TOI-431/HIP 26013: a super-Earth and a sub-Neptune transiting a bright, early K dwarf, with a third RV planet

Stars and planetary system

TOI-431/HIP 26013: A super-Earth and a sub-Neptune transiting a bright, early K dwarf, with a third RV planet

We present the bright (Vmag = 9.12), multiplanet system TOI-431, characterized with photometry and radial velocities (RVs). We estimate the stellar rotation period to be 30.5 ± 0.7 d using archival photometry and RVs. Transiting Exoplanet Survey Satellite (TESS) objects of Interest (TOI)-431 b is a super-Earth with a period of 0.49 d, a radius of 1.28 ± 0.04 R, a mass of 3.07 ± 0.35 M, and a density of 8.0 ± 1.0 g cm-3; TOI-431 d is a sub-Neptune with a period of 12.46 d, a radius of 3.29 ± 0.09 R, a mass of 9.90+1.53-1.49 M, and a density of 1.36 ± 0.25 g cm-3. We find a third planet, TOI-431 c, in the High Accuracy Radial velocity Planet Searcher RV data, but it is not seen to transit in the TESS light curves. It has an Msin i of 2.83+0.41-0.34 M, and a period of 4.85 d. TOI-431 d likely has an extended atmosphere and is one of the most well-suited TESS discoveries for atmospheric characterization, while the super-Earth TOI-431 b may be a stripped core. These planets straddle the radius gap, presenting an interesting case-study for atmospheric evolution, and TOI-431 b is a prime TESS discovery for the study of rocky planet phase curves

Lobbying and regulation in a political economy: Evidence from the U.S. cellular industry

In this paper we empirically test the simultaneity between the effects and the determinants of price regulation in the U.S. mobile telecommunications industry. We find that the regulatory regime is endogenous to firms pricing strategies. Because of lobbying successfulness, firms avoided regulation in those markets where it would have been more effective. Therefore, regulation did not significantly reduce cellular tariffs in regulated markets but it would have decreased them if adopted in non-regulated ones. Also, we provide evidence that the choice of the regulatory regime strongly depends on the political as well as regulatory environments. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005