Theory of Mind and Non-Human Intelligence

Comparative cognition researchers have long been interested in the nature of nonhuman animal social capacities. One capacity has received prolonged attention: mindreading, or “theory of mind” as it’s also called, is often seen to be the ability to attribute mental states to others in the service of predicting and explaining behavior. This attention is garnered in no small measure from interest into what accounts for the distinctive features of human social cognition and what are the evolutionary origins of those features. This entry surveys: (1) main hypotheses concerning the adaptive value of mindreading, (2) theoretical problems complicating our ability to determine whether nonhuman animals mindread, and finally (3) proposals that mindreading is a plural rather than unitary cognitive system

Comparative psychometrics: establishing what differs is central to understanding what evolves

Cognitive abilities cannot be measured directly. What we can measure is individual variation in task performance. In this paper, we first make the case for why we should be interested in mapping individual differences in task performance on to particular cognitive abilities: we suggest that it is crucial for examining the causes and consequences of variation both within and between species. As a case study, we examine whether multiple measures of inhibitory control for non-human animals do indeed produce correlated task performance; however, no clear pattern emerges that would support the notion of a common cognitive ability underpinning individual differences in performance. We advocate a psychometric approach involving a three-step programme to make theoretical and empirical progress: first, we need tasks that reveal signature limits in performance. Second, we need to assess the reliability of individual differences in task performance. Third, multi-trait multi-method test batteries will be instrumental in validating cognitive abilities. Together, these steps will help us to establish what varies between individuals that could impact their fitness and ultimately shape the course of the evolution of animal minds. Finally, we propose executive functions, including working memory, inhibitory control and attentional shifting, as a sensible starting point for this endeavour

Inhibitory control and cue relevance modulate chimpanzees’ (Pan troglodytes) performance in a spatial foraging task

This project has received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (Grant Agreement 639072). Brandon Tinklenberg was supported by a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC 435-2016-1051).Inhibition tasks usually require subjects to exert control to act correctly when a competing action plan is prepotent. In comparative psychology, one concern about the existing inhibition tasks is that the relative contribution of inhibitory control to performance (as compared to learning or object knowledge) is rarely explicitly investigated. We addressed this problem by presenting chimpanzees with a spatial foraging task in which they could acquire food more efficiently by learning which objects were baited. In Experiment 1, we examined how objects that elicited a prepotent approach response, transparent cups containing food, affected their learning rates. Although showing an initial bias to approach these sealed cups with visible food, the chimpanzees learned to avoid them more quickly across sessions compared to a color discrimination. They also learned a color discrimination more quickly if the incorrect cups were sealed such that a piece of food could never be hidden inside them. In Experiment 2, visible food of 2 different types was sealed in the upper part of the cups: 1 type signaled the presence of food reward hidden underneath; the cups with the other type were sealed. The chimpanzees learned more quickly in a congruent condition (the to-be-chosen food cue matched the reward) than in an incongruent condition (the to-be-avoided food cue matched the reward). Together, these findings highlight that performance in inhibition tasks is affected by several other cognitive abilities such as object knowledge, memory, and learning, which need to be quantified before meaningful comparisons can be drawn.PostprintPeer reviewe

Learning from communication versus observation in great apes

This research was supported by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013)/ERC Grant 609819 (SOMICS project).When human infants are intentionally addressed by others, they tend to interpret the information communicated as being relevant to them and worth acquiring. For humans, this attribution of relevance leads to a preference to learn from communication, making it possible to accumulate knowledge over generations. Great apes are sensitive to communicative cues, but do these cues also activate an expectation of relevance? In an observational learning paradigm, we demonstrated to a sample of nonhuman great apes (bonobos, chimpanzees, orangutans; N = 24) how to operate on a food dispenser device. When apes had the opportunity to choose between an effective and an ineffective method in the baseline conditions, the majority of them chose the effective method. However, when the ineffective method was demonstrated in a communicative way, they failed to prioritize efficiency, even though they were equally attentive in both conditions. This suggests that the ostensive demonstration elicited an expectation of relevance that modified apes’ interpretation of the situation, potentially leading to a preference to learn from communication, as human children do.Publisher PDFPeer reviewe

Learning from communication versus observation in great apes

When human infants are intentionally addressed by others, they tend to interpret the information communicated as being relevant to them and worth acquiring. For humans, this attribution of relevance leads to a preference to learn from communication, making it possible to accumulate knowledge over generations. Great apes are sensitive to communicative cues, but do these cues also activate an expectation of relevance? In an observational learning paradigm, we demonstrated to a sample of nonhuman great apes (bonobos, chimpanzees, orangutans; N = 24) how to operate on a food dispenser device. When apes had the opportunity to choose between an effective and an ineffective method in the baseline conditions, the majority of them chose the effective method. However, when the ineffective method was demonstrated in a communicative way, they failed to prioritize efficiency, even though they were equally attentive in both conditions. This suggests that the ostensive demonstration elicited an expectation of relevance that modified apes’ interpretation of the situation, potentially leading to a preference to learn from communication, as human children do

Methods and results of an analysis of individual differences in comparative test batteries aiming at self-control (Amici et al., 2008; MacLean et al. 2014). from Comparative psychometrics: establishing what differs is central to understanding what evolves

Detailed description of GLMM analysis of the dataset by MacLean et al. (2014) and correlation analyses of the dataset by Amici et al. (2008)

Methods and results of an analysis of individual differences in comparative test batteries aiming at self-control (Amici et al., 2008; MacLean et al. 2014). from Comparative psychometrics: establishing what differs is central to understanding what evolves

Detailed description of GLMM analysis of the dataset by MacLean et al. (2014) and correlation analyses of the dataset by Amici et al. (2008)