The Demand for High-skilled Worker and Immigration Policy

This paper provides a descriptive analysis of the demand for high-skilled workers using a new firm data set, the IZA International Employer Survey 2000. Our results suggest that while workers from EU-countries are mainly complements to domestic high-skilled workers, workers from non-EU countries are hired because of a shortage of high-skilled labour. The paper, furthermore, provides a short description of recent German policy initiatives regarding the temporary immigration of high-skilled labour. In view of our descriptive results these temporary immigration policies seem, however, to satisfy only partly the demand of firms interested in recruiting foreign high-skilled workers. A more comprehensive immigration policy covering also the permanent immigration of high-skilled workers appears to be necessary.migration, high-skilled workers, IZA employer survey

Discovering and quantifying nontrivial fixed points in multi-field models

We use the functional renormalization group and the $\epsilon$-expansion concertedly to explore multicritical universality classes for coupled $\bigoplus_i O(N_i)$ vector-field models in three Euclidean dimensions. Exploiting the complementary strengths of these two methods we show how to make progress in theories with large numbers of interactions, and a large number of possible symmetry-breaking patterns. For the three- and four-field models we find a new fixed point that arises from the mutual interaction between different field sectors, and we establish the absence of infrared-stable fixed point solutions for the regime of small $N_i$. Moreover, we explore these systems as toy models for theories that are both asymptotically safe and infrared complete. In particular, we show that these models exhibit complete renormalization group trajectories that begin and end at nontrivial fixed points.Comment: 10 pages, 6 figures; minor changes, as published in EPJ

Inequity Aversion and Individual Behavior in Public Good Games: An Experimental Investigation

We present a simple two-steps procedure for a within-subject test of the inequity aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In the first step, subjects played modified ultimatum and dictator games and were classified according to their preferences. In the second step, subjects with specific preferences according to the Fehr and Schmidt model were matched into pairs and interacted with each other in a standard public good game and a public good game with punishment possibility. Our results show that the specific composition of groups significantly influences the subjects' performance in the public good games. We identify the aversion against advantageous inequity and the information about the coplayer's type as the main influencing factors for the behavior of subjects. --individual preferences,inequity aversion,experimental economics,public goods

Hyperon forward spin polarizability gamma0 in baryon chiral perturbation theory

We present the calculation of the hyperon forward spin polarizability gamma0 using manifestly Lorentz covariant baryon chiral perturbation theory including the intermediate contribution of the spin 3/2 states. As at the considered order the extraction of gamma0 is a pure prediction of chiral perturbation theory, the obtained values are a good test for this theory. After including explicitly the decuplet states, our SU(2) results have a very good agreement with the experimental data and we extend our framework to SU(3) to give predictions to the hyperons' gamma0 values. Prominent are the Sigma^- and Xi^- baryons as their photon transition to the decuplet is forbidden in SU(3) symmetry and therefore they are not sensitive to the explicit inclusion of the decuplet in the theory

Inequity Aversion and Individual Behavior in Public Good Games: An Experimental Investigation

We present a simple two-steps procedure for a within-subject test of the inequity aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In the first step, subjects played modified ultimatum and dictator games and were classified according to their preferences. In the second step, subjects with specific preferences according to the Fehr and Schmidt model were matched into pairs and interacted with each other in a standard public good game and a public good game with punishment possibility. Our results show that the specific composition of groups significantly influences the subjects' performance in the public good games. We identify the aversion against advantageous inequity and the information about the coplayer's type as the main influencing factors for the behavior of subjects. --individual preferences,inequity aversion,experimental economics,public goods