Sparkling & Bright

[First Solo]Sparkling and bright, in liquid light,Does the wine our goblets gleam in,With hue as red, as the rosy bed, Which a bee would choose to dream in. [Refrain-sung twice in a row][Primo, Secondo, Bass]Then drink to the night with hearts as light,To love as gay and fleeting,As bubbles that swim, on the beaker\u27s brim,And break on the lips while meeting. [Second Solo]Oh! if mirth might arrest the flightOf time, through lifes dominions, We here awhile, would now beguileThe grey beard of his pinions.Then drink to night &c. [Refrain] [Third Solo]But since delight can\u27t stop the wight,Nor found regret delay him,Nor love himself, can hold the elfNor sober friendship stay him.Then drink to night &c. [Refrain

Do Labor Markets Provide Enough Short Hour Jobs? An Analysis of Work Hours and Work Incentives

This paper examines the role that work incentives play in the determination of work hours. Following previous research by Lang (1989), we use a conventional efficiency wage model to analyze how firms respond to worker preferences regarding wage-hours packages. We find that when workers are homogeneous, the role of worker preferences in determining work hours is similar to the simple neoclassical model of labor supply. For instance, if worker preferences shift in favor of shorter hours, firms will respond by offering jobs entailing shorter hours. When workers have heterogeneous preferences, however, employers will want to use a worker's hours preferences as a signal for the responsiveness of the worker to the work incentives used by the firm, and workers in turn may not reveal their hours preferences. Our key finding in this instance is that the labor market equilibrium may be characterized by a sub-optimal number of short-hour jobs. This shortage of short-hour jobs is likely to be found in high wage labor markets.

"When Knowledge is an Asset: Explaining the Organizational Structure of Large Law Firms"

We study the economics of employment relationships through theoretical and empirical analyses of an unusual set of firms, large law firms. Our point of departure is the "property rights" approach that emphasizes the centrality of ownership's legal rights to control important, nonhuman assets of the enterprise. From this perspective, large law firms are an interesting and potentially important object of study, because the most valuable assets of these firms take the form of knowledge--particularly knowledge of the needs and interests of clients. We argue that the two most distinctive organizational features of large law firms, the use of "up or out" promotion contests and the practice of having winners become residual claimants in the firm, emerge naturally in this setting. In addition to explaining otherwise anomalous features of the up-or-out partnership system, this paper suggests a general framework for analyzing organizations where assets reside in the brains of employees.

Extrinsic Rewards and Intrinsic Motives: Standard and Behavioral Approaches to Agency and Labor Markets

Employers structure pay and employment relationships to mitigate agency problems. A large literature in economics documents how the resolution of these problems shapes personnel policies and labor markets. For the most part, the study of agency in employment relationships relies on highly stylized assumptions regarding human motivation, e.g., that employees seek to earn as much money as possible with minimal effort. In this essay, we explore the consequences of introducing behavioral complexity and realism into models of agency within organizations. Specifically, we assess the insights gained by allowing employees to be guided by such motivations as the desire to compare favorably to others, the aspiration to contribute to intrinsically worthwhile goals, and the inclination to reciprocate generosity or exact retribution for perceived wrongs. More provocatively, from the standpoint of standard economics, we also consider the possibility that people are driven, in ways that may be opaque even to themselves, by the desire to earn social esteem or to shape and reinforce identity.agency, motivation, employment relationships, behavioral economics

When Knowledge is an Asset: Explaining the Organizational Structure of Large Law Firms

We study the economics of employment relationships through theoretical and empirical analysis of an unusual set of firms, large law firms. Our point of departure is the "property rights" approach that emphasizes the centrality of ownership's legal rights to control important, non-human assets of the enterprise. From this perspective, large law firms are an interesting and potentially important object of study because the most valuable assets of these firms take the form of knowledge - particularly knowledge of the needs and interests of clients. We argue that the two most distinctive organizational features of large law firms, the use of "up or out" promotion contests and the practice of having winners become residual claimants in the firm, emerge naturally in this setting. In addition to explaining otherwise anomalous features of the up-or-out partnership system, this paper suggests a general framework for analyzing organizations where assets reside in the brains of employees.

Matter in transition

We explore a novel type of transition in certain 6D and 4D quantum field theories, in which the matter content of the theory changes while the gauge group and other parts of the spectrum remain invariant. Such transitions can occur, for example, for SU(6) and SU(7) gauge groups, where matter fields in a three-index antisymmetric representation and the fundamental representation are exchanged in the transition for matter in the two-index antisymmetric representation. These matter transitions are realized by passing through superconformal theories at the transition point. We explore these transitions in dual F-theory and heterotic descriptions, where a number of novel features arise. For example, in the heterotic description the relevant 6D SU(7) theories are described by bundles on K3 surfaces where the geometry of the K3 is constrained in addition to the bundle structure. On the F-theory side, non-standard representations such as the three-index antisymmetric representation of SU(N) require Weierstrass models that cannot be realized from the standard SU(N) Tate form. We also briefly describe some other situations, with groups such as Sp(3), SO(12), and SU(3), where analogous matter transitions can occur between different representations. For SU(3), in particular, we find a matter transition between adjoint matter and matter in the symmetric representation, giving an explicit Weierstrass model for the F-theory description of the symmetric representation that complements another recent analogous construction.Comment: 107 pages, 3 figures, 32 tables. In version 2, one figure and comments added on the geometry of matter transition

Husband and Wife-Consortium Right of Action in Wife for Negligent Injury to Husband

Where the loss of her husband\u27s consortium is the result of personal injuries caused by the mere negligence of a third person, the wife has no cause of action; she did not have such right at common law and no legislation has been enacted to give her this right. Nevertheless, at the same time that this right is denied to the wife, her husband has a cause of action under identical circumstances. In such a case, the gist of the action is the loss of his wife\u27s services, and the right has not been affected by legislation which has abrogated the common law disabilities of the wife

The Effects of Extreme Media on Political Behavior, Attitudes, and Media Selection

This dissertation examines the role of extreme media (i.e. political talk radio and cable news opinion shows) on the political attitudes of viewers and listeners. I investigate whether extreme media has both positive and negative externalities for democratic citizenship. Specifically, I use laboratory experiments, national survey data, and qualitative interviews to test the impact of extreme media on viewers\u27 political knowledge, trust in government, efficacy, and political tolerance. I use laboratory experiments in controlled settings to uncover the impact of viewership on political knowledge, trust in government, and efficacy. I confirm these lab findings with the national survey data, by using propensity score matching and ordered probit models to demonstrate that exposure to extreme media produces political knowledge and efficacy, but decreases trust in government. I further use process tracing to ascertain the motivations individuals use to choose to view extreme media. Finally, through subject interviews conducted as part of the self-selection portion via a 1 x 3 self-selection experiment, I find subjects seek out entertaining media specifically from ideologically similar outlets. This project advances the media and politics literature by demonstrating the capacity for extreme media to alter political behavior, attitudes, and information processing

Incentives in HMOs

We study the effect of physician incentives in an HMO network. Physician incentives are controversial because they may induce doctors to make treatment decisions that differ from those they would chose in the absence of incentives. We set out a theoretical framework for assessing the degree to which incentive contracts do in fact induce physicians to deviate from a standard guided only by patient interests and professional medical judgement. Our empirical evaluation of the model relies on details of the HMO's incentive contracts and access to the firm's internal expenditure records. We estimate that the HMO's incentive contract provides a typical physician an increase, at the margin, of $0.10 in income for each$1.00 reduction in medical utilization expenditures. The average response is a 5 percent reduction in medical expenditures. We also find suggestive evidence that financial incentives linked to commonly used quality measures may stimulate an improvement in measured quality.