Behavioral Effects of Probation Periods: An Analysis of Worker Absenteeism

The theoretical probation literature shows that individuals have incentives to mimick "good workers" during periods of employment probation. This study empirically tests at the example of absence behavior, whether such behavioral responses to the incentives of probation periods exist. We find significant responses of white collar employees and public sector workers to probation periods: Once individuals enter into regular employment and employment probation is completed, the probability of work absences takes discrete jumps and is significantly above previous levels

Report No. 2: Schaffung von Arbeitsplätzen für Geringqualifizierte

Gutachterliche Stellungnahme im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums für Arbeit und Sozialordnung, Bonn 1999 (97 Seiten).

Brownian bridges to submanifolds

We introduce and study Brownian bridges to submanifolds. Our method involves proving a general formula for the integral over a submanifold of the minimal heat kernel on a complete Riemannian manifold. We use the formula to derive lower bounds, an asymptotic relation and derivative estimates. We also see a connection to hypersurface local time. This work is motivated by the desire to extend the analysis of path and loop spaces to measures on paths which terminate on a submanifold

The role of Pd over layer thickness on PLD YBCO coated conductor properties

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Behavioral Effects of Probation Periods: An Analysis of Worker Absenteeism

This is the first study to provide robust empirical foundations to a theoretical literature which so far had to assume behavioral adjustments in response to probation periods. Probation periods typically precede regular employment contracts and are commonly interpreted as a screening device for employers. During probation employees have an incentive to behave according to the expectations of employers, because in this time they can easily be laid off. Also, salaries are frequently renegotiated after probation periods. Thus it is hypothesized that "bad" workers attempt to mimick "good" workers during probation. The incentive for such mimicking behavior disappears as soon as the probation period terminates and the formal employment contract is signed. At the example of absenteeism we evaluate whether behaviors change after the end of the probation period. We investigate a sample of newly hired employees and find large jumps in the predicted probability of absences after probation periods are completed. For white collar and public sector employees this is confirmed in the coefficient estimates, and for public sector employees the predicted probability of a work absence is even significantly higher after the probation period is completed. These results confirm the hypothesis of behavioral effects of probation periods and are robust to various changes in estimation methods.Probation, moral hazard, absenteeism