Inferential processes in the forced compliance situation : A Bayesian analysis

The attribution made by an observer (O) to an actor in the forced compliance situation was regarded as a probability revision process which can be described by a Bayesian inference model. Os' perceptions of the forced compliance situation were analyzed in terms of the input components into the Bayesian model: prior probabilities of the relevant attitudes and the diagnostic values of the behaviors which the actor may choose. In order to test propositions made by attribution theory about such perceptions (Kelley, 1967; Messick, 1971), Os viewed actors under conditions of Low Inducement (LI) and High Inducement (HI). Before observing the actor's decision, Os estimated the prior probabilities of the relevant attitudes and the conditional probabilities of compliance and refusal given each of the attitudes. After observing the actor's decision, Os estimated the posterior probabilities of the attitudes. As expected, in the LI condition, compared to the HI condition, compliance was seen as less probable and more diagnostic about the actor's attitudes, and the posterior probability of the corresponding attitude was higher. Contrary to expectations, within both conditions, compliance, compared to refusal, was seen as less diagnostic and more probable.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/22432/1/0000882.pd

Processing the information contained in another's behavior

This study investigates attributions based on behavior congruent with situational demands (in-role) and those based on behavior incongruent with situational demands (out-of-role). By analyzing these processes in terms of a Bayesian inference model, it was possible to determine (a) the diagnostic values observers intially assign to behaviors, (b) the actual informational impact of these behaviors, and (c) the degree of optimality in processing information contained therein. The main results can be summarized as follows: (1) The diagnostic value and actual informational impact of out-of-role behaviors were much higher than those of inrole behaviors. (2) Information about out-of-role behaviors was less optimally processed than information about in-role behaviors. (3) Observers assigned smaller diagnostic values to behaviors which were described in great detail than to behaviors which were described in summary statements. (4) Observers' attitudes influenced their initial beliefs about the actors but not the processing of new information about the actor. (5) The Bayesian inference model predicted observers' inferences reasonably well.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/21998/1/0000411.pd

Abstract Thinking Facilitates Aggregation of Information

Many situations in life (such as considering which stock to invest in, or which people to befriend) require averaging across series of values. Here, we examined predictions derived from construal level theory, and tested whether abstract compared with concrete thinking facilitates the process of aggregating values into a unified summary representation. In four experiments, participants were induced to think more abstractly (vs. concretely) and performed different variations of an averaging task with numerical values (Experiments 1–2 and 4), and emotional faces (Experiment 3). We found that the induction of abstract, compared with concrete thinking, improved aggregation accuracy (Experiments 1–3), but did not improve memory for specific items (Experiment 4). In particular, in concrete thinking, averaging was characterized by increased regression toward the mean and lower signal-to-noise ratio, compared with abstract thinking

Interpersonal comparison versus persuasive argumentation: A more direct test of alternative explanations for group-induced shifts in individual choice

One class of theories explains group induced shifts in individual choice in terms of interpersonal comparison process. By comparing himself with others a member finds out that his position is uncomfortably discrepant, e.g., he is overly "cautious" or overly "risky". Knowledge of this discrepancy presumably is necessary and sufficient to induce him to change his initial choice. Another class of theories holds that merely knowing one is different from others is unimportant. Shifts in choice occur because during discussion a member is exposed to persuasive arguments which prior to discussion were not available to him. Thus, if in a factorial design one independently varied (a) the number of others' choices available for comparison and (b) the number of arguments others presented in support of these choices, interpersonal comparison theories would predict the magnitude of the shift to be a function of (a) and not of (b), while theories of persuasive argumentation would predict the opposite. When such an experiment was performed the only reliable main effects were based on the number of arguments, (b), as predicted by persuasive arguments. In no instance did effects involving (a) approach significance.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/33886/1/0000151.pd

The control-freak mind : Stereotypical biases are eliminated following conflict-activated cognitive control

Numerous daily situations require control for successful goal attainment. An important question is whether control can adjust across situations, to create control readiness from one situation to the next. Using trial to trial control adjustment paradigms, previous research generally suggested that control adjustments are domain specific. However, this research typically used neutral stimuli (e.g., single letters) devoid of personally and socially relevant goals. We propose that personal relevance may be an important modulator of control adjustment and, hence, that personally relevant control tasks can benefit from control readiness, even if it is produced by a different task. In 2 experiments we test whether control over the expression of stereotypes, a highly meaningful and desirable goal for many, can benefit from control readiness evoked by a neutral unrelated Flanker task. Results suggest that stereotype-driven behavior is modulated by independently activated control and that personal relevance may facilitate control adjustments across domains

ATTITUDES AND SOCIAL COGNITION Construal Levels and Self-Control

The authors propose that self-control involves making decisions and behaving in a manner consistent with high-level versus low-level construals of a situation. Activation of high-level construals (which capture global, superordinate, primary features of an event) should lead to greater self-control than activation of low-level construals (which capture local, subordinate, secondary features). In 6 experiments using 3 different techniques, the authors manipulated construal levels and assessed their effects on self-control and underlying psychological processes. High-level construals led to decreased preferences for immediate over delayed outcomes, greater physical endurance, stronger intentions to exert selfcontrol, and less positive evaluations of temptations that undermine self-control. These results support a construal-level analysis of self-control