Length mode piezoelectric ultrasonic transducer for inspection of solid objects

The transducer is constructed from individual transducer elements arranged in an array and configured to exhibit a predominant, longitudinal mode transversely to the array. The elements are interconnected through thin flexible sheets. Each element is individually damped, and the transducer as a whole is electrically damped through resonance with the clamped capacitance and dissipation. Electrical control permits inphase operation of all transducer elements or control with preselected phase differences

Reply to Valverde

Professor Thompson responds to Valverde\u27s argument, in the last issue, that his approach to Risk puts too much emphasis on the distinction between Risk subjectivism and Risk objectivism. In doing so, he asserts, inter alia, that anchoring Risk judgments in a probabilistic framework does not go far enough in rejecting reigning Risk-analysis notions of real Risk

Preliminary investigation of the electrodynamics of a conducting tether

An introductory study of the properties of an electrically conducting tether flown from the shuttle is presented. Only a single configuration is considered: a vertical conductor moving normally across the Earth's field, connecting the shuttle to a large conducting balloon that passively extracts electrons from the ionosphere. The distortions in the plasma at maximum current collection are described, as are the local and distant wakes. Numerical values are given

The Case for Iterative Statutory Reform: Appraisal and the Model Business Corporation Act

Appraisal may be the Model Business Corporation Act\u27s (MBCA) most distinctive and creative corporate law product in its sixty year history. Through a series of changes, beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and continuing through revisions in 1999 and 2006, the MBCA has shown the value that can come from an ongoing revision process of corporate law. Thompson examines the challenges that have long plagued appraisal statutes, and then evaluating the product that has resulted from the MBCA approach

Anti-Primacy: Sharing Power in American Corporations

Prominent theories of corporate governance frequently adopt primacy as an organizing theme. Shareholder primacy is the oldest and most used of this genre. Director primacy has grown dramatically, presenting in at least two distinct versions. A variety of alternatives have followed—primacy for CEOs, employees, creditors. All of these theories can’t be right. This article asserts that none of them are. The alternative developed here is one of shared power among the three actors named in corporations statutes with judges tasked to keep all players in the game. The debunking part of the article demonstrates how the suggested parties lack legal or economic characteristics necessary for primacy. The prescriptive part of the article suggests that we can better understand the multiple uses of primacy if we recognize that law is not prescribing first principles for governance of firms, but rather providing a structure that works given the economic and business environment in place for modern corporations where there is separation of function and efficiencies of managers as a starting point. Thus the familiar statutory language putting all power in the board must be read against the reality of the discontinuous nature of the board (and shareholder) involvement in governance. Corporate governance documents of the largest American corporations, as discussed in the article, are consistent with this reality, assigning management to officers and using verbs like oversee, review and counsel as the director functions. The last part examines dispute resolution and the role of judges in such a world, with a particular focus on the shareholder/director boundary. At this boundary there are two distinct judicial roles, the traditional role focusing on use of fiduciary duty to check conflict and other director incapacity and the less-recognized role of protecting shareholder self-help. In this more modern context shareholders, because of market and economic developments, are able to effectively participate in governance in a way that wasn’t practical three decades ago, when the key Delaware legal doctrines were taking root. What is particularly interesting here is how courts, commentators and institutional investors act in a way that is consistent with a shared approach to power, as opposed to the primacy of any of the theories initially suggested

Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance: Protecting Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell, and Sue

Thompson examines the changed roles of the state and federal governments since the enactment of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998. He notes that these changes have created a greater dependence on federal law, a greater emphasis on the voting function of shareholders, and the likelihood of additional argument over traditional corporate issues

Risk Objectivism and Risk Subjectivism: When Are Risks Real

Typically, those who discuss Risk management envision a two-step process wherein, first, Risk is more or less objectively appraised and, second, the acceptability of those Risks is subjectively evaluated. This paper questions the philosophical foundations of that approach