Decentralisation and the Centre Right in the UK and Spain:Central Power and Regional Responsibility

The British Conservative Party and the Spanish Partido Popular have been hostile, at least at times, to devolving greater power to regions. Although both parties might be expected to support decentralisation on economically liberal grounds, in fact both have found it extremely difficult to reconcile their centre-right economic instincts with a deeply ingrained commitment to the integrity of the state. This article explores the tension in conservative and liberal ideology between supporting sub-state political responsibility through decentralisation and supporting strong central government able to take long-term (and potentially unpopular) decisions in times of economic crisis. We examine these two parties in light of Toubeau and Wagner’s (2015) framework, finding that market liberalism can be interpreted differently when it comes to decentralisation: both the Partido Popular and the Conservative Party have both at different times used economic justifications for a strong central state. The Partido Popular continues to hold a conservative view of decentralisation and the Conservatives have only recently started to link their market liberalism to a justification for decentralisation. Thus, whilst it is possible to construct a liberal economic case for devolving power away from the central state, one does not necessarily follow the other

Explaining party positions on decentralization

Debates about decentralization raise cultural questions of identity and economic questions of redistribution and efficiency. Therefore the preferences of statewide parties regarding decentralization are related to their positions on the economic and cultural ideological dimensions. A statistical analysis using data from thirty-one countries confirms this: parties on the economic right are more supportive of decentralization than parties on the economic left, while culturally liberal parties favour decentralization more than culturally conservative parties. However, country context – specifically the degree of regional self-rule, the extent of regional economic disparity and the ideology of regionalist parties – determines whether and how decentralization is linked to the two dimensions. These findings have implications for our understanding of the politics of decentralization by showing how ideology, rooted in a specific country context, shapes the ‘mindset’ of agents responsible for determining the territorial distribution of power

Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), Germany and the Transatlantic Relationship

The European Union (EU) has negotiated a comprehensive trade and investment agreement with Canada, and is currently negotiating one with the United States (US). Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), a provision in most Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and other International Investment Agreements (IIAs), gives investors the right to pursue arbitration with a state. The inclusion of this mechanism in both the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the EU and the US, and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada has caused considerable public concern. Germany, as one of the most vocal opponents to ISDS in these trade agreements, is making headlines arguing in favor of removing ISDS provisions from the agreements, threatening the continuation of the TTIP negotiations and the ratification of the CETA. Germany has a longstanding history of negotiating BITs containing ISDS. As one of the originators of the concept, it seems surprising for many viewers to see Germany now opposing investment protection. This essay will argue that Germany is seen as opposing the inclusion of ISDS in both the CETA and the TTIP primarily because it does not want it included in the TTIP with the US. Germany’s perceived opposition to ISDS in the CETA is thereby tied to the strategically more important TTIP. This essay is aimed to be part of a larger research effort designed to look at the transatlantic investment protection and ISDS debate. What are the pros and cons of investment protection? Is it a necessary component of transatlantic trade and investment agreements? Could the CETA and the TTIP play a role in setting global, more modern investment protection standards? Examining these possible factors of why the US, Canada and the EU behave the way they do with respect to this debate and casting them against some of the facts of how ISDS works and some of the rulings that have been made with respect to ISDS in the past, future research as part of an PhD hopes to contribute to the larger scholarship on foreign direct investment and the direction thereof. Any suggestions, comments and feedback with respect to either this paper or the intended future research in terms of designing a research proposal for possible PhD applications are welcome

Position, selective emphasis and framing:How parties deal with a second dimension in competition

This Special Issue aims to (1) theorise party strategies in multi-dimensional policy spaces; and (2) apply the theory to party competition in multinational democracies characterised by a salient territorial dimension alongside a more established economic dimension. The introductory article brings together recent contributions treating spatial and salience theories as compatible and policy spaces as two-dimensional to propose four party strategies that can be ranked from one- to two-dimensional competitive behaviour: uni-dimensionality, blurring, subsuming, and two- dimensionality. The remaining contributions operationalise these strategies and draw on a variety of data sources ranging from manifestos to parliamentary bill proposals and expert surveys to describe when and explore why parties use these strategies in competition, focusing on patterns of party competition in multinational democracies, selected as typical cases of multi-dimensional competition.publishe

Moving beyond the second-order election model?: Three generations of regional election research

In this introduction to the sixth annual review of regional elections we identify three generations of regional election studies that have applied the second-order election (SOE) model. First-generation literature finds that regional authority, territorial cleavages, and election (non-)simultaneity explain territorial heterogeneity in SOE-effects because they affect ‘what is at stake’ in a regional election. A ‘stake-based’ approach also underlies a second-generation literature that finds that voters with strong regional identities and who find regional government important are more likely to make distinct party choices in the regional electoral arena. Third-generation research adopts a multilevel electoral system perspective and considers the impact of political-institutional variables on the extent of horizontal and vertical top-down and bottom-up spill-over between regional and national electoral arenas. Four election articles and four election reports make important contributions to the three generations of literature and thereby reveal that these generations of regional election scholarship remain highly relevant.publishedVersio

Padania Or Federalism? An Examination Of The Spatial Demands Of Italy\u27s Northern League

This study will analyze what factors affect the oscillation of the spatial demands of ethno-regionalist parties between more moderate and more radical objectives. The factors under examination are electoral, economic, internal organization, and the other that the party defines itself against. The study analyzes the relationship between these factors and spatial demands utilizing a case study of the Lega Nord. Ultimately, the study concludes that there is some relation between these factors and the Lega Nord\u27s spatial demands, even if they are not directly causal of the change in spatial demands themselves. The findings also suggest that the generalized findings of party change may not always apply to the spatial demands of ethno-regionalist parties