if the additive potential approach to the solution theory is replaced by a multiplicative potential approach in that the difference of two potential evaluations is replaced by its quotient. One out of two main equivalence theorems states that every solution with a multiplicative potential representation is equivalent to this specifically chosen efficient value in that the solution of the initial game coincides with the value of an auxiliary game. The associated potential function turns out to be of a multiplicative form (instead of an additive form) with reference to the worth of all the coalitions. The second equivalence theorem presents four additional characterizations of solutions that admit a multiplicative potential representation, e.g., preservation of discrete ratios or path independence
Concerto Competition Final Round
Competition Coordinator Dr. Robert Rust
Jury Cynthia Phelps, viola (Principal, New York Philharmonic) Leonard Hindell, bassoon (Former member, Metropolitan Opera Orchestra & New York Philharmonic) Robert Ward, piano (Director, Concerto Fest Austria)
Piano Accompanists Dr. John Tu (Concerto Competition Accompanying Resident) Mr. Tao Lin (Collaborative Piano Faculty) Dr. Yang Shen (Collaborative Piano Faculty)
Canvassers Roberta Burns Jack Kracke
Finalists Hsin-Hui Liu, piano - Ravel, Piano Concerto in G major (Tu) Giorgi Chkhikvadze, piano - Prokofiev, Piano Concerto No. 2 in G minor, op. 16 (Tu) Dotan Nitzberg, piano - Liszt, Totentanz (Tu) Aneliya Novikova, piano - Rachmaninoff, Piano Concerto No. 3, op. 30 (Tu) Jesse Yukimura, viola - Martinu, Rhapsody Concerto, H, 337 (Lin)
LUNCH BREAK Yaroslava Poletaeva, violin - Saint-Saens, Havanaise (Lin) Marina Lenau, violin - Tchaikovsky, Violin Concerto in D Major, op. 35 (Lin) Robert Harrover, trombone - David, Concertino for Trombone in E-flat Major, op. 4 (Tu) John Hong, clarinet - Mozart, Clarinet Concerto in A Major, K. 622 (Tu) Fabiola Porras, clarinet - Nielsen, Clarinet Concerto (Tu
Early Communication System (ECOMM) for ISS
The International Space Station (ISS) Early Communications System (ECOMM) was a Johnson Space Center (JSC) Avionic Systems Division (ASD) in-house developed communication system to provide early communications between the ISS and the Mission Control Center-Houston (MCC-H). This system allows for low rate commands (link rate of 6 kbps) to be transmitted through the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) from MCC-H to the ISS using TDRSS's S-band Single Access Forward (SSA/) link service. This system also allows for low rate telemetry (link rate of 20.48 kbps) to be transmitted from ISS to MCC-H through the TDRSS using TDRSS's S-band Single Access Return (SSAR) link service. In addition this system supports a JSC developed Onboard Communications Adapter (OCA) that allows for a two-way data exchange of 128 kbps between MCC-H and the ISS through TDRSS. This OCA data can be digital video/audio (two-way videoconference), and/or file transfers, and/or "white board". The key components of the system, the data formats used by the system to insure compatibility with the future ISS S-Band System, as well as how other vehicles may be able to use this system for their needs are discussed in this paper
The regularity of the positive part of functions in with applications to parabolic equations
Let with
be given. Then we show by means of a counter-example that the positive part
of has less regularity, in particular it holds in general. Nevertheless, satisfies an
integration-by-parts formula, which can be used to prove non-negativity of weak
solutions of parabolic equations
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