Worker Discretion and Misallocation of Talent within Firms

We develop a theory of worker discretion over task choice within a firm. Increasing the workers’ discretion has a trade-off between the gains from workers using private information about their abilities, and the costs from adverse selection within the firm due to workers herding into prestigious tasks. The theory leads to the result that, in line with the Peter Principle, misallocation of talent within firms takes the form of too many workers undertaking tasks with a high return to ability. Moreover we find that the degree of misallocation of talent is decreasing in the degree of discretion given to workers.Authority, Bureaucracies, Career Concerns, Discretion, Organizational Design, Misallocation, Peter Principle, Principal-Agent Theory, Sun Hydraulics, Wage Dynamics

GIOTTO's antenna de-spin mechanism: Ots lubrication and thermal vacuum performance

Except in the near Earth phase of GIOTTO's mission to Comet Halley, the HGA (high gain antenna) on board GIOTTO was the only designed means of up/down communications. The spacecraft spin stabilization required that the HGA be despun at the same rotational rate of nominally 15 rpm in order to keep the HGA pointing accurately to a Earth. A dual servomotor despin mechanism was designed and built by SEP of France for this purpose. The expected thermal environment suggested that dry lubrication was preferable to wet for the ball bearings but there existed no relevant data on the torque noise spectrum of candidate solid lubricants. Therefore ad hoc torque noise tests were run with two solid lubricants: ion plated lead film plus lead bronze cage (retainer) and a PTFE composite cage only. The lead lubrication showed the better spectrum up to the mission lifetime point so it was selected for continued test over some 20 times the Halley mission life, with periodic torque spectrum monitoring. The spectrum remained well within the pointing error budget over the 100 million revolutions covered

Seeing Earth's Orbit in the Stars: Parallax and Aberration

During the 17th century the idea of an orbiting and rotating Earth became increasingly popular, but opponents of this view continued to point out that the theory had observable consequences that had never, in fact, been observed. Why, for instance, had astronomers failed to detect the annual parallax of the stars that must occur if Earth orbits the Sun? To address this problem, astronomers of the 17th and18th centuries sought to measure the annual parallax of stars using telescopes. None of them succeeded. Annual stellar parallax was not successfully measured until 1838, when Friedrich Bessel detected the parallax of the star 61 Cygni. But the early failures to detect annual stellar parallax led to the discovery of a new (and entirely unexpected) phenomenon: the aberration of starlight. This paper recounts the story of the discovery of stellar aberration. It is accompanied by a set of activities and computer simulations that allow students to explore this fascinating historical episode and learn important lessons about the nature of science.Comment: 10 pages, 5 figures, submitted to The Physics Teache

A Theory of Capital Structure with Strategic Defaults and Priority Violations

Why do firms delegate job design decisions to workers and what are the implications of such delegation? We develop a private-information based theory of delegation where delegation provides a more efficient allocation of talent inside the firm, but at the cost that low ability workers must be compensated to self-sort. Career concerns limit the effectiveness of delegation: when returns to ability or market observability of job content are high, the compensation needed to get low-ability workers to self-sort is high, and firms limit delegation to avoid cream-skimming of the high-ability workers. We investigate implications for how misallocation of talent within firms may occur, the optimal design of incentive contracts, and which decisions are more likely to be delegated to subordinates.Cash Diversion, Costly State Verification, Outside Equity, Financial Contracts.

Atlas of the global distribution of atmospheric heating during the global weather experiment

Global distributions of atmospheric heating for the annual cycle of the Global Weather Experiment are estimated from the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF) Level 3b data set. Distributions of monthly, seasonally, and annually averaged heating are presented for isentropic and isobaric layers within the troposphere and for the troposphere as a whole. The distributions depict a large-scale structure of atmospheric heating that appears spatially and temporally consistent with known features of the global circulation and the seasonal evolution