The Search for Resolution of the Canada-France Ocean Dispute Adjacent to St. Pierre and Miquelon

They were not to become an object of jealously according to the British and French in 1783. True to this admonition, the French islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon have remained as the uncontested footnotes to France\u27s colonial presence in North America. However, the ocean area and resources adjacent to the French islands became the object of intense jealously, being the centre of a thorny, 25 year international dispute between Canada and France

The Consolidated Treaty Series, 1648-1918

The Consolidated Treaty Series was a twelve year publishing project undertaken by the distinguished Cambridge international law professor Dr. Clive Parry. The treaty series contains reprints and translations of over 10,000 treaties signed between 1648, the establishment of the modem European state system, and 1919 when the League of Nations Treaty Series, the first official international collection, commenced publication. Each treaty is reproduced in its original language accompanied by French or English translations where such exist. Where a translation does not exist a summary of the contents of the treaty is included. Most importantly the source from which the treaty was obtained is noted, as are alternative sources for the text. Many of the treaties are printed in German, Dutch, Latin and Spanish and where translations into French or English do not exist a translation is provided only when the treaty is of primary importance

Regional Port State Control Agreements: Some Issues Of International Law

The primary characterization of the relationship of ports both international and domestic is that of competition. Ports vigorously compete in terms of costs and services for international shipping business whether that business be container vessels, bulk carriers or cruise ships. The great ports of the world, for example, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Rotterdam, have competitive advantages compared with lesser ports because of geography and history. Nevertheless, these great ports, like others, are alert to competition and the need to acquire and retain vessel traffic. Until recently, ports were inclined to treat vessel safety and vessel environmental standards in the same competitive mode. In most of the world, competition between ports of different countries operated to ensure that a country did not adopt port laws unfavorable to vessel traffic. Strict environmental requirements and safety standards applied to visiting vessels could increase the cost of transportation and make a port less competitive. Moreover, the shipping industry argued that host states applying differing local standards would create a checker-board of regulations that would increase compliance costs unreasonably and inhibit ocean trade. While certain states, such as the United States, because of its unique geographical, economic and political situation, could unilaterally apply strict port laws, other countries feared that adoption of strict port laws would have the significant economic repercussions suggested by the shipping industry. However, the increasing concern about sub-standard vessels plying the oceans of the world-by the public, as a result of publicity surrounding oil tanker disasters such as the Exxon Valdez; by the shipping industry, because of their poor public image; and by governments, in response to the public and industry-created a demand for a cooperative or regional approach to encourage port states to enhance enforcement of marine pollution and vessel safety laws against visiting vessels. This demand has been responded to with the adoption of regional arrangements for port state control. The first regional arrangement for port states was created in Europe through the 1982 Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control in Implementing Agreements on Maritime Safety and Protection of the Marine Environment, known as the Paris Port State Control MOU. This was followed by the 1992 Latin American Agreement on Port State Control, then came the 1993 Tokyo Port State Control MOU, the 1996 Caribbean Port State Control MOU, and the 1997 MOU on Port State Control in the Mediterranean Region. Most recently, there is the Port State Control MOU for the Indian Ocean and East Africa and the West and Central African MOU. Preparations are being made for a port state control MOU for the Persian Gulf. All the regional port state control arrangements are substantively similar and follow the model of the 1982 Paris Port State Control MOU. For example, all the port state control MOUs contain wording in the preamble which indicates the need for a regional approach to prevent the operation of substandard ships in order to avoid distorting competition between ports. All the regional port state control MOUs encourage the appropriate national port authorities to inspect visiting vessels to ensure that those vessels have been constructed, are equipped, crewed and operated in compliance with the standards set by the relevant international treaties. Where vessels are detected as not being in compliance with the standard setting conventions, the host state may prevent the offending vessel from leaving until the defects have been remedied. The hope is that as more countries and regions adopt port state control, enforcement of international vessel standards will be enhanced and vessel-owners will undertake to comply with the standards voluntarily rather than risk detection of substandard vessels and face potential delays and penalties. The wide-scale adoption of port state control is an attempt to develop an exception to the competitive relationship of ports within the same region. Port state control has as its foundation and operational ethic cooperation amongst regional ports. That cooperation has as its goals safer ships and cleaner seas, and is built upon the view that the goals can only be accomplished if all the regional ports apply and enforce the same rules in a similar manner to visiting vessels. Where the ports cooperate by agreeing to apply the same rules in a similar manner, then no single port seeks or acquires competitive advantage by offering to overlook sub-standard vessels. The focus of this contribution is upon three international law questions that arise regarding port state control: 1) What is the international legal foundation of port state control?; 2) What are the international treaties that regional port state control authorities apply to visiting vessels and does international law place any limits on the law that a port state can apply to a visiting vessel?; and 3) What are the international legal principles applicable to a port state respecting the controlling of vessel access to or the departure from ports

Will Canada Ratify the Law of the Sea Convention

In this Article, Professor McDorman discusses the fact that five years after the completion of the Law of the Sea Convention, Canada has not yet ratified the convention nor has it offered hints as to whether it will ratify the Convention. The author contrasts this stance with the fact that that Canada was a signatory, is one of its major beneficiaries, and that many of its high ranking officials expressed praise for the final document. Moreover, Canada has extensive economic interests in the ocean. The question of Canadian ratification of the LOS Convention is addressed from three perspectives: as a question of oceans policy; of economic policy; and of foreign policy. The perspective which is dominant at the time of the decision on the Treaty is made will determine the outcome of whether Canada ratifies the Convention

Regional Port State Control Agreements: Some Issues Of International Law

The primary characterization of the relationship of ports both international and domestic is that of competition. Ports vigorously compete in terms of costs and services for international shipping business whether that business be container vessels, bulk carriers or cruise ships. The great ports of the world, for example, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Rotterdam, have competitive advantages compared with lesser ports because of geography and history. Nevertheless, these great ports, like others, are alert to competition and the need to acquire and retain vessel traffic. Until recently, ports were inclined to treat vessel safety and vessel environmental standards in the same competitive mode. In most of the world, competition between ports of different countries operated to ensure that a country did not adopt port laws unfavorable to vessel traffic. Strict environmental requirements and safety standards applied to visiting vessels could increase the cost of transportation and make a port less competitive. Moreover, the shipping industry argued that host states applying differing local standards would create a checker-board of regulations that would increase compliance costs unreasonably and inhibit ocean trade. While certain states, such as the United States, because of its unique geographical, economic and political situation, could unilaterally apply strict port laws, other countries feared that adoption of strict port laws would have the significant economic repercussions suggested by the shipping industry. However, the increasing concern about sub-standard vessels plying the oceans of the world-by the public, as a result of publicity surrounding oil tanker disasters such as the Exxon Valdez; by the shipping industry, because of their poor public image; and by governments, in response to the public and industry-created a demand for a cooperative or regional approach to encourage port states to enhance enforcement of marine pollution and vessel safety laws against visiting vessels. This demand has been responded to with the adoption of regional arrangements for port state control. The first regional arrangement for port states was created in Europe through the 1982 Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control in Implementing Agreements on Maritime Safety and Protection of the Marine Environment, known as the Paris Port State Control MOU. This was followed by the 1992 Latin American Agreement on Port State Control, then came the 1993 Tokyo Port State Control MOU, the 1996 Caribbean Port State Control MOU, and the 1997 MOU on Port State Control in the Mediterranean Region. Most recently, there is the Port State Control MOU for the Indian Ocean and East Africa and the West and Central African MOU. Preparations are being made for a port state control MOU for the Persian Gulf. All the regional port state control arrangements are substantively similar and follow the model of the 1982 Paris Port State Control MOU. For example, all the port state control MOUs contain wording in the preamble which indicates the need for a regional approach to prevent the operation of substandard ships in order to avoid distorting competition between ports. All the regional port state control MOUs encourage the appropriate national port authorities to inspect visiting vessels to ensure that those vessels have been constructed, are equipped, crewed and operated in compliance with the standards set by the relevant international treaties. Where vessels are detected as not being in compliance with the standard setting conventions, the host state may prevent the offending vessel from leaving until the defects have been remedied. The hope is that as more countries and regions adopt port state control, enforcement of international vessel standards will be enhanced and vessel-owners will undertake to comply with the standards voluntarily rather than risk detection of substandard vessels and face potential delays and penalties. The wide-scale adoption of port state control is an attempt to develop an exception to the competitive relationship of ports within the same region. Port state control has as its foundation and operational ethic cooperation amongst regional ports. That cooperation has as its goals safer ships and cleaner seas, and is built upon the view that the goals can only be accomplished if all the regional ports apply and enforce the same rules in a similar manner to visiting vessels. Where the ports cooperate by agreeing to apply the same rules in a similar manner, then no single port seeks or acquires competitive advantage by offering to overlook sub-standard vessels. The focus of this contribution is upon three international law questions that arise regarding port state control: 1) What is the international legal foundation of port state control?; 2) What are the international treaties that regional port state control authorities apply to visiting vessels and does international law place any limits on the law that a port state can apply to a visiting vessel?; and 3) What are the international legal principles applicable to a port state respecting the controlling of vessel access to or the departure from ports

In the Wake of the « Polar Sea »: Canadian Jurisdiction and the Northwest Passage

A l'été de 1985, la traversée du Passage du nord-ouest par le brise-glace américain Polar Sea retint substantiellement l'attention du Gouvernement et des médias au Canada. Bien que les États-Unis n'aient pas eu alors pour but de mettre en question la juridiction du Canada sur les eaux du Passage du nord-ouest, le Canada fut néanmoins obligé de réévaluer sa position quant au statut juridique des eaux internationales de même que la nature imprécise de ses prétentions sur certaines d'entre elles. L'article qui suit examine certaines questions, juridiques et extrajuridiques, soulevées par le voyage du Polar Sea. Il s'intéresse spécialement à la position prise par le Gouvernement canadien à cette occasion. L'attachement à la liberté de naviguer fit prendre aux Américains une attitude qui rendit difficile la riposte canadienne. Les mesures que prit le Canada, à savoir le tracé de lignes de base droites et l'annonce de la construction d'un nouveau brise-glace, furent minutieusement pesées afin qu'elles n'amènent pas les États-Unis à contester directement les prétentions canadiennes tout en ayant pour effet de rendre plus crédible l'affirmation voulant que les eaux du Passage du nord-ouest soient des eaux intérieures canadiennes dans lesquelles un bateau étranger ne peut naviguer sans permission